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This Supplement consists of a VERBATIM Report, specially drawn up for "India," of the Debates on Indian subjects in both Houses of Parliament, and questions put on such subjects and the answers given to them, arranged chronologically, from June 29th to July 24th.

Imperial Parliament.

June 29th.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

MUSSULMAN LAW IN INDIA.

Lord STANLEY OF ALDERLEY rose to ask whether the Secretara of State for India was aware of the alarm prevailing among the Mussulman subjects of her Majesty in India, owing to a recent decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Abdul Faiz Mahomed Ishak and others *versus* Russomoy Dhar Chowdry and others, the effect of which was to abrogate an important branch of the Mussulman law—namely, that relating to family vakfs, or the law relating to the creation of benefactions for the endower's family, with the reversion for the general poor; whether it was not the fact that the full enjoyment of their law and religious usages and institutions, so far as they did not conflict with any statutory enactment, has been guaranteed to the Indian Mussulmans by her Majesty's Proclamation. The law in question related to one of their most cherished institutions, upon which depended the prosperity of their principal families, which had rendered important services to the State in times of danger; whether it was not the fact that numerous memorials had been presented to the Indian Government against this judicial decision; and whether they have not prayed for a declaratory Act declaring the validity of the law which had been held to be invalid; and what steps the Government propose to take to redress the wrongs inflicted by this decision of the Privy Council. The noble lord said that he regretted having to differ from the opinions of the noble lord (Lord Hobhouse), and he regretted having been told by him that he thought this question of vakfs was dead, since it was as lively as ever, and the noble lord might have remembered that "the evil that men do lives after them." The notice on the Minutes had been prepared about last July, at which time memorials against the Privy Council judgment had been sent in to the Indian Government. This notice had been put on the Minutes in August and September last, so that there had been ample time for obtaining some of these memorials. He would, perhaps, be told that no memorials had been received at the India Office. This was most likely, if they had not been asked for, and after the notice last September, they ought to have been asked for; and the Indian Office ought to be ready with an answer to the question as to these memorials. The Mussulmans, however, were not the only persons aggrieved by the attitude recently taken by the Indian Administration, with regard to family settlements. The Hindus also had reason to complain of a decision in what was called the Tazore case. He had always felt the highest respect for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and he voted against his inclination and against a Resolution moved in 1872 by the late Earl Stanhope, and supported by the noble Marquess now at the head of the Government, on the occasion of the appointment of the late Sir Robert Collier to a seat on that Bench, because of the high opinion that was entertained at the time of the judicial capacity of that learned gentleman. He did not remember ever having read or heard of anything to diminish the judicial reputation of Sir Robert Collier during all the time that he sat in the Privy Council. During that debate in 1872 the noble marquess (the Prime Minister) had blamed the parsimony of Mr. Gladstone's Government, which had given too low a salary for the Privy Council Judgships, and if the salaries then fixed were still insufficient, he hoped her Majesty's Government would make them such as to secure a first-rate man for the next appointment to the Judicial Committee. He could not help thinking that the decision of the Privy Council, to which he was now calling attention, was likely to jeopardise the reputation of the Judicial Committee. Some decisions might err from the judges not being sufficiently informed on the subject before them, but in this case the decision quoted several very good authorities, but only for the purpose of disregarding them. Syed Amir Aly was an authority before he became a High Court judge at Calcutta. The judgment quoted from him frequently, and its reasons for differing with him were, to say the least, extraordinary. The judgment said: "The opinion of that learned Muhammadan lawyer is founded, as their lordships understand it, upon texts of an abstract character, and upon precedents very imperfectly stated. For instance, he quotes a precept of the Prophet Muhammed himself, to the effect that 'A pious offering to one's family to provide against their getting into want is more pious than giving alms to beggars.'" Further on the judgment said: "These precepts may be excellent in their proper application. They may, for ought their lordships know, have had their effect in moulding the law and practice of vakf as the learned judge says they have." This last sentence ought to have run as follows: "These precepts, as their lordships very well knew, had moulded the law and practice of vakf." This point, as to which the Court professed ignorance, was proved by language. The judgment used the word "Muhammadan" instead of "Mussulman" as to communities. He did not complain of this, since it was an ordinary English phrase; but, as a matter of fact, the adjective "Muhammadan" was never used in any Mussulman country or language except with reference to and to describe the law founded by the Prophet, which was named "Sheriat i Muhammadiyeh," so that Muhammadan law was correct, and a Muhammadan community an incorrect expression. Besides the precepts quoted by Syed Amir Aly, other sayings of the Prophet showed that he recommended charity to the family and dependents of a man in preference to more distant poor. Abu Hurairah said a man came to his Highness (to ask about alms and charity) and said, "I have got one dinar," he said, "expend it upon your-

self"; the man said, "I have got another dinar," the Prophet said, "expend that upon your children." The man said "I have got another dinar." He said, "expend that upon your relations, your women, father and mother." He said, "I have got another dinar." The Prophet said, "expend that upon your servants." The man said, "I have got another dinar." He said, "you know best the condition of the person most worthy of it, and whoever you know to be so give it." (Mishcat ul Musabih, Calcutta, 1809. Vol. I., p. 455). This judgment of the Judicial Committee appeared to have gone wrong, because it failed to be distinguished between gifts and vakfs. Gifts in perpetuity, it said were forbidden by Mussulman law: this is true; but the essence of vakf was its perpetuity. The judgment quoted an opinion of Mr. Justice Farran which showed this: That judge had described a settlement as "a perpetuity of the worst kind which would be invalid on that ground unless it can be supported as an okfnameh." The Privy Council judgment was very near arriving at a correct interpretation and decision when it declared:—"Whether it is to be taken that the very same dispositions, which are illegal when made by ordinary words or gift, become legal if only the settler says that they are made as vakf, in the name of God, or for the sake of the poor. To these questions no answer was given or attempted, nor can their lordships see any." They ought to have seen the answer for the judgment mentioned in the law book "Hidaye." This book was translated and published by order of the Bengal Government in 1791, and a new edition of it was published in 1870. This authority said (p. 234);—"An appropriation (or vakf) is not complete according to Hanifa, unless the appropriation) destine its ultimate application to objects not liable to become extinct; as when for instance a man destines its application ultimately to the use of the poor (by saying I appropriate this to such a person, and after him to the poor), because these never become extinct." So that when the judgment said, "Their lordships agree that the poor have been put into this settlement merely to give it a colour of piety, and so to legalise arrangements meant to serve for the aggrandisement of a family," their lordships appeared to have been ignorant of what was laid down in a law-book that was one of the best known in India, and to have imputed to the settlers as a colourable regard for the poor what was in fact a legal technicality. Whatever fault might be found with this judgment, the merit of great candour must be conceded to it. It stated that this Board in Assun Ullah's case adopted the view of Mr. Justice Kemp to the effect that provision for the family out of the grantor's property might be consistent with the gift of it as vakf. It also cited the judicial opinion of Mr. Justice Amir Aly in Bikani Min's case, a dictum of Sir Raymond West in the Bombay High Court, and a decision of Mr. Justice Farran in the same Court—all these contrary to this judgment. Mention had often been made of those who were *Plus Royalistes que le Roi*. In this case the India Office appeared to pose as a more strenuous supporter of Mussulman law than the Indian Mussulmans or the Turks of Constantinople, by denying the legality of such vakfs. The last time he was at Constantinople, which was six or seven years ago, before these cases had arisen in India, he had heard of similar vakfs, or family appropriations in Constantinople, and a few days ago he met a Turkish diplomatic agent who had confirmed the existence of many such vakfs at Constantinople. Some writers said that Mussulman law was not sufficiently elastic, and that it was only suited to primitive communities. The Indian Administration and the Privy Council Judges were in these cases endeavouring to deprive that law of the elasticity it did possess; and with regard to the latter accusation, all the practices of the Liverpool Produce Exchange were forbidden in Mishcat al Musabih. He had lately read a French historian's comment on judicial decisions during the reigns of the Stuarts, and their base subservience to the Government. He thought that a future historian reading the Privy Council judgment and the communication he had received from the India Office would infer similar pliancy on this occasion. For his own part he would be more inclined to impute obstinacy than pliancy to the noble lord who had delivered the judgment. But whether the legal or executive officials in India were at fault in this matter, it would be easy to remedy it, if the Secretary of State would order a Declaratory Act to be passed in the sense petitioned for in some of the memorials. He thought he had shown that the judgment of the Judicial Committee was not in accordance with Mussulman law, neither was it in accordance with Christian law. When their lordships so lightly dismissed the precepts quoted by Mr. Justice Amir Aly, they might have remembered that there was not much difference between them and the eighth verse of the fifth chapter of the 1st Epistle of Paul to Timothy. "But if any provide not for his own and especially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith and is worse than an infidel." Perhaps, as St. Paul lived 600 years earlier, the Privy Council judges who thought the precepts of the Prophet too old, would think still less of St. Paul's precept. A case had, however, been decided this year in one of her Majesty's Law Courts in London, by which a will leaving some thirteen thousand pounds to the poor had been upset. It was true that this was due to a technicality, but the satisfaction with the decision had been general, because the testator had left five relations unprovided for, one of whom was in the workhouse, and two others on the verge of it. He now came to the last two paragraphs of the Notice—questions addressed to the Under Secretary for India, as to what steps the Government of India would take. A correspondence had been going on in the *Moslem Chronicle* of Calcutta showing the interest taken in this question. A pleader, Mehmed Mustafa Khan, had written a letter, dated May 11th, from the Vakil's Library, High Court, in the *Chronicle* of May 23rd last. This letter repudiated the views urged in another letter of Mr. Iradut Ullah in the *Chronicle* of May 9th. After pointing out that for a Mussulman to propose to repeal divine law by human legislation would be apostacy, he ended his letter in the following words, and he entreated the noble earl to give his attention to them: "The vakf question, however, stands on a different footing, and its administration by our Courts has, to a great extent, certainly been unsatisfactory. Even here our Courts profess to expound the Muhammadan law, but we say 'No,' this is not our law, and we have now appealed to the Government to put our Courts right by legislation. But the difference in the two legislations proposed is that, while in the vakf question we want an Act confirming the Muhammadan law disturbed by our Courts, Mr. Iradut Ullah wants an Act disturbing Muhammadan law heretofore rightly administered." These few words summed up the whole question. It would be preposterous if the answer were that the India Office could not interfere, after the Secretary of State had interfered with the Government of India in an unprecedented manner by a Mandate to alter the cotton duties, in order to redeem the electioneering pledges which he had incautiously given to Lancashire.

The Earl of Onslow: It is the fact that full enjoyment of their law and religious usages and institutions has been guaranteed to the Mussulman population of India by her Majesty's Proclamation; but the case to which the noble lord has called attention was decided by the Privy Council strictly in accordance with the Mussulman law. It was a case in which a remainder to the poor was inserted merely for the purpose of perpetuating a bequest to the family of a testator, and in accordance with the Mussulman law it was held by the Privy Council not to be valid. The noble lord asks whether it is not the fact that numerous memorials have been presented against this decision. The India Office is not aware that any memorials have been presented, and it is quite certain that they were not numerous. It may be that the parties in this case may have presented a memorial, but no others are known of. The Government of India does not propose to take any steps to redress the wrongs which the noble lord imagines to have been inflicted by the decision, and if any representation is made on the subject it should be to the local government, who will be able to introduce legislation.

The Lord Chancellor: My lords, I cannot allow this occasion to pass without entering a protest against the precedent set by the noble lord. It is quite within his right, if he thinks proper, to ask her Majesty's Government whether they mean to alter the law; but to argue a judgment of the Privy Council—a matter over which I may point out, your lordships have no jurisdiction at all—and to use such language as the noble lord has thought it right to use—namely, that the judges have altered the law, and that wrongs have been inflicted by their decision—appears to me neither a decorous treatment of the highest legal tribunal of the land nor a very desirable precedent to set; and, further, it is not calculated, I think, to add to the dignity and impressions which the judgments of the Privy Council make in those places where observations such as those of the noble lord are likely to do more mischief than good. (Hear, hear.) The noble lord must assume that this is the law,

because when once a decision has been given by the highest Court of Appeal it becomes the law of the land. Therefore, the noble lord's course should be to alter the law and not to make observations on the character of a judgment which may do no little harm in the country affected. (Hear, hear.) I want to say this, further, that when the noble lord examines the judgment and comments upon it and reasons with it he is in this difficulty. I am making this protest because I was not a party to this judgment. If I had been I should have refused to have said a word, and I do not suppose that any one of the learned judges sitting in this House who were parties to that judgment would condescend to argue with the noble lord whether their judgment was right or wrong after they had once delivered it. (Hear, hear.) They would tell the noble lord to look at the judgment and read it and—may I add?—understand it—(laughter and cheers)—before he comments upon it.

Lord STANLEY of ALDERLEY said he understood the noble and learned lord to say that the Privy Council made the law. For that reason it was justifiable to ask that her Majesty's Government should alter it.

INDIAN DESPATCHES.

Lord REAY asked the Under-Secretary of State for India whether he would lay on the Table of the House a return of opinions and reasons entered in the minutes of the proceedings of the Secretary of State in Council with reference to the despatch of April 2, 1896, to the Government of India, leaving to their operation Acts 2 and 3 of 1896, on the subject of the Indian Tariff Act and the cotton duties; a similar return with reference to the expenses of troops to be despatched to Africa in aid of the Egyptian troops; and the despatches from the Government of India on the liability of India to defray the cost.

The Earl of ONSLOW said that there would be no objection to laying the first two papers to which the question of the noble lord referred upon the Table if he would move for them. The third paper would be presented to both Houses in due course by command, and therefore there was no necessity for the noble lord to move for its production.

Lord REAY moved that the first two papers should be laid upon the Table.

The motion was agreed to.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

PAPERS PRESENTED.

East India (Loans raised in India), Return of all Loans raised in India, chargeable on the Revenues of India, outstanding at the commencement of the half-year ended on the 31st March, 1896, etc., [by Act]; to be printed [No 257].

East India (Kafiristan)—Return [presented 26th June] to be printed. [No. 262.]

East India (Siam and the Upper Mekong),—Return [presented 26th June] to be printed. [No. 263.]

INDIAN TROOPS AND MASHONALAND.

Sir ELLIS ASHMEAD-BARTLETT asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether her Majesty's Government would, in view of the critical position of British Colonists in Mashonaland, send a force of her Majesty's Indian Army to their relief *viâ* Beira.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: If more troops are required for the suppression of the rebellion I am advised that it will be undesirable to employ Indian regiments, as this would be accepted by the natives as a confession of weakness on the part of the whites. General Goodenough and Sir F. Carrington have been informed that her Majesty's Government are prepared to send any reinforcements which they may consider necessary, but they agree that no more troops are required at present. (Hear, hear.) Her Majesty's Government however, propose to keep the Cape garrison at its full strength, and will supply the places of any troops which have been or may be moved to the front. With this object a battalion of the King's Royal Rifles has been ordered to the Cape from Malta. (Hear, hear.)

June 30th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

INDIAN TROOPS AT SUAKIN.

East India (Suakin Expedition). Copy presented of Correspondence between the Government of India and the Secretary of State in Council regarding the incidence of the cost of Indian troops when employed out of India [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

"LAPSE AND ESCHEAT."

Mr. HERBERT LEWIS asked the Secretary of State for India whether there was any, and, if so, what difference between the law as to lapse and escheat in British India and Native India:

What were the conditions required to constitute respectively a lapse or escheat in India, such as to vest the territory so lapsing or escheating in the British Government:

And, whether, in the event of any of the present ruling Princes and Chiefs in India dying without male issue, the law of lapse and escheat as prevailing in India or this country would apply.

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: The law as to lapse and escheat in British India rests upon the law administered by the British Courts of Judicature established by legislative enactment. The law in the Native States depends upon the Native State law and the will of its Prince or Chief, and it varies in almost every State. As regards the second and third questions, to answer them would require a legal treatise on the law of escheat, and which I am quite unable to deliver.

LAPSED ESTATES IN INDIA.

Mr. HERBERT LEWIS asked the Secretary of State for India how soon he expected to receive the information, which he had requested the Government of India to furnish, with reference to the Return relating to lapsed estates in India, moved on the 19th instant.

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: My reference to the Government of India on the subject of the notice put down by the hon. member on the 18th June went by last week's mail, but I do not expect to receive a reply before the end of August.

THE INDIAN MAILS.

Mr. HENNIKER HEATON asked the Secretary to the Treasury, as representing the Postmaster-General, whether the invitations for tenders for the new contracts respecting the conveyance of the Indian and Australian mails had been or would shortly be published; and whether he would state the new conditions as to time, speed required, etc.:

Whether he was aware that, owing to the depreciation of the rupee, large numbers of officers serving in India were either unable to visit England, or found it necessary to travel second class, in company with the soldiers from the ranks:

Whether he was aware that the French Government had made special arrangements with the Messageries Maritimes Company for a reduction in the fares of French officers serving in the French Colonies:

And, whether he would take steps for the inclusion in the new contracts for the conveyance of mails to India and the East of provisions for the transport of officers on active service at reduced fares.

Mr. HANBURY: As stated in this House in reply to a question asked on April 17th by the hon. member for Glasgow (Blackfriars), advertisements for tenders for new contracts for the Indian and Australian mail services were published on and after April 8th last. Among others, tenders have been invited for the conveyance of the mails between Brindisi or some other European port and Bombay in 322 hours, 312 hours, or 302 hours; and between Brindisi, Naples, or some other port in Europe and Adelaide *via* Colombo and Albany or Fremantle in 720 hours or 672 hours—the Australian service to be performed by steamers starting from and returning to this country, but not at fixed speed. The Postmaster-General is not aware that, owing to the depreciation of the rupee, large numbers of officers serving in India are either unable to visit England or find it necessary to travel second class in company with the soldiers from the ranks. He understands that arrangements have been made between the French Government and the

Messageries Maritimes Company for a reduction in the fares of French officers serving in French colonies. He has no intention of initiating any provision such as that suggested by the hon. member with the view, as it would seem, of affording pecuniary relief to officers in India at the expense of the Post Office revenue.

THE AFRICAN WILD ELEPHANT.

Mr. Bryce asked the Secretary of State for India whether the attention of the India Office had been called to the desirability of preventing the extinction of the African wild elephant in Somaliland by the establishment of a reserve or sanctuary for those animals within the British Somaliland Protectorate:

Whether he had received a memorial on the subject from Mr. Edward N. Buxton, who lately visited Somaliland and examined the question:

And, whether it was intended to take steps for the prevention of the slaughter of elephants in the district indicated, having regard to the probability that in default of such steps the wild elephants now to be found in the Somaliland Protectorate would very soon be either driven out or extirpated.

Lord George Hamilton: The answer to the right hon. member's first and second questions is in the affirmative. I have invited an expression of the opinion of the Government of Bombay as to any modification that may be required in the rules in order to prevent the extermination of wild elephants; and upon the receipt of their reply I shall be glad to consider what steps it may be advisable to take to secure this object.

THE INDIAN TROOPS AT SUAKIN.

Mr. Maclean asked the Secretary of State for India whether the despatch from the Government of India, received last week, and any reply made thereto by the India Office, would be laid upon the Table of the House in time to be considered by members before the debate on the pay of the Indian troops sent to Suakin took place.

Lord G. Hamilton: I will lay papers to-day on the Table of the House relating to the despatch of Indian troops in 1885 to Suakin, together with telegrams and despatches relating to the present expedition, and I hope that they will be distributed on Thursday next.

July 2nd.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE BOMBAY SMALL CAUSE COURT.

Sir William Wedderburn asked the Secretary of State for India whether he had received a memorial from the Bombay Presidency Association against the appointment of Mr. C. N. Macleod, barrister-at-law, to be second judge of the Bombay Small Cause Court, and what his decision on that memorial had been:

Whether, under the Secretary of State's despatch of 12th September, 1889, a barrister, in order to hold that post, must be of 10 year's standing, and possess a thorough knowledge of the vernacular languages; and, whether Mr. Macleod possessed those qualifications:

Whether the Secretary of State had issued any unpublished instructions modifying the Despatch of September, 1889; and, if so, whether he would lay them upon the Table of the House:

Whether the appointment of Mr. Macleod involved the supersession of Mr. Cursetjee, the third judge, a barrister of 26 years' standing, who had served as a judge for 22 years, and had acted as first judge of the Court on three occasions:

And, whether, seeing that the fourth and fifth judges, who were also superseded, were officers of experience and long standing, the Secretary of State would veto the appointment of Mr. Macleod.

Lord George Hamilton: I have received no memorial against the appointment of Mr. Macleod to the Bombay Small Cause Court. It was decided by the Secretary of State in Council, in compliance with the prayer of a memorial which had the support of the Government of India and of the Government of Bombay, that the restrictions laid down for the Provincial Service in the Despatch of 12th September, 1889, should not apply to this office. That decision was conveyed in a despatch dated August 25th, 1892; and I shall be ready to lay the Correspondence on the Table if the hon. member will move for it. The appointment is by law within the discretion of the Government of Bombay; and I cannot admit that the fact of certain gentlemen having already served as judges gives them a claim in preference to any other person who, in the opinion of that Government, may possess higher qualifications.

THE INDIAN FRONTIER.

Sir William Wedderburn asked the Secretary of State for India if Haidari, Tach, and Sarwakai, which were not part of India when c. 21 and 22 Vic. of 1858 became law, were now not beyond the external frontier of her Majesty's Indian possessions, and when and how were those frontiers so extended as to include those places.

Lord George Hamilton: I would invite the attention of the hon. baronet, to the answer given by me on the 4th of June which answers his first question; as to how the places mentioned have become formally included within the external frontiers of her Majesty's Indian possessions, I must refer him to the Kabul Convention recently published.

July 3rd.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

INDIAN RAILWAYS: REPORT FOR 1895-6.

East India (Railways). Copy presented of Administration Report for 1895-6 by Col. T. Gracey, R.E., Director General of Railways in India [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.

INDIAN TROOPS AT SUAKIN.
VOTING IN THE INDIA COUNCIL.

Mr. Buchanan asked the Secretary of State for India whether the decision conveyed in his despatch to the Government of India of 30th June, by which the ordinary expenses of the Indian troops at Suakin were to be borne by the Indian Exchequer, obtained the unanimous support of the Secretary of State's Council; and, if not, what were the numbers and the names of those members of his Council who were opposed to that decision.

Mr. Curzon (for Lord George Hamilton): Seven members of the Council of India, irrespectively of the Secretary of State, voted in favour of the decision to which the hon. member refers, and four members, namely, Sir Donald Stewart, Sir James Peile, Mr. Hardie, and Mr. Le Marchant, were opposed to it.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.

Replying to a question of Sir W. Harcourt as to the order of business next week,

Mr. Balfour said, We propose to take the resolutions with respect to the employment of Indian troops in the Sudan on Monday.

SALARIES OF BRITISH RESIDENTS IN INDIA.

Major Jameson asked the Secretary of State for India if there was any objection to granting the Return on to-day's Paper relating to the salaries of British residents in India.

Mr. George Curzon (for Lord George Hamilton): The Secretary of State for India will refer to the Government of India, and, if they see no objection to the granting of this return, will communicate with the hon. member in order that he may move for it. It is assumed that, when he speaks of heads of departments, the hon. member refers to officers lent to Native States to act as heads of department under the Native administration.

July 6th.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS.

The Earl of Kimberley said he wished to put a question to the noble earl the Under Secretary for India. A return had

been laid before the House of the correspondence with the Government of India on the subject of the payment of the Indian troops which had been sent to Suakin, but the papers had not been circulated among the members of their lordships' House. In view of the importance of the subject and the action being taken on the matter in the other House, the point was an important one, and he thought some explanation should be given why the paper had not been circulated. He was aware, of course, that the noble earl the Under Secretary was not responsible for the omission, but it was obvious that an important paper of this kind, upon which, no doubt, a motion would be founded in the House, should be circulated, and he wished to know why it had not been done. He also wished to ask the noble earl whether he had any objection to lay before the House the despatch or despatches from the Government of India in regard to the recent treaty with France in respect to Siam, and also the correspondence between the Amír of Afghanistan and the inhabitants of Kafiristan.

The Earl of Onslow said he shared the surprise of the noble earl that the paper referred to, which was of great importance in view of the debate which was to take place in the other House on the matter, had not been circulated. On enquiry he had been informed that the procedure in reference to papers to be laid on the Table of that House was governed by what took place in the other House, and he had learned with some surprise that the members of the House of Commons had not received copies of the paper either. (Laughter.) The papers could, of course, be obtained at the Printed Paper Office; but, in view of the importance of the subject and the debate that would be raised upon it, he would take the necessary steps to see that the papers were circulated among their lordships. With respect to the other papers referred to, they had been presented by the House of Commons, and if the noble earl would move for them in that House they should be printed and circulated.

The Earl of Kimberley said it was very desirable that papers of an important character should be circulated as soon as possible, not only on account of the information they contained, but in order to call the attention of their lordships to the fact that such papers had been laid on the Table. He moved formally for the production of the papers to which he had referred.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE BURMESE RAILWAYS.

Mr. Wolff asked the Secretary of State for India wheth e a syndicate was about to purchase the Burmese railways for the sum of £6,000,000; and, if so, whether the House would have an opportunity of discussing the matter.

Lord George Hamilton; Proposals after consultation with the Government of India have been made, and are now under consideration, not for purchasing, but for taking over the working and extension of the Burma Railways by a company to be formed for the purpose: I am in hopes that a decision may be speedily arrived at. Transactions of this kind in connection with Indian Railways are not infrequent; but it is not usual to submit them for discussion in Parliament and I see no reason why in the present instance we should depart from the ordinary practice.

INDIAN TROOPS AT SUAKIN.

ORDINARY EXPENSES CHARGED UPON INDIA.

"A MASTERPIECE OF MELANCHOLY MEANNESS."

IMPORTANT DEBATE.

THE GOVERNMENT'S MAJORITY REDUCED.

Lord George Hamilton moved: "That Her Majesty having directed a military expedition of her native forces charged upon the revenues of India to be despatched to Africa in aid of the Egyptian troops, this House consents that the ordinary pay of any troops so despatched, as well as the ordinary charges of any vessels belonging to the Government of India that may be employed in this expedition, which would have been charge- upon the resources of India if such troops or vessels had red mained in that country or seas adjacent, shall continue to be so chargeable: provided that if it shall become necessary to replace the troops or vessels so withdrawn by other vessels or native forces, then the expense of raising, maintaining, and providing such vessels and forces shall, in so far as may not be otherwise provided, be repaid out of any moneys which may be provided by Parliament for the purposes of the said expedition." The noble lord said: I rise to make the motion which has been for some days on the Notice Paper of the House. Every member who has read it will see that it divides itself into two parts. The first part suggests that the ordinary pay connected with the troops despatched to Suakin should for a certain time be apportioned to Indian revenues; and the second part of the Resolution proposes that any extra charge of any kind or sort arising either directly or indirectly from the employment of these troops should be charged on the Imperial revenue. Roughly speaking, the two propositions which this Resolution contains are, first, that India shall not make money by participation in an enterprise in which she has a common interest with this country. But, on the other hand, she should not be asked to spend any money because she is interested in common with this country in such enterprise. These two propositions taken together seem incontestably just, always provided that one can show that India has a special interest in the object of the expedition to which these troops may be attached. Perhaps I may explain why it is necessary to move this Resolution. It is to comply with the 55th section of the Government of India Act of 1858, which relates to the expenditure connected with the employment of troops outside the external frontiers of India. During the past few years a number of expeditions have been sent from India for various purposes, and perhaps it will interest the House if I give these expeditions in chronological order. The first occasion on which troops were employed outside the external frontiers of India after the Government of India had been transferred to the Crown was in 1859, in connexion with the third China War. In 1867 a large expedition was sent to Abyssinia from India: in 1875 a small expedition was sent from India to Perak to put down certain disturbances there; in 1878 a considerable number of Indian troops were sent from India to Malta. In the same year a war occurred in Afghanistan which necessitated the employment of a considerable number of Indian troops outside the external frontiers of India. In 1882 an expedition was sent to Egypt, and another expedition was sent to the Sudan in 1885, and this year two expeditions left India, one for Mombasa and the other for Suakin. These expeditions naturally classify themselves into certain categories in accordance with the financial arrangements connected with each. First come those expeditions in which no charge whatever was made either in connection with the ordinary pay or extraordinary expenditure on the revenues of of India. The expeditions in which this has occurred are the third China War; the movement of troops to Malta, and recently the movement of troops from Bombay to Mombasa. In no instance where the whole of the expenditure has been borne by any funds other than the revenues of India has any Resolution been moved in Parliament. In the second category comes those expeditions in which the ordinary charge is placed upon India and the extra expense placed upon other sources, and these comprised the Abyssinian War of 1867, the expedition to Perak in 1875, the Sudan expedition of 1885, and the expedition which left this year. In all these cases, with the single exception of Perak, a Resolution was moved in the House of Commons. Last come the cases in which not only the ordinary expenditure, but all expenditure above that, was placed upon the revenues of India. Two expeditions only come under this class—namely, the second Afghan War, and the expedition sent to Egypt in 1882 by the right hon. gentleman opposite. In both of these cases a certain contribution was eventually made from Imperial funds, but on each occasion the greater part of the extraordinary charges was placed upon Indian revenues. The practice, therefore, has been uniform. No Resolution has been moved unless it was intended that certain charges should ultimately be paid out of Indian revenues. This section is not one, as has been stated, to restrain the prerogatives of the Crown or the Executive in moving troops from one part of the empire to the other, but only for the purpose of safeguarding the Indian revenue. All the lawyers who have been consulted

are unanimous in so interpreting it. There is, it is true, a certain *obiter dictum* by a Secretary of State for India which is opposed to that view. I have the highest regard for the opinion of a Secretary of State, but the views of a Secretary of State do not necessarily constitute law. (Laughter.) The only doubt, as far as I know, ever entertained by lawyers concerning the construction of the section is whether, from its peculiar phraseology, it is necessary to move a Resolution where the ordinary pay only was to be defrayed by Indian revenue. A consensus of opinion in recent years is in the affirmative, but a contrary opinion prevailed some time back. The financial result of the Resolution will be that the ordinary pay and allowances of the Indian troops, amounting to about £5,000 a month, will be borne by Indian revenues. It is true that the Council of India have restricted that charge to the close of the present year. It is, I think, very likely, but, if the Indian troops are in Egypt at that time, the Council will consider itself perfectly free to act as they may think fit. The extraordinary expenses, independently of any expenditure for local transport from Suakin will be about £140,000, which will be found from the treasury chest.

Mr. Leonard Courtney: How long will that last for?

Lord George Hamilton: That is for the same time. Two arguments have been advanced against this arrangement. The first is that there is a risk in taking such a number of troops from the Indian establishment, and the second is that the financial charge on the Indian revenue is not a fair one. Let us consider each of these. As to the first, I quite agree that the greatest caution is necessary to prevent India being drawn upon to meet any of the military emergencies that may occur in Africa. Imperial interests are rapidly spreading in that continent, and there is no doubt that from time to time demands will be made for troops to maintain law and order, and to the Indian Government and the Indian army will the Imperial Government look as extraordinarily well suited for this purpose. When we take into account the numbers of men in past and in the present expeditions, we see that the present expedition involves a much smaller abstraction of force, for a temporary period, from the military strength of India than has been involved in former expeditions of recent years. The total forces in India now number 75,000 Europeans and about 140,000 natives. At the dates of previous expeditions the numbers were considerably less—about 60,000 Europeans and 120,000 natives. The expedition to Abyssinia consisted of 14,000 men, 10,000 natives and 4,000 Europeans; they were all taken from the Indian establishment. Considering that that expedition left India within ten years of the Mutiny, I must say it does seem to me to have been a somewhat dangerous weakening of the military establishment in India. It was in that sense that the present Prime Minister, speaking in the other House, laid down the maxim that India could not be looked upon as a reservoir from which this country could draw an unlimited number of troops without paying for them. In 1882, when right hon. gentlemen opposite were in office, they sent a considerable expedition from India to Egypt—6,700 men, of whom 2,000 were Europeans. In 1885, the same Government sent another expedition consisting of 3,200 native troops. The present expedition numbers only 2,500, and to deduct that number from a total army of 210,000 is a very different thing from deducting 14,000 from a total force of 180,000. Of course, the risk which a country runs by having a force taken away is increased by the length of time that that force is absent, and therefore the Government will take the precaution to put a limit on the time during which India is to pay the ordinary expenses of the troops.

An Hon. Member: That is not in the Resolution.

Lord George Hamilton: It is not in the Resolution, but it is in the despatch. No Resolution in this House in reference to expenditure is binding upon the India Council. So much for the allegation that we are unduly drawing on the military establishment of India. I turn now to the more serious consideration that this proposal is unjust to the Indian revenue. Any protest of that kind coming from the Indian Government is worthy of the most careful consideration—(cheers)—and the Council at the India Office have given a very exhaustive examination to the arguments and the reasons which have been urged by the Indian Government. Roughly speaking, and stripped of all phraseology, the contention of the Indian Government amounts to this—that since the neutralisation of the Suez Canal India has no special interest in Egypt over and above other parts of the British Empire. I have examined that contention to the best of my ability; I have taken the advice of some very able authorities; and I venture to say that neither from the historical nor from the military point of view can that contention be maintained. India has always had a special interest in Egypt over and above that of other portions of the Empire, and if we were to assent to the present contention of the Government of India—which, after all, is only the *ipse dixit* of the Government of the day—it would be difficult to mention any expedition outside the frontier of India in which India has had any special interest. No one who has watched the development of India can deny that Indian interests in different parts of Asia and Africa are decade by decade increasing. I have always contended, and will always contend, for a fair distribution of the expenditure which will be necessary to defend those external interests; but if the Home Government were to assent to the proposition of the Indian Government it seems to me that, no matter what expedition be necessary in Asia or Africa, it will be impossible ever to ask India to bear any part of the expenditure connected therewith; and as those interests outside India grow and develope, and require protection, the whole cost of that protection will fall upon the taxpayers of this country. But while the Home Government cannot agree to the particular proposal of the Indian Government, I am much in sympathy with the substance of their complaint. Those who have read the despatch of the Indian Government will notice that four-fifths of it do not deal with the proposal now before the House, but they deal with transactions of the past. No one can deny that from time to time charges have been put upon India somewhat in excess of the interests which India has had in former expeditions. (Opposition cheers.) It is the recollection of these transactions that has been in the mind of the Indian Government. The Abyssinian expedition was too heavy a drain on the military establishment. But—and I do not say this for the purpose of annoying right hon. gentlemen opposite—the particular transaction which rankles in the mind of the Indian Government is the action taken in 1882. (Cheers.) That action was of a very summary character. The Government of the day requested the Indian Government to send a large expedition to Egypt to work in accord with the British force; and on July 24th the Home Government telegraphed to the Indian Government that, subject to final decision on any representation the Indian Government desired to make, the Home Government proposed that the Indian revenue should bear all the expenses of the Indian contingent. This was the reply of the Indian Government on the 26th: "We beg unanimously to protest very strongly against the proposal that the Indian revenue shall bear all the expenses of the Indian contingent for service in Egypt." The next day the right hon. gentleman then in office brought down a Resolution to this House which put all the charges on the Indian revenue; and it was the present leader of the Opposition who formally moved that Resolution. In that transaction the Indian Government does seem to me to have been treated with but little consideration. But even in that controversy the Indian Government did not take up the position which has since been assumed by the present occupants of office in India. They did not then object to paying a certain portion of the expenses of the expedition; their objection was that India should pay the whole cost; they pointed out that the precedents of the past were against such a proposal; and they looked with anxiety upon the establishment of so dangerous a principle for the future. Well, the Home Government did, to a certain extent, moderate the Resolution, and a certain contribution was made from the Imperial Exchequer towards meeting a portion of the extraordinary charges of the expedition; but India had to pay 60 per cent. of the extraordinary expenditure. Again, in 1885, the right hon. gentleman placed a Resolution on the Notice Paper of the House, without giving the Indian Government time to have its views laid before Parliament. What is the result of thus, in the past, placing undue obligations upon India on the assumption that the Indian Government has a joint interest with this country in these enterprises? The Indian Government, to save themselves from charges which they consider excessive, now repudiate all common interest in expeditions outside of India.

An Hon. Member: No.

Lord George Hamilton: I think they do so; in the despatch laid upon the Table of the House they lay it down that they have no special interest in Egypt. ("No!" and some Hon.

Members: "In the Sudan!") Very well; but in 1882 the Indian Government did admit that they had an interest, because they were willing to pay the ordinary charges, and having had to pay the extraordinary charges laid upon them, they then denied that they had an interest in order to avoid these charges.

An Hon. Member: In the Sudan!

Lord George Hamilton: It is practically the same thing. Anyhow, my contention is worth consideration; and it is that the result of putting unfair or excessive charges on India in the past is that the Indian Government now repudiate that they have any interest in these expeditions. That is a position which I do not think any responsible minister can accept. Desiring as I do to protect the Indian revenue, and anxious as I am to find a working solution of a difficulty which is constantly cropping up, and which is detrimental to the efficiency of military expeditions from time to time, I venture to suggest that, in the despatch to India, I have laid down a principle which will secure that equity in these matters which the House desires, without rendering us in the future liable to the suggestion which has now come to us from India. I do not know if any hon. members have read our despatch to the Indian Government. If they have they will find three propositions laid down which are for the future to govern the financial arrangements of expeditions of this character. In the first place we say: "It may be laid down that on all occasions when the temporary loan of a military force is urgently required either by Great Britain or by India, such assistance will be promptly given so far as the ability, resources, and situation of either country at the time may permit." There are two military establishments—one in India and one in England—and there is in all ordinary times a certain margin of reserve strength in each establishment, and it is desirable in the common interest of the empire that this double reserve should be available for any expedition it may be necessary suddenly to send out. Therefore, it is desirable that not too onerous obligations should be imposed on the country that wants to borrow the force, because it is necessary that the utilisation of it should be made as expeditiously as possible. In the next place, we lay down: "It would seem to be established that if the object for which such assistance is required is one in which the Government supplying the troops has no special interest beyond that which must be common to all members of the empire, the whole cost of the force, so long as it is required, including both ordinary and extraordinary charges, must be borne by the Government that needs its assistance." That is a principle which I think will recommend itself to the House. (Hear, hear.) But it is a principle that was not inserted in the despatch merely to give plausibility to our position. It was put in in order that it might be effective; for we have had to decide, not only the question of the apportionment of the expense in connexion with Suakin, but also in connexion with Mombasa, and we came to the conclusion that no part of the expenditure in connexion with the regiment sent on the latter expedition, though sent out of India, should be placed on the Indian revenue. After some discussion and correspondence with the Treasury we have brought the Treasury round to our view, and they have assented to it. Therefore, by our second proposition we have established a precedent which cannot fail to be a great safeguard to the Indian revenue in the future (Hear, hear.) Our third proposition is: "If the circumstances are such that the Government supplying the troops has a distinct and special interest in the matter at stake, than, although that interest may be less strong than that of the Government requiring assistance, the Government supplying the troops should be content to bear in one form or another a portion of the burden which the operations involve." In this category falls the Suakin expedition. The House will naturally assume that if the Secretary of State in Council, after full deliberation, came to the conclusion that the expedition to Mombasa fell into one category and the expedition to Suakin into another category, there must be in the view of those who made that distinction strong differences in the natures of the two expeditions. I will explain the difference between the two expeditions. There is no doubt that in the neighbourhood of Mombasa and Zanzibar India has a considerable commercial interest—perhaps the largest commercial interest of any portion of the British Empire. Still, we did not feel that that fact was sufficient to justify India being made to bear part of the expenditure to Mombasa. The interest of India, as apart from the other portions of the Empire, did not appear to be of that particular and substantial character which would justify a distinction, and therefore we decided that the whole of the cost of the regiment must be borne by sources other than Indian. But when we came to the expedition to Suakin it seemed to us impossible to pretend that India has not very special interests in Egypt. Let us assume for a moment that India belonged to a foreign country. Would that not constitute an enormous and gigantic diminution of our interest in Egypt? (Cheers.) By merely putting that question it is self-evident that India has, of all parts of the Empire, a special interest in Egypt. (Hear, hear.) I venture to say that there is an unbroken series of precedents in political actions and in military enterprises which support that contention. There has not been an expedition sent by this country to Egypt during the present century in which Indian troops have not participated. In 1801—a time when the Suez Canal was not thought of, when communication between India and England was by the Cape, when England was scarcely the predominant power in India—so vital were the interests of India then in Egypt that a large expedition was sent from India under Baird to co-operate with the English troops in Egypt. Before I came to a decision on this point I was anxious to ascertain the points which decided the apportionment of the expenditure in connexion with that expedition, and on looking into the appendix to the first Report from the Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company, I found that the East India Company claimed a refund of the whole of the expenditure connected with the expedition, less the ordinary pay of the troops in Egypt. There was a further proviso that the ordinary charges of such of the regiments as went from India to Egypt and did not return thither, of the regiment that was in Egypt but did not proceed to India, and the ordinary charges of levies made in India to replace volunteers from native corps sent to Egypt, should be borne by the Imperial Government. The principle on which the claim was founded was that India should bear the ordinary charges of the troops sent from India and returned thither, but not the ordinary charges of regiments which did not return, and which, therefore, were treated as being struck off the Indian establishment from the date of embarkation, and that she should be paid the cost of any extra troops raised in consequence of their absence and all extraordinary expenses consequent on the expedition. We therefore find that in connexion with an Egyptian expedition as far back as 1801, when India was in the hands of shrewd business men, arrangements were made identical with the arrangements which have been made now. I cannot understand how anyone can pretend that India has no special interest in Egypt. Why, our government in India could not exist if it had not a constant supply of soldiers going out to India from this country year after year to replace other soldiers in India; and it is, in consequence, of vital importance that the shortest route between England and India should be secured. Egypt is the natural resting-place, the natural stepping-stone, between England and India; and if there be stepping-stones across a river which are used by neighbours on both sides of the river, no one will pretend that it is an unfair thing to ask both sides of the river to pay for their repair; and that is practically what we are doing in this case. The House must also recollect that a great change has taken place in the method of dealing with many questions which are purely Eastern and purely Indian in origin and character. Owing to the extension of the influence of European Powers in Africa and Asia, there are many questions which are purely Indian in character and origin which, for convenience sake, are now settled in London instead of in Calcutta; and they are so settled because, being raised in places in the neighbourhood of which certain European authority exists, they have a European aspect as well as an Asiatic aspect, a Western aspect as well as an Eastern aspect. But it must not be assumed that because the *locale* of settlement has, for the purposes of convenience, been changed, that therefore the questions have changed in character, and that they do not still remain Indian and Eastern questions. (Hear, hear.) The Press outside has been good enough to assume that there are great differences of opinion between us and the Indian Government. It is true we differ in details, but the points on which we agree far exceed those upon which we differ. The Government of India have in the first place asked for reciprocity. They say that in the past arrangements have been made beneficial to the Imperial Treasury, but that there has been a

disinclination to apply similar principles where they would be beneficial to the Indian Exchequer. In this despatch we have laid down principles which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has admitted shall be reciprocal in character, and we have established an important precedent in the case of Mombasa. (Opposition Hear, hear.) I am glad to get that cheer, because I am the first Secretary of State for India who has sent an expedition from India to Africa the whole cost of which is not to be borne by India. (Cheers.) Therefore, so far as Mombasa is concerned, we are in complete accord with the Indian Government. The Indian Government also wish that their statements and their despatches should be laid in their totality before Parliament. I was not able in the first instance to assent to that proposal because it came during the recess, and I was under an obligation to introduce a Resolution sending the troops to Egypt; but as soon as we came back I willingly assented, and for the first time the statement of the Indian Government has been laid in its entirety before Parliament. Therefore, in three out of four questions we are in complete accord with the Indian Government, and we have been able to comply with their wishes; but in the case of the fourth—for reasons I have mentioned—it is not possible for us to assent to their particular suggestion. I venture to say that if anyone will impartially consider the arrangements which I have laid down in that despatch as regulating the finance connected with expeditions of this character for the future, he will see that they will be advantageous in many ways. These arrangements will secure a unity of military organisation; they will protect Indian finance and establish permanently a working and equitable principle on which the expenditure in connection with these expeditions will in future be regulated. Before I sit down there are two other matters to which I should like to allude. The right hon. member for Montrose is about to follow me. He has been using exceedingly strong language out of doors about this expedition; and he has accused us of embarking on a new and wanton war. (Opposition cheers.) That is really the most astonishing statement I have heard. We are not embarking on a new war; we are trying to finish an old war. (Cheers and Opposition laughter.) The fact is incontestable. Ever since Hicks Pasha was allowed to go to his doom there has been an unceasing, relentless, brutal warfare between the Egyptian Government and the Mahdi and his successors. The one governing factor of it all has been the power of the Mahdi and his successors to inflict injury on Egypt. When strong the Mahdi has invaded Egypt, and if he had his will he would sweep the Egyptian Government into the sea.

An Hon. Member: Why not? (Cheers and laughter.)

Lord G. Hamilton: It is to prevent that that the expedition is at Suakin. The war may have varied in its character, but that which has dominated it has been the power of the Khalifa to inflict harm on Egypt. (Hear, hear.) Everyone knew that if Kassala fell it would give a great increase to the prestige and power of the Khalifa, and all that we have done is to anticipate that danger and, by a forward and offensive movement, to reduce to the smallest dimensions this war, which we have inherited from our predecessors. (Cheers and ironical cheers.) Then the right hon. gentleman has attempted to disparage the operations in which we are engaged by associating them with what he calls "the discreditable disasters in the Sudan in the past." I wonder whether the right hon. gentleman has ever considered what was the origin and cause of those disasters which I admit to have been discreditable. The right hon. gentleman is the great exponent of the policy of abstention and non-interference in Egyptian affairs. Is he aware that all this trouble and difficulty arose from the principles which he professes getting for a short time the upper hand in Egypt? (Cheers.) The history of our troubles and disasters in the Sudan is very remarkable. In 1883 the English Government were masters with regard to Egypt, and the Egyptian Government proposed to send an expedition under Hicks Pasha to reconquer Kordofan. Hicks Pasha knew that he had not the strength for the undertaking, and he implored the Government of the day to help him. (Cheers.) Our representative in Egypt impressed in the clearest and strongest way upon the Government of the day the necessity of doing one of two things—either reinforce Hicks Pacha or prevent him from going on his errand. What was the final policy of the Government? "Earl Granville to Sir E. Malet, June 11, 1883. Your telegram of 5th. Reinforcements for Sudan. Report decision of Egyptian Government as soon as you can, taking care to offer no advice." (Ironical Ministerial cheers.) Later on Sir E. Malet, who was not allowed to advise or interfere or do anything, sends home to the Government a number of despatches saying (13th August, 1883): "I have the honour to enclose copies of three telegrams from General Hicks in regard to affairs in the Sudan, and the numberless difficulties with which he is surrounded." (Hear, hear.) And on August 18th Sir E. Malet wrote to General Hicks: "I congratulate you on your appointment as commander-in-chief and general of division. The act is spontaneous on the part of the Egyptian Government, for, although I am ready to transmit to it telegrams that come from you I am debarred by my instructions from giving advice with regard to action on them. (Cheers.) For a few months that policy of abstention and non-interference, with which the right hon. gentleman is inseparably associated, got the upper hand; and in a very short time after the telegram instructing Sir E. Malet to "take care to give no advice," the British Government had to take the whole affairs into its own hands, and year after year large expeditions were sent out which resulted in nothing but profitless and futile slaughter, and which involved great expenditure to the Egyptian, the English, and the Indian taxpayer. (Cheers.) Therefore, if the right hon. gentleman likes to refer to "the discreditable disasters of the past, he can do so; but they are associated with his principles and not with ours. (Cheers.) The only transaction which can be fairly charged to our policy is not a "discreditable disaster," but the victory of Ferkeh—(cheers)—which is remarkable for the physical and moral regeneration shown by the Egyptian troops. (Cheers.) I say that the right hon. gentleman, although he is one whom we all admire, has never been accepted by his own side as sacred in Egyptian matters; and why is he going to move this amendment? The Front Bench opposite, when in office, moved two motions similar to this, but they were far more drastic and placed far heavier obligations on the Indian Government. I have looked through the division lists, and there is not a single gentleman sitting on the benches opposite who took part in the divisions of 1882 and 1885 who did not vote for the Resolutions similar to that which I am now proposing. (Cheers.) And, therefore, when I explain to the House the modifications and safeguards and concessions with which we have surrounded this Resolution, I cannot believe that right hon. gentlemen opposite will decline to give us that assistance which they, when similarly circumstanced, never hesitated to give themselves. (Cheers.)

Mr. Morley's Amendment.

Mr. John Morley moved to leave out from the word "that" to the end of the question, and to add the words—"it is inexpedient that any portion of the charges of the Indian force that is being dispatched to Africa in aid of Egyptian troops, whether ordinary charges or extraordinary, should be imposed upon the revenues of India." The right hon. gentleman said: The noble lord has remarked that I have out of doors permitted myself to use strong language in connexion with this expedition. I propose, with the permission of the House, to repeat that strong language in the presence of the noble lord. (Cheers.) I do not suppose that an important debate was ever entered upon by a Government under more discouraging circumstances than those of the present Government to-night. (Cheers, and Ministerial cries of "Why?") I am asked why? Because there is not, as far as I can ascertain—and I have taken some trouble to survey the ground—one single organ of the right hon. gentleman opposite which does not condemn the demand which he has now made. (Cheers.) The only cheer of any magnitude which the noble lord secured during his speech was that which followed when he diverged into what I may call complete irrelevance. (Cheers.) The noble lord gave the House a history of the expedition of Hicks Pasha, and he said that that all came from compliance with the principles of which I am the very humble professor, and from following the doctrines with which I am inseparably associated. Yes, sir; but—(pointing to Mr. Chamberlain)—who is sitting next to the noble lord? (Cheers.) The noble lord asks why we did not take part in the divisions in connexion with the expeditions of 1882 and 1885. As far as 1882 goes, it was impossible for me to take part in the division because I was not a member of the House; and in 1885, if I took no part in the division, I did not support the Government of which I was in general an adherent. My right hon. friend the Secretary of State for

the Colonies and the noble duke the President of the Council—it is they whom the noble lord has been attacking in his recitation of the circumstances of the expeditions of 1882 and 1885. (Cheers.) It is for my right hon. friend the Colonial Secretary to defend himself and the Government of which he was a member, and not for me. (Renewed cheers.) The noble lord had prided himself in his remarks about his decision in the case of Mombasa. As I shall presently show, he did establish an admirable precedent in the case of Mombasa; and I move the amendment which stands in my name exactly because the noble lord has departed from that precedent on which he so much prides himself. It will be felt by his own adherents and by those who expected most from his explanation that the noble lord has wandered very wide of the mark, and has scarcely, in one single observation, come to close quarters in the dispute between himself and the Indian Government. (Hear, hear.) The question to-night is not whether this expedition in the Sudan is a good thing or a bad thing in the interests of humanity and civilisation. Nor is it the question whether resort to an Indian force is a good thing or a bad thing in the interests of Egypt or Great Britain. The noble lord says I asserted the other day in the country that the Government have made a new departure. But have they not? We were repeatedly assured by the right hon. gentlemen—by the First Lord of the Treasury, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Secretary to the Colonies—that these operations were to be limited and measured by the financial and military resources of Egypt. (Cheers.) How can it be said that you are limiting the operations by the military resources of Egypt, when you are to-night asking the House of Commons to sanction a charge upon the Indian revenue in order to justify the introduction of an Indian force to eke out the failure of the military forces on the part of Egypt? That may be right, or it may be wrong; but do not pretend that you are not now making a completely new departure. But, again, that is not the question which I wish to discuss to-night. The question before us is this. The Secretary of State in Council of her Majesty's Government akes a certain view of the proper incidence of the charge of this Indian force. The Government of India—which is, after all, the only representative body where the views and interests of the population of India can find a voice and an expression—takes an exactly opposite view. The question is before us as an almost judicial tribunal—the question which of those two authorities is right and which is wrong. This House and the other House are by the Act of 1858, section 55, constituted the arbiters in this dispute. It is to that point and to that great issue to which I wish to call special attention, and on which I wish to base my amendment. The noble lord, like some of those who have gone before him on that Bench, has not appeared to me to give the House a very clear view as to the exact state of the legal and constitutional question. I do not wish to overload what I have to say with a discussion of that legal and constitutional question; but I think I have a right, and it is my duty, to call attention to the extraordinary divergence of language which has been used by gentlemen on the Treasury Bench in connection with this vital and organic section of the Act of 1858. The only gentleman who has been uniformly right in his statement of the law is the Chancellor of the Exchequer. On the 11th of May the Chancellor of the Exchequer told the House that the Government was bound according to the Act of Parliament, where any charge was laid upon the Indian revenue, to come to the House of Commons.

The CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER dissented.

Mr. JOHN MORLEY: I do not know why the right hon. gentleman should dissent. It is very much to his credit.

The CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: I had forgotten that I ever said a word about it. (Laughter.)

Mr. J. MORLEY: They are always forgetting. (Laughter.) Perhaps the First Lord of the Treasury will say he has forgotten that the very next day after the Chancellor of the Exchequer had laid down the law correctly he came and told the House this: "In point of actual law there is no obligation under the statute to have the assent of Parliament, unless some extra charge is thrown upon India. The evidence of precedent is undoubtedly in favour of giving Parliament an opportunity in these cases of discussing whether India should bear extraordinary charges." Surely by this time the right hon. gentleman will have seen that that is a completely inaccurate and misleading statement.

The FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY: It is perfectly right.

Mr. J. MORLEY: Does the right hon. gentleman not mean by this to say that there is no obligation to come to this House unless there are extraordinary charges? That is not the case. You are bound to come to the House, and you are coming to the House to-night. The point which the noble lord has argued is that this is the imposition upon the revenues of India, not of an extraordinary, but of an ordinary charge. I am sure the right hon. gentleman will see that his statement was misleading and incorrect. The noble lord the Secretary of State for India has been guilty of some inconsistencies in this matter. The noble lord, in his dispute with the Treasury as to the Mombasa case, caused the following to be written: "In this connexion I am directed to call your attention to the provisions of the Act for the better government of India, 21 and 22 Vict., cap. 106, sec. 55, to the effect that the revenues of India cannot, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be applied to defray the expense of any military operation beyond the frontiers of that country. It appears to Lord George Hamilton that if the ordinary pay and allowances of the force employed on this expedition are defrayed from Indian revenues, it may and will be argued that this section has been contravened, unless the assent of Parliament be previously obtained." The Attorney-General will recollect the debate in 1886, in which there was a duel between himself and Mr. Gladstone as to whether this prior consent before even an ordinary charge was laid upon the Indian revenues was or was not necessary. These issues are raised by the loose language used by gentlemen on that Bench with reference to a constitutional point of the highest importance—a point upon which, for example, Lord Selborne and Lord Cairns carried on in 1878 one of the most remarkable duels in the history of British law. That shows that the noble lord has not carefully informed himself as to the ground on which he is travelling.

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: I said the law I believed was perfectly clear except on this particular point as to whether it was absolutely necessary to move a Resolution when the only charges are ordinary charges.

Mr. J. MORLEY: The point is whether you are bound to move a Resolution before you impose a charge or take steps involving a charge. I am far too prudent, I hope, to venture upon a disputation of this kind. But the noble lord is quite mistaken if he thinks that any interpretation whatever of this important section is one upon which great lawyers have agreed, or do at this moment, as I believe, agree. I would point to the language used by Sir Stafford Northcote in connexion with the Abyssinian expedition when in 1867 he came down to the House and admitted that he and the Government had been guilty, in view of the strict construction of the law, of a contravention of that law, and he apologised to the House for it. Mr. Gladstone, who was then Leader of the Opposition, congratulated him upon admitting his illegality, and he laid down his great *dictum*—which I submit to the hon. gentlemen opposite when they come to consider this matter in the case of Mombasa—that the strictest construction of an Act of Parliament is the only construction that is tolerable within the walls of Parliament. We may depend upon it there is no place where the strict construction of an Act of Parliament—especially a great organic Act like the Act of 1858—ought to be so highly regarded and cherished as in this High Court of Parliament. (Cheers.) The noble lord intimated that he might be found in some conflict with a former Secretary of State for India. The Secretary of State to whom he refers was the present Duke of Devonshire, then Lord Hartington. I think we should be missing an important point in this debate if we did not recall the weighty language used by Lord Hartington in 1882 in making that very motion which the noble lord has said so much about—the language of Lord Hartington upon the conditions under which resort to the Indian troops could be lawfully had. Lord Hartington went much further than the noble lord seems even to dream of. Lord Hartington said that there were two objects in Section 55. The first was to prevent such a contingency as that the Government should carry on military operations by means of troops maintained on Indian establishments and without having to come to Parliament for its consent at all. The House will perceive that that is a different point from the point raised in the Resolution, which is simply the point of the revenue charge. But Lord Hartington laid down the great constitutional doctrine that it is going beyond the spirit of the 55th Section to do as you did in Mombasa—to use

Indian troops outside the frontier and outside the cases excepted in the Act without the consent of Parliament, whether you impose a charge on India or whether you do not. I was glad to hear the noble lord admit—it was to me one of the most important parts of his speech—that we cannot be too vigilant, too jealously careful, at this moment especially, in regard to examining the conditions under which Indian troops may be employed: because, as the noble lord very well said, we are in an era of what I may call adventures in South Africa, when the temptation to resort to the employment of Indian troops will be immense. How immense it will be is shown even in the case of Mombasa, and it is most important that Parliament should make up its mind with something like definiteness whether or not Indian troops may be brought out of India for military operations beyond the Indian frontier without the consent of Parliament. The Indian Government in that despatch—and it is one of the most important and most significant things in the despatch—express their apprehension lest the principles which are now unfortunately defended by the noble lord should be extended and applied to cases where, as they contend, it is most inexpedient, both in the interests of India and, perhaps, in the interests of Great Britain, that there should be this unfettered right to claim on the part of the executive Government to move Indian troops into Africa, or elsewhere, whenever they think fit without the consent of Parliament. (Cheers.) It is well known now that there is a strong, and probably a growing, school, who argue that East Africa is to become a sort of annexe of the Indian Empire, and that the real and effective military base of what they expect to be our East African possessions is to be found in India and the Indian army. In these circumstances, and in view of these apprehensions, which the noble lord shares with some of us, I feel—and many in the House, irrespective of party, will feel—that nothing can be more delicate or more important in the view, not only of the present contingency, but the future, than the relations between the Indian army and the Parliament sitting at Westminster. (Cheers.) The noble lord referred to, but did not quote, the very remarkable statement of doctrine which was made in this House in 1867 by no less a person than the Prime Minister. For my own part, I am satisfied with that expression of doctrine; and upon the language used by Lord Cranborne in 1867 I shall be content to found all the arguments brought before the House. Such passages have been quoted from this remarkable statement of doctrine in the public press, and some have found their way into the despatch from the Government of India. The House will recollect the circumstances in which the language was used. It was proposed to take the Indian troops to Abyssinia. Mr. Fawcett announced his intention to move an amendment that no charge, ordinary or extraordinary, for that purpose should be put on the Government of India; and the Lord Cranborne of that day said that he entirely agreed with Mr. Fawcett, and, though he deprecated the taking of a division on the amendment, Lord Cranborne approved it, and Mr. Bright and Mr. Forster supported him. Lord Cranborne said: "I do not like India to be looked upon as an English barrack in the oriental seas from which we may draw any number of troops without paying for them. It is bad for England, because it is always bad for us not to have that check upon the temptation to engage in little wars which can only be controlled by the necessity of paying for them." (Cheers.) Lord Cranborne then put to the House a dilemma which applies equally to the case of to-night: "If this garrison which we keep in India is, as all Indian authorities assure us, necessary for maintaining that country in security and peace, that garrison ought not to be rashly diminished. If, on the other hand, it is too large, and India can for any length of time conveniently spare these troops, then the Indian population ought not to be so unnecessarily taxed." (Cheers.) A perfectly admirable statement of doctrine, and I only regret that Lord Salisbury to-day does not adhere to it. The noble lord to-night, instead of coming to close quarters with the particular case which he was bound to present and to defend to the House, wandered over the precedents; but the noble lord himself, in what he has said in the despatch of June 30th to the Government of India, has completely swept away the whole foundation of those precedents if they are made as an argument to the Resolution which the noble lord proposed to the House. He says in his despatch to the Government of India: "It is impossible to say that the decisions which have been arrived at on previous occasions with regard to the distribution of charge for troops lent by India to Great Britain or by Great Britain to India are such that any very clear or definite doctrine can be drawn from them." What is the good of the noble lord taking up half an hour to go through the precedents of China and Perak, when he has himself told the Government of India all through that there was no doctrine to be drawn from these precedents? The important passage from the point of view of precedent is the declaration made by another noble lord, a colleague of the right hon. gentleman opposite in 1887—I mean Lord Cross. (Cheers.) This I regard as a fundamental passage; it is the opening of a completely new position by the Secretary of State for India in this country. This is what Lord Cross said in respect of the expedition of 1885, an expedition which was begun by the Government of Mr. Gladstone and which was not wound up till the Government of Lord Salisbury was in power. Lord Cross had to deal with the matter, and after he had examined the papers and the arguments he told the Treasury and the Government of India for their information and encouragement:—"The Secretary of State for India in Council, however, feels that there is much force in the general scope of the arguments"—(the arguments repeated to-night as to the incidence of the ordinary charge)—"of the Government of India, and desires to take this opportunity of expressing his earnest hope that on any future occasion, when Indian troops are employed on duties not directly attributable to the requirements of the Government of India, or despatched to a country distant from India, no portion of the expenses of such troops may be charged to India without the full assent and concurrence of the Government of that country." (Cheers.) Could anything be clearer or more definite than that? (Cheers.) Then the Treasury, in their reply, showed that they, at all events, understood the full weight and significance of this declaration of Lord Cross, for the Treasury said:—"Their lordships make no doubt that, should the occasion again arise for employing Indian troops outside India, the views of the present Government of India and of the present Secretary of State for India in Council on the question of the expense of such employment will be respectfully weighed by the Imperial Government of the day." (Cheers.) But Lord Cross is himself a member of the Imperial Government of the day, and, therefore, there arises before our mind's eye a vision of Lord Cross, the Privy Seal, respectfully weighing the views of Lord Cross, the Secretary of State for India, and finding, apparently those views devoid of any force or weight. (Laughter.) The noble lord went on to make reference to the case of Mombasa. What is the significance of the case of Mombasa? Indian troops were sent to Mombasa in these circumstances. The Foreign Office writes to the noble lord to say that there is trouble in the East African Protectorate and suggesting that an Indian regiment should be despatched in order to inspire confidence on the part of friendly natives and to deal with the rebels. On February 21st the Foreign Office communicated to the noble lord their expectation that the charge would fall as before, on the Government of India. The Foreign Office had forgotten the *dictum* of Lord Cross; but the noble lord had not; and now we come to a series of most interesting transactions which I submit to the House, and if any hon. member be at the trouble to read with moderate care the noble lord's dealings with the Treasury in the matter of Mombasa he will find that the noble lord took up in almost every particular a position from which he now entirely recedes, and used arguments from which to-night he is running away. (Cheers.) He manfully defended Lord Cross's position. Writing, under date February 27th, to the Foreign Office, it is said:—"In reply, I am to express Lord George Hamilton's opinion that there is no justification for charging upon Indian revenues any portion of the cost of this force, so long as it is employed out of India and for purposes exclusively Imperial. In a letter dated March 25th, 1890, the Government of India lays down as a principle that, when circumstances and the safety of India permit, aid should be freely given to the Imperial Government; but that, when the objects of the expedition or campaign are unconnected with India, the whole of the expenses of the troops drawn from India should be paid by the Imperial Exchequer, just as the whole of the expenses of the troops drawn from England for an Indian expedition would be paid by Indian revenues. It appears to his Lordship that this principle is sound, and that, if the course suggested in your letter were adopted, the result would be that the cost of the operations would in effect be shared between India and the United Kingdom." (Cheers.) Let me look one by one at the arguments

used by the Treasury and raised by the noble lord in the Mombasa case, some of which, at any rate, he has refuted to-night. The first plea adduced by the Treasury why the Indian revenues should be chargeable with the ordinary expenses were that financial and commercial interests were at stake, and that there were "numerous British and Zanzibar dhows owned by Indians all along the German coast." On April 15th last the noble lord gave a tart answer to any contention of that kind:—"In your letter much stress is laid on the Consular reports and statistics of Zanzibar as showing that the expedition is 'connected with India.' With much greater force could it be shown that British interests are connected with the trade of India, but as already observed, no assistance is given by the exchequer of the United Kingdom in defraying the charges of the military forces in India." The second position of the Treasury in February was that the whole cost of the naval defence of India is paid for by the United Kingdom. The Treasury used that fact as an argument why India should not refuse to pay this charge; but the noble lord brushes that argument aside in a single peremptory sentence. When the Treasury tell him that the United Kingdom bear the cost of the whole of the naval defence of India he says that he cannot admit that in regard to naval defence India is under any special obligation, because the protection of the general trade of the United Kingdom in Eastern seas is undertaken by the Admiralty at the cost of the Imperial revenue. The noble lord brushed aside, therefore, any contention that we are justified in imposing an ordinary charge upon India because they do not contribute to their own naval defence. Then the third argument on the part of the Treasury was—we are still on the Mombasa case—that we were not asking India to bear any military charge in regard to the East African Protectorate, but only to consent not to save money. The noble lord to-night used the expression "the Indian Government was not to make money." The expression used hitherto, and rightly used, is that the Indian Government is not to save money as the result of employing troops in the Protectorate. India, it was stated, was not asked to defray any part of the charges, but only to lend some troops to a third party, who was making a saving out of the transaction. I was not quite sure, but I think the noble lord took up that argument and used it in defence of the attitude of the Government in reference to the expenses of the present expedition; at all events, it has been used, and I daresay will be used again. But the noble lord summarily dismissed that argument in May last when he said: "On the argument that troops lent and not replaced can continue to be paid for by India without adding to their burdens, I am to point out that the work of the army must necessarily be performed by a smaller force than is deemed requisite, thereby entailing a risk, even if it be not shown in a financial aspect, and that India would be confessedly paying for the employment of a force beyond her own frontiers from which she derives no benefit." Therefore, the noble lord, in dealing with Mombasa, has brushed aside that argument. But then a very strange transformation came over him, and all the sophistry which he had so triumphantly and so efficiently demolished in May he himself reproduces in his own despatch of June 30th. In that despatch he says: "For this important object, then, India is not asked to incur the smallest additional expenditure or to impose the slightest extra taxation." The noble lord must know quite well, or must certainly have known in May, that there is no ground in this argument whatever, and he was told this in plain and almost blunt language by members of his own council. The opinion of men of such remarkable competence and authority as Sir James Peile and Sir Donald Stewart is very important, and they pointed out with reference to the argument addressed to India that she would have to pay the troops even if the troops had not been sent, so that it made no difference, that there was a great difference between paying your own men for doing your own work in your own country and paying the same men for doing other people's work in a foreign country. (Opposition cheers.) The Treasury had urged that if India did not pay the ordinary charges there would be an actual saving in the Indian Budget, but is it unreasonable, they ask, that India should make a saving by not paying for what she does not get? (Hear, hear.) Surely it was a monstrous doctrine, they continued, that we were to impugn the Government of India because they claimed a right under these circumstances. These two sentences of Sir James Peile and Sir Donald Stewart seem to me to contain the whole of this case. Does anybody who has attended to Indian affairs at all deny that the Indian military charges are enormous? (Hear, hear.) And ought not this House, apart from the general consideration of the subject, to be glad of an opportunity of allowing the Indian Government to make a saving—small and insignificant as I admit this is—upon these military charges? Suppose that I were on such terms with the noble lord that, finding that he had got a pair of carriage horses which he was not going to use this summer, I said to him, "I have an Egyptian friend who would be glad if you would allow him to use your carriage horses." And supposing that the noble lord acquiesced, what would he think of me, or of my Egyptian friend, if at the end of the time when we were returning him his horses we sent him in a Bill for the oats, the hay, the straw, the shoeing, the grooming, and all the regular charges which he would have been at if these carriage horses had remained in his own stable? And if he said that was rather hard measure, what would he think if we reproached him by saying, "Oh, you want to make a money saving then!" (Opposition laughter.) That is an exact parallel to the position taken up by those who object to India making any saving out of this force. It is not wise, surely, to let the Indian population think that you are keeping up in India a native army larger than is necessary, and are loading her for purposes of your own with a charge which is wholly unnecessary so far as she is concerned. I am not, of course, going into the vexed question of the adjustment under normal circumstances of military charges between the Home Government and the Government of India, because there is a Departmental Committee, I think, appointed by my right hon. friend, the member for Wolverhampton, considering that point, and I confess I am not competent to express any general view upon a question of that kind. I see the Secretary to the Treasury in his place; he is a member of the Government, and a not unimportant one, and perhaps the House would like to hear his views on the subject of whether the account against India is or is not a just one—I am sure the hon. member for King's Lynn would. (Laughter.) The right hon. gentleman has said that the more we looked at these Indian military charges the more unjust they appeared to be, and the injustice was all the greater when we compared the treatment of India with the treatment which our colonies received. (Opposition cheers.) But, whether it is a just account or not, I do not think anybody will deny that the military account between ourselves and the Government of India is a pretty rigorous account, one which is without abatement or relaxation, and if you hold them to a rigorous account of this kind you cannot be surprised at the Government of India, when opportunity arises, holding you in your turn to an equally rigorous account. Before finally leaving the Mombasa case I would make one observation. The Treasury argued that the case for making a charge upon the Indian revenue was stronger—and this is really an important point—in regard to the Mombasa case than in regard to the Abyssinian expedition and the expedition of 1885. Now they have given up the case of Mombasa, therefore it seems to follow by reasonable implication and deduction that they have given up the precedents of the Abyssinian expedition of 1868 and the expedition of 1885. I submit that that is a perfectly sound argument. After all the real crux of this discussion is the question of Indian interest. (Ministerial cheers.) What is the Indian interest? I think the House must have felt that the noble lord dealt rather rapidly and perfunctorily with that vital part of the discussion. (Hear, hear.) The constructive interest of India has been strangely abused, and the noble lord I think admitted that there were cases in the past where this constructive interest of India would not now be regarded as an interest of India at all. There was the very first case of all, which I think my right hon. friend the member for the Forest of Dean will recollect—the trivial but significant case of the Sultan's ball, where the Government of India was charged with £10,000 because it was thought expedient to give a great ball in the quadrangle of the Government Offices to the Sultan of Turkey. (Laughter.) I think Mr. Fawcett said in true, though alliterative language, that that was a "masterpiece of melancholy meanness." (Laughter.) There has been a great deal of melancholy meanness since, and I think to-night the House is being asked to perform an act of melancholy meanness. (Hear, hear.) What sort of interest is it supposed that India had in the Abyssinian case? The doctrine was that you might fairly charge India if interested. The House will

recollect that in that case certain envoys had been maltreated by King Theodore in Abyssinia, and it was gravely argued in this House that it was to the interest of India that semi-barbarous potentates should be taught that they could not with impunity illtreat the envoys of her Majesty's Government—not in India, but in Africa. (Laughter.) Then came the Suez Canal case, and I admit that there was some force in the argument in that case. Then came the case of 1885—as a matter of fact I had nothing at all to do with the Government of 1885, of which I had not the honour to be a member. The argument was that if Osman Digna or the Mahdi did battle with Egyptian troops that would disturb the equilibrium of the Muhammadan world. The second argument was that the expedition arose out of the philanthropic and generous impulses of the people of this country, who could not bear to contemplate the possibility of what might happen to the Egyptian garrison, and that satisfaction of our generous impulses was represented from that box as being an Indian interest. (Hear, hear.)

The FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY: Whose speech was that?

Mr. J. MORLEY: It was that of the Under Secretary of that day. I am glad to be able to refer to a high Conservative authority, who is, unfortunately, no longer among us. Sir Stafford Northcote admitted in 1867, in connexion with the Abyssinian expedition, that there were cases in which it would be the height of shabbiness and of injustice to employ Indian troops without paying their charges, such as cases affecting the balance of power in Europe, which could not be represented as an Indian interest, of affairs with France, Russia, or Italy—(cheers)—these, he said, could not be treated as Indian interest. (Cheers.) Other cases he mentioned were cases affecting our American or West Indian colonies or attempts to acquire new territory. "There can," says Sir Stafford Northcote, "in such cases be nothing more disgraceful than to employ Indian troops without paying for them." Now the noble lord claims to have laid down three principles with which little fault is to be found. I think they are a fair statement of a just view. What are the tests of what would constitute a justification for charging the Indian revenues with the cost of the troops employed in this expedition according to the principles of the noble lord? "India," he says—"must have a distinct and special interest in the matter at stake beyond that which is common to all the other members of the Empire." Those are the noble lord's tests. Lord Cross laid down a test of rather a stiffer kind. That noble lord said:—"Military duties required from the Indian forces must be duties directly attributable to the requirements of the Government of India." Suppose that we adopt Lord Cross's test. By that test this employment of Indian troops in the Sudan must have been moved or supported by the Indian Government, and, therefore, you must have been in communication with the Government of India in respect of current events in Egypt. Is there a single despatch that you can produce or cannot produce to show that you have consulted the Indian Government on current events in Egypt? Were you thinking of the military requirements of India for one instant when you ordered operations to relieve the Italians from their embarrassments at Kassala? (Cheers.) India never entered into the thoughts of the Government. No wonder that the noble lord has laboured without much success to bring before us a specific Indian interest. I think we can imagine the troubled dialogue that must have occurred between the noble lord and his advisers to whom he was giving instructions for drafting the despatch of June 30th. His advisers would say, "What is it to be?" The noble lord would say—"We are to make a charge upon the Indian revenue and we are to say there is an Indian interest involved." The advisers would say—"What is it to be this time? (Hear, hear, and laughter.) Is it to be prestige with the Arab races and the Muhammadan tribes? Why we used that before. Is it to be safeguarding of the mortgages on the clove plantations which we used in February? Is it to be commercial interests or the equilibrium of the Muhammadan world as in 1885." (Hear, hear, and laughter.) "For my own part," I think the noble lord would say, "I suppose you will find nothing better to fall back upon than the Suez Canal." (Cheers and laughter.) And then the noble lord and his advisers would sit down with all the gravity they could to pen what I call—the noble lord has destroyed my character for moderate language—the most spurious and insincere paragraph that was ever printed in any despatch from any department. (Cheers.) The paragraph is this:—"The Government of India has no greater interest than the maintenance of rapid and secure transit, in times of peace and war alike, whether for commercial or for military purposes, between India and the United Kingdom. This is true of India in a sense in which it is true of no other great dependency of the British Empire, for it is upon Great Britain that India relies for the recruitment of the most important (though not the most numerous) part of its civil and military establishments, for army reliefs, for Government stores of all kinds, and, in short, for a large and essential portion of the machinery of administration and defence. It is therefore obvious that, apart from all considerations of trade, the preservation of free communication by the shortest route with a country on which she is so largely dependent is to India a matter of vital importance." (Hear, hear, and laughter.) When did the relevancy of that argument to the expedition to the Sudan occur to the Government? (Hear, hear.) During the years in which the Sudan has been out of the possession of Egypt there has been no danger to those communications. When the Mahdi and the Khalifa made a movement, did you tremble for your stores or for your machinery of administration and defence? You never trembled at all, because you knew that it had nothing to do with their safety. (Cheers.) Lord Salisbury said the other day that we have upon us a moral obligation to restore Khartum to Egypt. I may remark, with reference to that moral obligation, that it is not to become operative beyond the limits for which Egypt is willing to pay. (Cheers and laughter.) It is a very singular moral obligation which Lord Salisbury never said or thought could by any strain of construction be made an Indian moral obligation. (Cheers.) I meant to ask the noble lord another question. In 1888, in the course of a debate in another place, Lord Salisbury, whom we are now to regard as considering the restoration of the Sudan to Egypt an indispensable condition for the safety of the Suez Canal, said, "We accept the policy of abandoning the Sudan." (Cheers.) How could Lord Salisbury have said anything of that kind if the restoration of the Sudan to Egypt was an indispensable condition of the maintenance of our communications with India. (Hear, hear.) Then Lord Salisbury on that occasion used some language about Suakin which is worth quoting here. Lord Salisbury said:—"Egypt has no interest in Suakin whatever. If I were advising Egypt from the Egyptian point of view alone, I would say to Egypt abandon Suakin." The importance of Suakin, Lord Salisbury said, was in connexion with the suppression of the slave trade. But does the suppression of the slave trade come within any one of the noble lord's tests? Is it not exactly one of those interests which are common to the whole Empire? (Cheers.) We may, therefore, dismiss that argument. I wonder whether Lord Cromer will not smile when he reads the contention of the Government both in the despatch and on the lips of the noble lord that the Suez Canal was in danger from the Dervishes? Those who know more about Egypt than I do assure me that the canal is, and has been, no more in danger from these Dervishes whom you are now fighting than is the city of London. (Cheers.) I do not wonder that the noble lord in that despatch of June 30th wanders away as fast as he can from his own principles and the application of those principles and sinks into what I may call the language of weak apology. (Hear, hear.) He has used the same kind of language, though much more shortly, to-night. He says that this is going to be a very short expedition. He draws attention to the comparatively small size of the Suakin force. He anxiously protests that the assistance is essentially of a temporary nature, and he implores the Indian Government to accept the principle of loans of small bodies of troops for short periods. The noble lord must be a very sanguine man and a man of great prophetic power if he can foresee the exact time for which that Indian force will be required. (Hear, hear.) But, of coures, that does not arise, because, as I understand the matter, he has agreed that after December 31st the whole matter is to be reconsidered, and I infer from an engagement of that kind it can only mean reconsideration with a view to removing from the revenue of India the whole of the ordinary as well as the extraordinary charges. I would remind the House that this Resolution, if it is passed to-night does not limit the number of months during which this force can be used. We pass this Resolution as a general and not a terminable Resolution. I cannot imagine a much weaker case for resisting the appeal of the Indian Government than that the expedition is small and the time is limited. (Hear, hear.) The noble lord has told us to-night that the whole sum for which the Government of India is

being, as it were, flouted is about £35,000. This proceeds from the specially Imperial party, and the glory of the Empire is to be tarnished for £35,000! (Cheers and Ministerial cries of "No!") I am sure to a great many gentlemen opposite this is not a matter of party, and that they are just as much ashamed of this vote as the most debased Little Englander. (Hear, hear.) I should like now to ask the House to listen to some words written by Lord Lawrence to Sir Stafford Northcote in the year 1868. He used this language:—"I cannot admit that India has the slightest interest in the question at issue between England and King Theodore. We shall be neither stronger nor weaker here, if he is duly punished for his misdeeds. Abyssinia is too distant from India; the communications between the two countries are too slight for the people of India to take any interest in what goes on in the former part of the world. The true grounds of the war are the vindication of England's honour. . . . If England could not afford to pay the expenses of the war, and if the finances of India were in a flourishing condition, the Government of India, as the representatives of the interests of the people, might perhaps have been asked to contribute its quota. But the case is exactly the other way. India is really a poor country. The actual condition of the masses of the people is a bare, I might say a miserable, existence. We, its rulers, are at our wit's ends to increase the amount of taxation, to devise new sources of public revenue which may be remunerative, and not extremely unpopular. And it is at this time that it has been decided by the Parliament of England that India must bear a portion of the expenses of a war in which it has really and truly no interest. . . . . India is treated very differently to the colonies. No one would think of asking any of the latter to pay a portion of the war expenses of Abyssinia." I would ask the House to recollect what Lord Lawrence pressed on Sir Stafford Northcote in 1868, and to remember that while we are chattering here about £35,000, the Indian Government is not in such easy circumstances that even £35,000 would be of no consequence to it. (Cheers.) There are two considerations that come into our minds in connection with to-night's transaction. The first is the effect of these proceedings of ours on the credit and authority of the Government of India with those over whom they rule. (Hear, hear.) There are these men, diligently discharging on behalf of this nation their share in the most noble and beneficent task that any nation in the history of the world has even undertaken—(cheers)—and invested with every shred of authority with which you can clothe them. What do you suppose will be the effect on the moral authority of the Government of India, which is far more the secret of our power in India than mere military establishments, when the population of India see the Government of India treated with so little ceremony that decisions are taken on questions without waiting for more than a mere brief telegraphic summary? (Cheers) Do you think that the people of India do not understand that the decision arrived at in so summary a manner is a slight on the Government of India? When they see, moreover, that the pledge given to the Government of India in 1887 by Lord Cross, that their full concurrence should be required when anything not demanded by the requirements of India took place, is broken, what will be the effect in India upon the contentment with the rule of this nation and this Parliament? (Cheers.) What will be the effect when they find such a statement of the case against this nation and Parliament as is contained in the masterly despatch of the Government of India? (Cheers.) The Government of India gave the House a warning. They say: "We have already adverted in this despatch to the opinions of the Government of India previously recorded, showing that the imposition on Indian Revenues of burdens for services in which India is in no way interested would be an impolitic course to adopt. We would add that, since the passing of the Indian Councils Act of 1892, the annual Financial Statement of the Governor General in Council comes under discussion in the Legislative Council of the Governor General; and from the discussions which have since taken place it will be seen that the finances are watched and scrutinised, and their utilisation for purposes which are viewed as illegitimate or unauthorised is vigorously challenged." What do we read in *The Times* this morning from India?—"The decision of the Ministry with regard to the expenses of the Suakin brigade has been received here with something like indignant surprise, as the case presented by the Government of India in the despatch made public on Friday seems an overwhelming one. For some time to come it is certain that there will be the strongest denunciation of the selfish policy of the home authorities in every newspaper, English and native, throughout the country. The impression thus produced will be a lasting one, for a belief will obtain that Indian interests will be sacrificed on future occasions. The weakness of the India Office in yielding to the Treasury is much commented upon." The risk of all this mischief is to be run for the sake of £35,000, because somebody in Whitehall can patch up some sort of a case. This is not a question for an arithmetician or an accountant. (Cheers.) The question is whether this is an item which this House ought to exact; but even the accountant's view renders it doubtful whether there is any fair ground for the imposition of this charge, and where there is a doubt clearly this House ought to decide the doubt against itself—(cheers)—and in favour of those who have no representative in the House and whose only representatives, namely, the Government of India, have protested against this plan. I do not say that this House is capable of supervising every minute detail of administration in India as we supervise administration in England. I do not think that it is desirable that we should be too keen to intermeddle in Indian administration; but this Resolution is in opposition to the past opinions of great authorities now sitting in the Cabinet, and is based upon pleas and arguments which were repudiated by the noble lord in a parallel case not two months ago. Its foundation in the plea that the Suez Canal may be endangered by the Dervishes is a spurious and insincere foundation; the Resolution tarnishes the honour of England in the very field where our work is most glorious, and it is because it does this that I beg to move the Amendment that stands in my name. (Cheers.)

Mr. J. Maclean.

Mr. J. Maclean asked to be allowed to second the amendment, because he wished the principle of fair play to India to be adhered to, and deeply regretted the course which the Government had taken in bringing this resolution forward. He felt no doubt in his own mind that if this question were left to the independent judgment of the House the Government would not have very many supporters that night. The noble lord's speech seemed to show that his heart was not in this business, and it was difficult to suppose that the Secretary of State who had showed conclusively that India ought not to be charged for the expenses of the regiment sent to Mombasa could really think that India ought to pay for the expedition now under consideration. The noble lord must have allowed his better judgment to be overborne by the representations of the British Treasury. It had been said by the Secretary to the Treasury that India ought not to expect to save money because her troops had been sent to Suakin. But the saving of money was just what the Government on their side desired to effect. If Indian troops had not been sent to Suakin, we should have been obliged to send British troops there. These British troops were now at home, and should any little war arise elsewhere than in Egypt, they would be available. A great deal had been said about precedents. For his part he was in favour of establishing a new precedent, if necessary, in connection with this matter. The speeches and despatches of Lord Salisbury and Lord Cross had been cited; all showed their great anxiety not to make use without payment of the immense reserve of military strength that we possessed in India. But there was a still higher authority he could cite. What was the precedent set by Lord Beaconsfield in 1878? The First Lord of the Treasury, early in the Session, reminded them, perhaps somewhat unnecessarily, that Lord Beaconsfield was dead. That was true, and pity 'twas 'twas true. But there were still many members on the Ministerial Benches who borrowed Lord Beaconsfield's name and would like to be guided by his example. When Lord Beaconsfield brought Indian troops to Malta in 1878, he did not charge the Indian Government a single rupee for the expenses of that expedition. If they were to be guided by precedents, they could not have a better precedent than that. That high-minded and far-seeing statesman was too great a man to care about paltry considerations of the cost incurred by the British Treasury. He wanted to show our enemies that we had a great reserve in the army of India, which could be called upon to help us whenever we should have any difficulty with European nations. As long as he taught that lesson, Lord Beaconsfield cared very little about the money part of the matter. He dissented altogether from the view that seemed to be held that India could not be shown to have a very im-

portant interest in Egypt. When at the beginning of this century the first expedition was sent to Egypt Lord Wellesley, who was Governor General of India, said that he had come to the conclusion that to expel the French from Egypt was necessary for the future security of the British Empire in India. That statement of policy still held true. Both Napoleon and Nelson were agreed that whatever power could bestride the Isthmus of Suez and command the valley of the Nile would become masters of India. Some people, he knew, thought that we ought to abandon the Mediterranean, and that India could be protected by troops and munitions of war sent by the Cape of Good Hope. A friend of his was anxious the other day that Indian troops should be sent to South Africa, to aid us in our difficulties there. It was evident therefore that in the future Indian troops might be called upon to serve in any part of Africa. Well, supposing that this precedent which they were asked to establish were set up would it not open the door to unlimited abuse of the principle of sending Indian troops to Africa? The proposal of the Government might lead possibly to dangerous consequences. The Secretary of State for India, in his despatch in reply to the Indian Government, laid down three principles, which showed a desire on his part to do what was right towards India, but the noble lord had apparently forgotten certain things which it was essential to pay regard to if those principles were to be carried out. In the first place, the burdens of Imperial administration ought to be fairly distributed among all parts of the British Empire, but India at present bore far more than her fair share of Imperial burdens. Before they put a fresh burden upon the revenues of India they ought to examine this question as a whole, and see that all the component parts of the Empire shared the Imperial burdens fairly according to their respective capacities. When a short time ago there was a discussion about the incidence of new taxation in India, the noble lord said that all that he asked for was perfect equality of treatment for Bombay and Lancashire, and he examined the tariff with the most minute and microscopic nicety of discrimination in order to see whether the balance did not incline by a hair's breadth in favour of India, and when he found himself able to shift a large portion of taxation from Lancashire into Bombay he claimed that he had secured perfect equality of treatment. Why was there not to be perfect equality of treatment now? What was the burden that fell upon India at the present moment? India paid 24½ millions out of a total expenditure of 70 millions on the armaments of the Empire. That was to say, India paid more than one-third of the total charges for the armaments of this immense British Empire, while the self-governing colonies only contributed an insignificant fraction of the whole expenditure. The Chancellor of the Exchequer lately showed that the Army and Navy charges in England had arisen from £30,000,000 in 1885-6 to £38,000,000 in 1895-6, or an increase of 30 per cent. in ten years. He had compared these figures with a return relating to India, and found that the military charges in India rose from 17 millions in 1884-5 to 24¼ millions in 1894-5, or an increase of about 44 per cent. in ten years. They must remember, too, that the burden of responsibility now laid on the Indian Government was immensely heavier than it was in former times. During the last twelve years, since the annexation of Upper Burma, they had added immense unproductive territories to the area of British India; they had increased her army by 30,000 to 35,000 men, and they had compelled her, practically, to subsidise or to pay blackmail to the whole population of Central Asia from the Indian frontier up to the Russian frontier. And look at the enormous extent of territory India now had to defend. She had to maintain an army of 225,900 men, because they had given her a frontier of something like 1,500 miles to defend against Russia; and now to improve the matter they had given her a frontier down on the south-eastern side of India to defend against France. In addition to that, look at the charges with which they saddled her. Not only did she pay the expense of every British soldier sent out to garrison India from the moment he left these shores, but India had also to pay a very large sum for the training of these soldiers in the United Kingdom. The sum of £600,000 a year was paid by India for that purpose. It had been said that night, as a set-off against that, that India paid nothing for the British Navy. That was not the case. India paid £106,000 as an appropriation in aid of the expenditure of the Navy.

Admiral FIELD: Only this year.

Mr. MACLEAN said she paid it regularly, and he should say that that was a larger amount of money than would pay the whole expense of the East Indian Squadron. If they compared that with what was done by Australia or any of their colonies, they would see how much they took from India for this purpose. Not only was that contribution paid, but India had to maintain two monitors at Bombay for the defence of that port; she had also to purchase gunboats and torpedo-boats and catchers, and she had to maintain, as well, an Indian Marine, which did all the trooping service around her own coasts, and some of the vessels of which were used to convey the troops to Suakin. He thought it would be admitted that India really at the present moment paid a much larger share than she ought to do of the Imperial burdens. He might mention that, in addition to these charges, India maintained the agencies in the Persian Gulf, subsidised the Sultan of Muscat, and supported such unpaying possessions as Aden and the Somali dependencies on the opposite side of the Gulf. Altogether, if they included the subsidy to the Legation in Persia, and what she spent in China, India was made responsible for the greater part of their Imperial expenditure in the whole of the East beyond the Isthmus of Suez, and no further burdens ought to be placed on her until these matters were fairly enquired into, and until they saw whether she did not at present pay more than her fair share of Imperial expenditure. He opposed the motion on the ground that it was being pressed against the wishes of the Government and the people of India. It was being pressed against the public opinion of this country also. The Government has no supporter in the press who said that this was a fair charge for them to make; and he was astonished at the perversity of a Government which, after throwing over with a light heart the most important legislative measure of the Session, now came forward and obstinately persisted in laying this charge on the people of India. He did not think the noble lord in his speech, or the Government as a body, had shown any adequate sense of the value of India to this country, or they would not have ventured to make such a proposition. What was it that made England occupy such an immense place in the imagination of mankind, except that she possessed the wealth, the power, and the glory that attached to the dominion of India? India was of far more value to them, in matters of trade, than all their self-governing colonies put together. They were told the other day that they ought to enter into some new-fangled arrangement in order to obtain a qualified free trade with 300 millions of people. Why, they had perfect free trade with 250 millions already. India demanded no preferential treatment for her goods, and she would not get any, as they knew. Their friends from Lancashire would take care of that. And he might say, in a parenthesis, that he would warn his friends from Lancashire, who came down there to demand that warlike expeditions should be sent for Imperial purposes, if they thought India was going to pay for them, they must be prepared to bear the fresh taxation which would be necessary to enable her to do so. They knew that India could barely pay her way now. She had had to increase her taxation in order to do it, and here they were ready to make fresh charges on her. They knew she had had to increase the pay of her native troops in order that she might obtain an adequate supply of men, and General Brackenbury had stated that further charges would have to be made in order to increase the supply of English officers for the native army. With all these things within their recollection, how could they dare to say to the Government and people of India, that they must pay this paltry charge to relieve the British Treasury. No doubt they had a despotic Government in India, and could do pretty much as they would, but it ought not to be necessary to tell the British House of Commons that no despotism, however strong it might appear, could exist for a long time unless it was based on fair administration and on the goodwill of the people subject to it. He had no doubt that goodwill would be forthcoming in time of trouble if they treated India fairly. An hon. and gallant gentleman said that night, in an interruption, that they did not call upon Canada to pay for these Imperial expeditions, because she helped them voluntarily. Had not the princes of India helped them voluntarily only lately in the Chitral expedition? Were not the Imperial service troops sent up there at the cost of the princes, and not at the cost of the Government? And if any greater danger threatened this country, if the occasion arose when England was engaged in a struggle for her very existence against a coalition of European

Powers, then England would look to her colonies and her dependencies for aid, and would expect that aid to be given voluntarily, ungrudingly, and without counting the cost. Then India would be happy and proud to take her part in that Titanic struggle, if meanwhile, they did not irritate her people and weaken the foundations of their rule thereby behaving in a shabby and sordid manner unworthy of a magnanimous people. They had, in his opinion, rightly refused to give India representative institutions, which were inconsistent with the character and traditions of the people; but because they had taken upon themselves the great responsibility of governing that country without representative institutions, it was all the more necessary that they should be scrupulously careful in their dealings with India. It was a case in which the maxim *noblesse oblige* applied with especial weight. He had risen to to second the amendment because he believed that the claim of India in this matter was founded on reason and justice and was supported by authority and above all, that it appealed with an irresistible force to the sense of honour of the English people.

MR. VICARY GIBBS.

MR. VICARY GIBBS said he supported the amendment, because he believed that, in taking this course, he was doing his duty, not merely by India, but by England as well. There was one part of the speech of the right hon. gentleman opposite with which he could not quite agree. He seemed to have fears that, in consequence of the extension of their territory in Africa, the demands on the Indian troops would increase. He quite agreed that these demands were likely to increase, and he desired that they should be able to be increased. He thought that, considering the immense difficulties they had in England in producing a sufficient army for their Imperial requirements, it was most desirable that they should be able to draw upon India; but it was most desirable that they should draw upon her on terms which were satisfactory to the Government of India as well as to the Government of England. He could not think that it was in the interest of this country that they should, for a trivial sum such as this, produce a feeling in India that they were prepared to sacrifice the opinion of the Indian Government to suit the economic views of the British Treasury. There was another point to which the right hon. gentleman referred on which he should like to comment. It had been said by the noble lord the Secretary of State for India, that this case was differentiated from that of Mombasa, because Egypt had a special interest for India. He had no doubt that that was said, but consider for a moment whether Egypt could possibly be indifferent to the result of English warlike operations in any part of the world. India depended upon England, and if the present course could be defended, then in any warlike operations upon which England embarked it could be shown that India had an interest for which in his judgment, it was as much entitled to be called upon to pay as it was in the present case. This was not a question of the retention of Egypt in which they were concerned. Could any one on the Treasury Bench get up and say that since the fall of Khartum, there had been any sort of representation from the Indian Government that they regarded their interest as seriously endangered, or the Suez Canal seriously endangered because the Sudan had passed out of the control of Egypt? If it was essential to the proper holding of India that Egypt should belong to England, what became of all the statements that as soon as Egypt was strong enough to run alone they should leave Egypt? It seemed to him that the plan of the Government was unjust, mean and impolitic, and on that account he felt compelled to support the amendment.

On the return of teh SPEAKER after the usual interval,

MR. BHOWNAGGREE.

MR. M. M. BHOWNAGGREE said that he had approached the consideration of the Resolution, since it was put down on paper, with some misgivings, but, at the same time, in view of the promise made with regard to the production of the despatch from the Indian Government, he had kept his mind perfectly open. They now had the despatch of the Government of India before them, with the reply of the Secretary of State, whose eloquent explanation he had also heard, with attention, and, having kept his mind open up to that afternoon, he had now come to a conclusion which he would presently state. He must, however, first offer his congratulations to her Majesty's Government on the one hand and to India on the other, on the fresh proof which had been accorded on behalf of the British nation of the confidence which was felt in the loyalty, the devotion, and the valour of the Indian troops, by their being called upon to serve in Egypt. (Cheers.) He wished he could carry this sentiment of congratulation further into the consideration of this question; but he was sorry he felt himself utterly unable to do so. The noble lord had referred to precedents; and there were earlier precedents than those which had been cited. In the first China War, under the East India Company, India paid, as is now demanded, the ordinary expenses; but it must be remembered that between the company and the Government of the day there were mutual relations involving reciprocal concessions. In the Persian Expedition India bore the ordinary charges and one-half the extraordinary charges, and there was good reason for it, because the Persian Expedition was undertaken mainly in the interests of India. To the third precedent, that of the second China War, he wished to direct special attention, because Sir Stafford Northcote, in submitting a Resolution to the House on the Abyssinian Expedition, admitted that no expenses at all were charged to India, and the reason he gave was that "much tenderness was felt for India on account of the Mutiny." Looking at the discontent with which the present motion was regarded in India, the expressions used by Sir Stafford Northcote might be recalled with significance and force. The noble lord, the Secretary for India, had laid special stress upon the decision to which Lord Cross came in 1887 as the result of the representations made by the Government of India. And in Lord Cross's despatch dated February 3rd, 1887, it was stated that he had impressed upon the Treasury that, in the event of the employment of Indian troops outside India in future, no part of the expenditure should be charged to India without the previous assent of the Governor General in Council. That was what he might describe as the final decision of her Majesty's Government in regard to the employment of Indian troops outside India; and he should have thought the noble lord would have insisted upon the observance at any cost of the principle enunciated in that despatch by Lord Cross. He gratefully acknowledged that the noble lord had carried that principle to its right conclusion when he resisted the demand of the Treasury to call upon India to pay the ordinary charges of the troops sent to Mombasa a few months ago. He should have thought that the noble lord would have had no difficulty in pursuing that principle again, and in insisting that the ordinary charges of the Indian troops sent to Suakin now should not be claimed from India. He regarded this matter from more points of view than one. It had been attempted to be made out that India had an interest in the present complications in Egypt, but when they looked back on the history of the origin of the expedition to Dongola, and searched the speeches of the Ministers in regard to it, they would not find the slightest allusion to any interest India had in the expedition. The purpose of the expedition was acknowledged to be purely Egyptian—namely, to recover the lost territory around Dongola. No later than Friday last the First Lord of the Treasury stated that the expedition was in the interest of Egypt; that it should be carried out at the cost of Egypt, and that if it should happen—a contingency which the right hon. gentleman did not anticipate—that England had to come to the financial assistance of Egypt, the House of Commons would, of course, be taken fully into the confidence of the Government. If, then, it be a fact that not a penny out of the British Treasury was to be devoted to this expedition, why should a large sum be taken out of the Indian Treasury for such a purpose? It was not because of the £35,000 or £40,000 which would be charged to India that he objected to the action of the Government, but it was because of the principle involved. He denied that India had even the remotest interest in the expedition to Dongola. Whether or not the Egyptian Government succeeded in regaining the lost territory of the Sudan, no one can say that the Suez Canal was in danger—(hear, hear)—and, that being admitted, the last shred of excuse for saying that India had an interest in the expedition, was removed. (Hear, hear.) He would make any sacrifice in reason to maintain an intimate loyal connection between India and England, and if her Majesty's Government were to appeal to the Indian Government saying that they required the loan of these Indian soldiers and Indian vessels for some Imperial object, he should support their demand, at least to

some extent. But he could not support the present demand when it was based on the assumption that the interests of India were involved. If the logic of that statement were once accepted, it would be said that the interests of India were at stake whenever we went to war in any country the way to which lay through the Suez Canal. (Hear, hear.) When Indian soldiers were called upon to fight against Britain's foes, statesmen proclaimed their sympathy with Indian interests; we then say to him—

"You are good in heart and hand;
You are a credit to your calling and to all your native land.
May your luck be never failing, may your love be ever true,
God bless you, Tommy Atkins, here's your country's love to you."

But when the battle is won and peace restored, how is this love expressed? When in our own colonies, as well as in foreign countries, Indian subjects of her Majesty—not only coolies, but merchants and traders, men who helped to make British settlements—were treated in a manner that was a disgrace to the Empire, were robbed of the rights that belonged to them not only as citizens of the Empire, but as human beings, without a word of protest from Statesmen who have the direction of foreign and colonial affairs, no wonder this talk about care for Indian interests was regarded as hollow by the whole community of India. The people of India keenly watched how their interests were guarded by the Imperial Government of the day, whatever Party was in power, and mistakes like those he had alluded to shook their belief in the beneficence of British rule in India. He was sorry that he had been compelled to say these things; but he should have neglected his duty to the people of India if he had not given expression to the sense of deep injustice which the demand made in the noble lord's Resolution aroused in their minds. (Opposition cheers.) He should think that the British spirit of fair play would recoil from the attempt to relieve the burdens of the British taxpayer at the expense of such a poor country as India. (Hear, hear!) Such an attempt was acceptable neither in the sight of God nor of man. "In the house of the righteous there is much treasure, but in the revenues of the wicked there is trouble;" and there would be trouble some day if the unwise policy contained in the Resolution were persisted in, and those who made it their mission in life to expound to the people of India the benefits of British rule were thereby rendered powerless for good. He besought her Majesty's Government to withdraw the Resolution—(cheers)—and if they would not do that, let them at least place the charges with regard to the Indian troops on the same basis as those for the English troops—a debt to be discharged out of Egyptian funds. The Resolution would give rise to an amount of discontent in India which few hon. members could realise. (Hear, hear!)

MR. R. B. HALDANE.

MR. R. B. HALDANE said that he would be expressing the feeling of many Members when he referred to the pleasure which it had given him to listen to the speech of the hon. member who had just sat down. The hon. member had spoken as a native of India with singular moderation and directness, and, what was most important, in no sense on party lines. He agreed that the conduct of both parties on this subject had been not a little inconsistent. There had been great inconsistencies in the course which the Leaders of the Liberal Parties had taken; but a point had been reached when it was possible for the House to lay down principles which should be just to India, and at the same time fit to be relied on in the future. The doctrine laid down by the noble lord the Secretary of State was apparently this—that it was right for the Government, two months after the event, to ask the sanction of the House of Commons to the use of Indian troops for Imperial purposes. That doctrine was in accordance neither with the spirit nor the letter of the Constitution. It had been challenged more than once, and it would be wrong to allow this occasion to go by without a protest, lest silence should be construed into an admission to be quoted in the future. It was of great constitutional importance to lay down the principle that in the interests, not only of the people of India, but of this country also, it was not right for the Government of the day to assume the legal and constitutional powers of making use of Indian troops—a standing army outside the standing army over which Parliament had control—for the purpose of sudden and unexpected expeditions and small wars. This question had been raised in connection with Abyssinia, Egypt, Burma, and Malta, and on the last occasion the very strongest protest was made by the present President of the Council then Lord Hartington. The noble Lord said: "I maintain that the powers of the Government for making war are far greater than they have been at any previous time; and I believe that the precautions and restrictions which Parliament has always thought it necessary to take against the existence of a standing army should not be relaxed, but rather strengthened." He did not admit that the days were gone by when it was necessary to maintain the doctrine contained in the Bill of Rights—that the House of Commons alone should have control over the size of the standing army at the disposition of the Government. There was no pretence to a divine right of kings now-a-days; but there was a pretence to a divine right of Cabinets and Executive Governments to undertake and spring upon the country expeditions on which the country had not been consulted, and which came to the notice of the House for the first time when it was asked for its approval to a policy which it was to late to revoke. He did not wish unduly to limit the power of the Government in the conduct of affairs. At times they must act upon an emergency, as when they had to face an unexpected call to war, which arose through no choice of their own. Then the Government took the responsibility of immediate action, and the House of Commons in such circumstances, would always be ready to give its sanction and support to the Government. But that was not the case in the present instance. The House and the country knew nothing of this expedition to the Sudan until they read of it in the newspapers; and then long after the expedition had been undertaken and the Indian troops had been despatched, the Government asked Parliament for its approval of steps which could not be retraced. The House ought to declare that it had not relaxed its control over the means which the Executive possessed for waging war. It was high time to show that the House had not parted with any of the privileges which it undoubtedly possessed at one time. Before the Government could make use of Indian troops, it was the business of the Government to get the previous and not the subsequent consent of Parliament. There were certain admissions which he was ready to make. In the first place he would admit that the command of the Indian troops was in the Crown; but the extent of the troops which were at the command of the Crown was a question entirely for the House of Commons, and not for the Executive at all. His second proposition was that the Imperial troops in the Queen's dominions were limited to those the raising of which was sanctioned by the annual Army Acts with one exception only—namely, the troops in India, which were for the use of the Government of India only within the limits of India, unless Parliament should give its consent to their use outside those limits, just as it might give its consent to the increase of the ordinary Army. There was nothing in the India Government Act which contradicted in any way the doctrine he had laid down. That doctrine was as true to-day as when it was first laid down. Lastly, he contended that in all cases of the kind in question it was necessary for the Government to obtain the consent of Parliament before they acted, and that this consent was to be distinguished from subsequent consent or acceptance. (Hear, hear!) The argument put forward by the noble lord the Secretary for India, if it was justifiable, would come to this: that it would be within the power of the Government of the day, without the previous consent of Parliament, to take Indian troops out of India to Gibraltar and elsewhere, or even to bring them, and move them, in ships on the coasts of this island. The effect, of course, would be that the Government would have the power of increasing the strength of the standing army of this country, independently of the consent or control of Parliament. (Hear, hear!) He was enunciating no new principle. In fact, there was no principle of our Constitution that had been laid down with more persistency and greater clearness since the reign of the Stuarts than that the standing army in time of peace was under the control of Parliament, and that the previous consent of Parliament was necessary to the increase of the Army. It had likewise been laid down with equal clearness in the India Government Act, 1858, and other Acts, that, except under clearly-defined circumstances affecting India herself, Indian troops should not be employed by the Government of this country beyond the frontiers of India.

itself, without the previous consent of Parliament. By the Army Annual Act, moreover, Parliament controlled, year after year, the numbers of our standing army in time of peace, and the very object of the Act was to prevent Governments of the day raising a greater force than was necessary, and to protect the country from small and sudden military expeditions. (Hear, hear!) But the noble lord invited the House to throw over altogether the main principle of the Army Annual Act, for if the Government of the day had the power of employing Indian or Colonial troops in an expedition they were carrying out, the effect practically was to increase the force of our standing army, independent of the consent or control of Parliament. (Hear, hear.) But he denied absolutely that any Government of this country had that power. As long as the Bill of Rights and the Army Annual Bill remained, it would be a direct violation of the constitution to bring troops from any foreign source into any part of the Queen's dominions without the previous consent of Parliament. It was equally a violation of the laws that had been enacted in relation to our government of India to take her troops beyond her frontier, as in this case, without first consulting Parliament. It was a violation, both in the spirit and the letter, of the Army Annual Bill, and it behoved Parliament to be very jealous of its prerogative in this matter. (Hear, hear.) He believed there was as much danger from Cabinets to-day as there was in the days of the Stuarts. More and more a tendency was becoming apparent on the part of Cabinets to consider themselves free from the control of Parliament, especially in regard to small military expeditions, such as the one under discussion, at a distance and in time of peace. And Parliament should be alive to the danger. In 1858, when the India Bill was discussed, Mr. Gladstone was so conscious of the difficulty and danger involved in the matter—was so anxious to make it clear that the Indian army should not be used by the Government of this country in addition to our standing army in such expeditions as that now in Egypt, that he moved a clause on the point which was actually carried by the House of Commons, and was only altered somewhat when it reached the House of Lords. The clause was in these terms—that, except for preventing or repelling actual invasion, or for meeting any sudden and urgent necessity, Her Majesty's forces in India should not be employed for any military purpose beyond the external frontiers of India without the consent of Parliament. As he had said, the clause was somewhat altered by the House of Lords, because it seemed to restrict unduly the prerogative of the Crown, but in the end it was passed in the form in which it now stood in the Act—Clause 55, and it also contained the words that—"the revenues of India cannot, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be applied to defray the expense of any military operation beyond the frontiers of that country." Was there in these words any repeal of the Act of Settlement—anything inconsistent with the Mutiny Act, or with the doctrine in point if its control of its standing army is to be subject to Parliament? Was there anything in this to justify any reasonable man in saying that the consent of Parliament was consent after the event, instead of before the event? Mr. Gladstone said the word "consent," whether used in an Act of Parliament or in the House meant previous consent. If that was the case it was impossible to allow this matter to pass now without some sort of protest. The doctrine of the noble lord amounted to this, that for the future it would be said, you allow without protestation a motion to pass on the footing that it was within the right of the Government and the perogative of the Crown to make use of Indian troops as an extra and additional force with which to wage their wars. That would be a very convenient doctrine, especially when taken with the addendum that they might charge the people of India with the cost so long as the charge was not an extra charge.

Lord George Hamilton: I only said on that point and on many others that lawyers differed.

Mr. Haldane pointed out that in regard to the Mombasa expedition, the noble lord said no Resolution was necessary. That meant that the Government had the right to take troops for the Mombasa expedition or anything of the kind without going to Parliament. He maintained that they were face to face with a very grave question of principle. He did not wish to raise it in any acrimonious spirit. He was only taking the ground which had been taken by the party opposite. It was true that the Liberal party had been guilty of inconsistencies and injustices with the administration of the forces under the great Indian Government Act of 1858; but this, at least, they might say, that some of the severest criticism of their methods, some of the hardest things said against them, some of the most definite layings-down of principles came from hon. members prominent on the Front Bench opposite, and who were now themselves acting contrary to the doctrines they had previously maintained. These principles ought to be maintained. They could not be laid aside and regarded as obsolete because they had to deal with a Cabinet instead of a crowned head. He supported the amendment, in the first place, for the sake of India. We were stronger than the people of India. But we held the power as trustees, and were not entitled to abuse our trust by making it something which was used for our own profit and not for theirs. The Government of India had their interest in these matters. Surely of that the Government of India were the best judges, and when they sent despatches entreating the Government of the day to hold their hand, and pointing out that misunderstanding and bad feeling would be aroused in India, then surely it was not only the province but the duty of the House of Lords to step forward and say that the course alike of generosity and policy compelled them to resist the proposal that the revenues of India should be used in a matter about which India had not been consulted, and about which India, except in the most remote way, had neither lot nor part. In the second place, he supported the motion for the sake of a great and useful vital principle. Just as Parliament limited the powers of the Crown in days gone by, so he held that Parliament must continue to limit the power of the Government over the troops which it had at its command. He believed that the constitutional safeguard of the Act of Settlement remained intact and unaffected. He believed that the doctrine laid down by Lord Camden and Lord Bathurst, by the great statesmen of a century ago, and by Lord Hartington and Lord Selborne more recently, was true to-day; and with that faith, and in that conviction, and with a feeling that it was a matter upon which all sides of the House had done well to unite in raising their testimony, he, for one, would support the amendment.

Mr. E. Lawrence.

Mr. Edwin Lawrence said the House had listened to a most interesting constitutional speech, but it might be worth while to bring the House back for a few moments to the question at issue. That question was whether India had or had not an immediate interest in the expedition now undertaken in the Sudan. He held with those who said years ago that no power could hold Egypt which did not also hold the Upper Nile. Therefore he felt when England years ago abandoned the Upper Nile she had taken a course which sooner or later she would have to reverse, and that she would have to re-conquer the Upper Nile. Knowing something of engineering, he believed it was possible for a civilised Power holding the Upper Nile to so divert its tributaries that a rising of the Nile should be no longer possible. Therefore he held that it was of vital importance that those who held Egypt should also hold the Upper Nile, and he appealed to his hon. friend who spoke on behalf of the people of India, and whose presence they welcomed in the House of Commons, that India was interested in the expedition, because she was interested in Egypt and the Upper Nile. With these views he felt that it was right that India should pay some portion of the cost. But as a matter of fact India was not asked to pay anything. She was only asked to allow a certain number of troops now in barracks to have an opportunity of fighting in Egypt. He believed there was no body of Indian troops that would not like to be selected for the work, and that nothing would make the Service more popular in India than the movement of these Indian troops to the Sudan. In these circumstances, he failed to see any reason for the great protest of the Indian Press. India's future depended on the preservation of the way to India. If ever we ceased to hold the pass through the Suez Canal we should lose our hold over India. Therefore India was interested as much, if not more, than this country, and he felt sure that when the matter was fully understood in India the Indian people would feel that the Government were taking the right course. He strongly supported the Motion.

Sir Andrew Scoble.

Sir Andrew Scoble said he certainly agreed with the last speaker that the Indian army was ready to fight side by side

with our own army in any campaign where the dignity, honour, and interest of England were concerned. Therefore he had no doubt—though his hon. friend appeared to be under some misapprehension as to the sort of duty they would have to discharge at Suakin—that these troops would go there cheerfully in the hope that they might have a chance sooner or later of going to the front. But that was not what they had to consider. He was very glad that the debate had not been a party debate. What they had to consider was this. What were the precedents which ought to guide them, on this occasion, and in the absence of precedents, what was the course which the House ought to take? It was admitted by the Secretary of State that there was really no governing precedent in this matter, and the House had to make a precedent to-night. The nearest precedent was that of 1885, in which the House came to a decision behind the backs of the Government of India. Since that decision it had been recognised, both at the India Office and the Treasury, that the Government of India had the right to be consulted before any expenditure on this account was adopted. Therefore they had to consider what they ought to do on this occasion. His noble friend took credit to himself for having in his last despatch laid down three principles which ought to guide the Government. The noble lord wrote: "The true principles upon which the relations between England and India should rest, are that the Indian army should be considered a branch of her Majesty's Imperial army." That, he thought, everyone in the House would confirm—"That, when circumstances and the safety of India permit, aid should be freely given to the Imperial Government." That was another point which would command universal acquiescence—"But when the objects of the expedition or campaign are unconnected with India, the whole of the expenses of the troops drawn from India should be paid by the Imperial Exchequer, just as the whole of the expenses of the troops drawn England for an Indian expedition would be paid by Indian revenues." It was the third point they had to decide; it was for the House to determine upon whom was to rest the responsibility of saying whether the objects of the expedition were connected or unconnected with India. He was ready to admit that in the interest of Egypt it was proper that the Sudan campaign should be undertaken, and that if in pursuing the present Sudan policy we could give a helping hand to our friends the Italians further south, it was our duty and our interest to do so. But the Sudan operations did not seem to him to be in the slightest degree connected with Indian interests. The noble lord told them that the free passage to India was a desirable thing to maintain. He evidently had in mind the Suez Canal, but did anybody with the slightest geographical knowledge mean to say it made any difference whatever to the free use of the Suez Canal whether the Egyptians were at Wady Halfa or at Dongola? He could not understand how it could be said that this expedition had even an indirect bearing upon the free transit of our troops, our commerce, and our travellers between England and India. This very question arose in 1885, and how was it dealt with by the Government of India of that day? They had not an opportunity of putting their views before Parliament before the Vote was passed, but they wrote—"There is no question now of the safety of the Suez Canal, which was urged in 1882 as a reason why the Indian Government should bear its share in the expenditure then to be incurred. The operations taking place in the Sudan have no connection with any Indian interests, and lie altogether outside the sphere of our responsibilities. We can look for neither advantage nor loss from them. The pretentions and the aims of the leaders of the rising in Africa are a matter of indifference to the Government of India, which is in no way interested in disputing or putting down by by force the claims of political or religious pretenders in regions of the world remote from its own limits and from those of its neighbours." If that argument was good then it was equally good now, and by whom was that put forward? By the Government of Lord Dufferin, than whom there was no statesman of a more Imperial mind. Those arguments ought to have been present to the mind of the Government before they resolved to make the present demand. Precisely the same view was taken of the Sudan operations by Lord Elgin's Government as was taken in 1885 by Lord Dufferin's Government. In spite of all the protests, and for the paltry sum of £35,000, they were to do this mischief, for there could not be any doubt whatever that mischief would follow, mischief of a character which was not appreciated by a good many members of the House. For the miserable and wretched sum of £35,000 they were asked to blacken the faces of the Government of India and to raise a spirit of disaffection amongst the Indian people. It appeared to him that this Vote, if passed would be passed rather from a desire not to embarrass the Government than from any feeling that the demand was a righteous one. He was very sorry that the Government, who was strong enough to have taken a righteous course, had not taken it. It was a disappointment to him that, having the opportunity of doing the right thing, they had failed to do it.

SIR W. WEDDERBURN.

Sir W. WEDDERBURN was sorry the noble Lord the Secretary of State for India had made this a question of confidence, and not left his supporters to vote freely. The good name of the House and the country was involved, and, therefore, the pressure of party discipline should not have been brought to bear on any member to vote either one way or the other. The question of finality was also involved, for no one could suppose that a party vote would dispose of the matter. He had the honour of serving on the Royal Commission which had to deal, amongst other things, with the apportionment of the charges between England and India, and he felt the labours of that Commission would be very much aided by such a free discussion of this question in the House as could take place if no pressure were employed. He regarded both parties as sinners in respect to their dealings with India, but if anything the Tories had the better record, and therefore it did not lay with the Liberals to call the Tory kettle black. There were five important precedents, of which three were bad; the cases of Abyssinia, of Egypt in 1882, and of the Sudan in 1885. These were cases in which the recommendations and protests of the Government of India were set aside by the Liberal Government. There were two good precedents, those of Malta and of Mombasa, and they were both made by a Conservative Government. It appeared to him it was not too late even now for the Government to allow the House a free hand in this matter. When the noble Lord decided to wait until the Government of India had an opportunity of putting forward their own view of the case, he thought the noble Lord was building a golden bridge for his own retreat. (Hear, hear.) Having already two good precedents, it would be well if he would make a third; and if the Government were not willing to change the recommendation they had made, they might, at all events, leave the responsibility of a decision to the free judgment of the House. There were two important declarations made by two Conservative Secretaries of State. In 1887, Lord Cross laid down the doctrine of the veto to be exercised by the Government of India; and again the present Secretary of State laid down on the 30th of June last, the excellent doctrine of reciprocity between India and England. The noble Lord's three rules must recommend themselves to all sides of the House; but on one point, perhaps, they did not come up to the full extent of reciprocity. His first proposition was that, when temporary and urgent need arose, assistance should be promptly given by either party; but the reciprocity stopped if the two conditions existed under the second and the third rules, for this reason that the objects for which an Indian contingent was required was generally temporary and emergent, whereas the objects for which British troops were required in India were of a more permanent kind. Therefore, in order to give the Indian people advantage from this reciprocity, we must make an allowance with regard to British troops serving in India, although they remained from year to year. If that point was conceded and complete reciprocity established between the two Governments everything would be settled on a fairly equitable basis, and it would then not be necessary to consider very carefully this difficult question of what were special interests because it would not matter much, for whatever the decision was it would apply equally to both parties. At present the Indian Government made enormous payments every year for British troops, not only for the use of them in India, but also for the transport and training of them. If an account was taken for the past it would be found, however much might be charged against India, there would be a large balance in her favour. The suppression of the Indian Mutiny was a matter specially affecting the welfare of England. British supremacy in India was vital to the British nation. Yet on the suppression of the Mutiny not a penny was paid by England and

unfortunate India was saddled with a debt of about £46,000,000. It was said that India would be put to no additional expense, and would, therefore, lose nothing by the proposed arrangement; but allowance ought to be made for the effect of these requisitions on the military budget of India; it would be necessary to make provisions for the average annually required for such contingents. It might be that Indian troops were willing to serve in other parts of the world, but it must be remembered that Suakin was a very unhealthy place, and the liability of Indian troops to be sent to unhealthy climates made recruiting in India more costly and more difficult. Another point to be remembered was the difficulty the Viceroy would be placed in his own Legislative Council when he had to bring forward proposals for granting money for purposes regarded as illegitimate by the whole public opinion of India. What a position it was to put a Viceroy in to compel him, in the face of his own Despatch, to assure the Council that the payment could properly be passed by the representatives of the people of India. It had been pointed out that since 1892 a different complexion had been given to the Viceroy's Council, and that there were in the Council men who in a great measure did represent the people of India. The Viceroy himself, his Finance Minister, and the Military Member would have a bad quarter of an hour when they brought forward these proposals and, against their own declared convictions, proceeded to force them through by means of their mechanical majority. He earnestly urged the Government to reconsider their decision.

Sir M. Hicks-Beach.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach), who, on rising, was received with Ministerial cheers, said: I think it my duty to trespass for a time on the attention of the House on this subject, but I shall be as brief as possible, because I am aware that there are several other members who are anxious to address the House. I will not attempt to follow the right hon. gentleman the member for Montrose, or the hon. member who spoke a little time ago, into the question of constitutional law, as to the power of the Government of the day to employ Indian troops without a previous Resolution to the House. It is the view of her Majesty's Government that there could be no ground for asking the House of Commons to come to a Resolution upon the subject unless it related to the question of the payment of the troops. (Hear, hear.) That matter may arise on another occasion; to-night, at any rate, it does not arise at all, although the right hon. gentleman opposite took up a very considerable period of time—(hear, hear)—in impressing the House with his views on the subject. We gave notice, as soon as we had arrived at the decision that India should have this charge, of our intention to propose the Resolution which has been proposed by my noble friend, and if that Resolution has been delayed for a month it has been delayed solely, as the House is aware, in deference to what I am quite sure is the universal desire of the House to be thoroughly acquainted with the views of the Government of India before arriving at a decision. (Ministerial cheers.) Therefore, Sir, in this case at any rate, there is no necessity whatever for me to go into the merits of a question of constitutional law, on which two such eminent persons as Lord Cairns and Lord Selborne hold diametrically opposite views. The right hon. gentleman the member for Montrose found some fault with my noble friend for devoting a very small portion of his speech to the past history of matters in the Sudan. He said that the question before us to-night was not whether the expedition which had been undertaken to Dongola was right or wrong or whether it was right or wrong to employ Indian troops in garrisoning Suakin; but when I listened to the speech of the right hon. gentleman I could not help thinking that he had largely pre-judged this question which is now before us, and that not a few hon. members on his side of the House have done the same, owing to their conviction—which, of course, they are perfectly entitled to hold—that our policy in Egypt, in sanctioning this expedition to Dongola, has been wrong, and that, therefore, they could not approve of any motion which should provide funds for purposes connected with that expedition, whether those funds were to be provided by England, by India, or by Egypt herself. (Hear, hear.) I will not attempt to argue that part of the question. Neither will I dwell upon the suggestion of the right hon. gentleman that this matter before us to-night is part of a policy on the part of her Majesty's Government to employ the army of India in unhallowed expeditions for the conquest of the habitable globe.

Mr. J. Morley: I beg pardon for interrupting the right hon. baronet, but I did not refer to her Majesty's Government in that respect; on the contrary, I desired to express my opinion that the apprehensions of the Government of India, which the noble lord had raised, that they might have to provide troops on a larger scale were not ill-founded. There was no attack on the Government.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer: I think the right hon gentleman laid stress upon some suggestions of the Government of India that they might have a reasonable apprehension of some kind of policy of that sort on the part of her Majesty's Government, and the right hon. gentleman went on to quote some words, which have now become celebrated, of the Prime Minister, to the effect that we must not look upon India as an English barrack in the Oriental seas from which we may draw any number of troops without paying for them. Sir, those words were quoted with approval by the right hon. gentleman, they were cheered by his followers behind him, and I confess I was delighted to find that the wit and wisdom of the Prime Minister were for once properly appreciated on that side of the House. (Cheers.) I entirely agree, and every member of her Majesty's Government agrees in that sentiment of the Prime Minister's; it is as true now as it was when he uttered it. But there is nothing in what we are now proposing in any way contrary to that sentiment. (Hear, hear.) Addressing an audience in the country a little time ago, the right hon. gentleman said that if we passed such a motion as this we should admit that there is an unlimited reservoir of Indian forces which may be applied to unlimited and indefinite objects (Opposition cheers.) Nothing can be more definite as an object than the garrisoning of Suakin—the number of forces is strictly limited to 2,500, and the time even is limited to the close of the year. (Cheers.) Therefore, all these wild apprehensions of the right hon. gentleman are entirely beside the mark. What we have to decide to-night is an issue of importance—it is not merely a matter of £35,000, as the right hon. gentleman seems to think—(hear, hear)—it is an issue of importance, but it is a comparatively narrow one. It is whether, in the circumstances before us and in similar circumstances in the future, India shall do in the service of the Empire what India has done in the past. (Cheers.) I entirely agree with my noble friend the Secretary for India that the proposal which he has made to the House is a more favourable one to India than has ever been made before under similar circumstances. (Cheers.) He had proposed no more than was proposed in 1885, that India should bear the ordinary expenses of her troops which she would have had to bear if those troops had remained in India; but he had coupled with that proposition certain statements of opinion as to the policy to be pursued in future as between the Government of India and the Imperial Government which have met with the approval of the hon. baronet opposite who has just sat down, and which, I venture to say, will be considered by those who have taken up a strong line on this matter on behalf of India as far more favourable to them than any propositions that have ever yet been accepted by the Government of this country. (Hear, hear.) Let me recall the House for a few minutes to what occurred in this matter with regard to the Abyssinian expedition. It was proposed by the Government of the day that the ordinary pay of the large number of Indian troops employed in that expedition should continue to be borne by the Government of India. Mr. Gladstone was then in opposition, and Mr. Gladstone supported the proposal of the Government of the day. We probably entertain on opposition sides of the House different ideas of the political career of Mr. Gladstone, but no one has ever accused him of a want of consideration for weaker races or for India. But what did Mr. Gladstone say with regard to the employment of Indian troops in the Abyssinian expedition, in which we all admit now India had a very remote interest indeed? Mr. Gladstone on that occasion rather blamed the Government for being more liberal towards India than to England. Mr. Fawcett, who was opposing the Motion at the time, dwelt upon what he considered to be the injustice to India in making her pay this portion of the expenses of the campaign, whereas, on the other hand, she was compelled to pay the whole cost of English troops that were sent out to India. Mr. Gladstone, in his reply, almost ridiculed the idea that there was any

injustice to India in the matter. He dwelt at some length upon the question, and he repudiated the idea that any adequate return was made for the responsibility of the United Kingdom for the defence of India merely by the payment by India of the English troops that happened to be there at any given moment. He said:—"Our responsibility for the military government of India is not measured by the amount of English troops there. We are bound to keep in reserve a force adequate to meet all the contingent demands of India. Suppose India wants men—a soldier cannot be made in a day. But we are bound to keep up the stock of soldiers from which the wants of India can be supplied at a moment's notice. India again ceases to want men. Three, four, or five regiments are sent back, and the moment they come to England they become matter of charge against us. They do not come back because we want them, but because India does not want them." The right hon. gentleman summed up the whole position in these words:—"England must keep a military bank on which India can draw cheques at pleasure, and to which again, when it suits her, she may make remittances whether we have employment for them or not." Therefore, at that time, such an authority as Mr. Gladstone thought that there was no ground for this charge of injustice to India which is made against us to-day when we are asking India to continue to bear the ordinary pay of her troops which she has sent to the Sudan. (Hear, hear.) That was the language of Mr. Gladstone in 1867. With regard to what occurred in 1882 and 1885, let me in the first place name two points on which I think we are all agreed. I do not think that I have heard this evening any objection taken to the dispatch of Indian troops to the Sudan. (Hear, hear). Certainly no one connected with the Indian Council or with the Indian Government has raised it. The hon. member for Hackney, who objected to India being compelled to bear the cost of the pay of her troops employed in the Sudan, expressed his delight that they had been sent there, as it was a proof of the mutual relations which existed between England and India. (Hear, hear). Again, I think we are agreed upon the principle that where Indian interests are concerned, India ought to pay some of the costs of expeditions undertaken to protect those interests, even if those expeditions should be outside their own territories. (Hear, hear). But, of course, as the hon. member for Hackney remarked, the point is whether this expedition to the Sudan is undertaken in furtherance of the interests of India. (Hear, hear). Of course the Government of India has always disputed the position which has been taken up from time to time by the British Government on the question. Her Majesty's Government in England has always held that Egypt possesses a very material interest for India. The Indian Government in 1882 and 1885, and in the present year, have taken a different view of the matter. They have contended that Egyptian affairs were Imperial affairs, and that the great interest involved in the Suez Canal was an English rather than an Indian interest, and that even if it were an Indian interest in any degree, it was still more a colonial interest, and that, therefore, England was not justified in asking India alone to bear a portion of the cost of any Egyptian expedition. That, I think is the view of the right non. gentleman the member for Montrose, who told the meeting to which I have already alluded, that the interests of India and Egypt as corn and cotton-growing countries were antagonistic. I do not think that I have ever heard a more narrow view put forward. Let me turn to what was said on this subject by the right hon. gentleman who sits by his side—the right hon. member for Wolverhampton. The right hon. gentleman, when he had to deal with this matter as a member of the Government in 1883, when there was a proposal that India should bear not merely the ordinary pay of her troops employed, but 60 per cent. of the extraordinary expenses incurred by the large Indian force sent to assist in putting down the rebellion in Egypt, said—"It was perversity of intellect to resist the proposal that the Indian Exchequer should pay a very small sum towards the expenses of a war which he ventured to say was in the main, if not entirely, for the benefit of our Indian Empire."

Sir HENRY FOWLER said that he was not a member of the Government at the time to which the right hon. gentleman referred.

The CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: If the right hon. gentleman was not a member of the Goverment at that time, I think that his words are entitled to even greater weight. (Hear, hear, and laughter). And then he went on to say that his opinion was that unless they had an Indian Empire to protect, no Government would have ventured to propose, and he was quite sure the country would never have sanctioned, a war in Egypt at all. (Cheers.) Well, sir, the right hon. gentleman the member for Montrose was perhaps ignorant of that expression of opinion on the part of his colleague. The right hon. gentleman found very severe fault with my noble friend the Secretary of State for India with regard to the eighth paragraph of his despatch. He characterised it as a spurious and insincere paragraph, because my noble friend put forward his views as to the interest which India has in the particular operations in which we are engaged. I admit that so far as these operations are concerned, the right hon. gentleman the member for Wolverhampton is not bound by what he said in 1883; but the right hon. gentleman the member for Montrose, a few weeks ago, challenged the opinion of this House on the policy of her Majesty's Government in undertaking these operations. That policy was fully discussed, and by a very large majority the House approved that policy as an essential part of the policy of the English Government in Egypt, in attempting to perfect and maintain the tranquillity of that country. (Cheers.) The right hon. gentleman has characterised the despatch of my right hon. friend as spurious and insincere.

Mr. J. MORLEY: That paragraph of it.

The CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: Yes, that paragraph of it. May I refer him to the opinion of a gentleman in high position and authority, Sir Alexander Arbuthnot, a member of the Council of India, and, therefore, by no means disposed to consider the question in any other light than that of the interest of India. (Hear, hear.) He said: "The main argument used by Sir James Peile and Sir Donald Stewart is that India has, in their opinion, no direct or substantial interest in the operations now in progress in the Sudan. I altogether demur to this assertion. I hold that India has a very direct and substantial interest in the safety and tranquillity of Egypt, and in safeguarding that country from attack. The position of Egypt, lying, as it does, on the direct route from England to India, being, as it is, the highway by which our British troops have to travel to and from India, renders it as essential to the interests of India as it is to British interests that Egypt should be protected from her foes, and that her present peaceful and prosperous condition should be maintained. And, if it be, as I believe it is, requisite to this end that the supremacy of Egypt in the Sudan or in a portion of it should be re-established, then I submit that the success of any operations which have to be undertaken with this object is a matter which has a direct and substantial interest for India. The truth is"—and I agree in this—"that, if it were not for her Indian Empire, England would have no practical interest in Egypt." That is the opinion of the majority of the Indian Council, who are, at any rate, as entitled to decide a question of this nature as the Indian Government. My hon. friend behind has said: "Who ought to decide this question as to whether the interests of India are or are not involved in any particular matter?" Ne doubt it is right that we should attach importance to the views of the Indian Government on any such subject; but the authority to which Parliament has deliberately entrusted the right of agreeing to or refusing any Indian expenditure is the Council of the Secretary of State in London, and the Council of the Secretary of State, after having deliberately considered this question, have decided on the grounds I have quoted, by a large majority, that India may be fairly charged with this expenditure. (Hear, hear.) Now, what is the charge proposed? Is it that India should bear one single penny of taxation more than she does now? Not a bit of it. (Cheers.) What is proposed is that India should bear the ordinary pay of her troops, which she would have had to bear if they had remained in India. (Cheers.) We are told that that is not fair, because they are taken away from India and are serving somewhere else. But does India want them? Supposing that the £35,000 were paid over to India to-morrow, would India raise more troops? Certainly not. (Hear, hear.) That idea that we are depriving India of something that she requires is altogether wrong; because, if she had required it, the Government of India would not readily I may almost say voluntarily, have assented to those troops being sent to Suakin. All that India loses is this, that troops that would be in barracks in India are in barracks at Suakin. (Cheers.) It is said by some hon. members that this means

that we are charging India for our own advantage with a larger army than she would otherwise maintain. (Opposition cheers.) I hear a cheer at that, but is it really supposed that there is any army in the world, whether it be the English army, the Indian army, or even the American army, which is merely confined to the number of troops requisite for garrison duty? (Hear, hear.) Every army must include a considerable number of men which may be available for any unforeseen emergency. (Cheers.) The Indian Government having considered, of course, the requirements of India at the time, and not considering that these 2,500 men were likely to be required for any emergency, have readily allowed them to be sent to Suakin. How can it be urged that we are imposing on India any extra burden, or that we are compelling her to employ, owing to the temporary employment of these men at Suakin, a larger force than it would be otherwise necessary for her to keep up? (Hear, hear.) That is really the whole of this question. We are not asking the taxpayers of India to bear a single penny of additional taxation. We are asking them to utilize for the benefit of the Empire of which they form a part, for the service of the Empire to which they are proud to belong, their forces, which are only too anxious to be employed in the military duties of the Empire, without the cost of a penny to themselves; and we are do nothing in this but following the precedents set in the past. (Hear, hear.) Hon. members opposite have told us that there is a commission now sitting to enquire into the apportionment of the charge between the Governments of the United Kingdom and India for purposes in which both are interested. No doubt this, as well as matters of more permanent charge, must necessarily come under the consideration of that Commission. It may be that they may disapprove of the present rule. It may be that they may not be satisfied with the proposal of my right hon. friend the Secretary of State for the future, to which I, as representing the Treasury, have readily given my consent; but pending the consideration of this question, I say we are not entitled to give such authority as is claimed to the views of the Government of India. The Government of India are not an independent Government. The Government of India are entitled to hold an opinion and to express it; but what was said by Mr. Gladstone in the very debate I have already quoted with reference to the Government of Bombay? He said:—"The Governor is not a person acting on the part of a local legislature or on the part of a nation invested with privileges; he is a confidential servant of the Secretary of State, his representative and agent at Bombay." Great though their authority may be, I say that it is subordinate to that of the Secretary of State in Council, and to that of the Government of the Queen, and I protest against making any change, without the authority of the Commission, in the practice which has hitherto been pursued. I protest against placing the Government of India in a position of almost independent authority, to which position I contend they have no claim. (Cheers.)

SIR H. H. FOWLER.

SIR HENRY FOWLER: The right hon. gentleman seems to be under the impression that hon. members on this side of the House have prejudged the question because they think that the general policy of the Government in connection with the Sudan is wrong. I can assure the right hon. gentleman that I have not approached the consideration of this question in any such spirit. The question before the House is not as to the wisdom or folly of any policy that may be pursued in Egypt. The question is, as the right hon. gentleman most fairly stated, whether in the circumstances India shall do in the service of the Empire what she has done in the past. The right hon. gentleman admits that it is an issue of importance, but he says that it is comparatively narrow. I differ from him; I think the issue is much wider; I think that he himself, in his concluding remarks, which amounted, I would almost say, to a very serious attack upon the Government of India—(cheers)—has put the question on a much broader basis. I shall ask the House to consider, not whether India shall do in the future what she has done in the past, but whether India has not been compelled to do in the past what she ought not have been compelled to do, and whether this House will impose the same burden upon her in the future. The right hon. gentleman said that the despatch of the noble lord was very much in advance of anything that has been done in the past, but the determination of the Government is very retrograde as compared with what Lord Cross laid down 10 years ago, when he said that when Indian troops are employed on duties not directly attributable to the requirements of the Government of India and are dispatched to a country distant from India, no portion of the expenses of those troops could be charged to India without the full assent and concurrence of the Government of India. The issue now is whether we shall or shall not agree with the views of Lord Cross, whether we shall or shall not put this burden upon the taxpayers of India without the full assent and concurrence of the Government of that country? (Hear, hear). I think the right hon. gentleman was inaccurate when he said that Parliament had placed the control of the expenditure of the revenue of India in the hands of the Council of India. Undoubtedly it has done so as a general rule, but Parliament has reserved cases of this kind and with reference to them Parliament alone must decide.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: What I meant was this—the control of the expenditure is placed in the hands of the Council of India. If the Council had not agreed that India should bear this expenditure, no proposal of this kind could have been made to Parliament.

SIR H. FOWLER: Even if the Council had agreed, and if the Government of India had agreed, and it has not, the final and supreme tribunal is Parliament. There is one precedent to which attention has not been specially drawn to-night. It is the case of Perak, when the Abyssinian precedent was followed—namely that India should pay the ordinary charges and that the extraordinary charges should be borne by the Imperial Exchequer. The Indian Government objected, and quoted Lord Lawrence and Sir Willian Muir, great authorities. What did Lord Salisbury say on that occasion? He said that he recognised the soundness of the principle laid down in Lord Lawrence's minute. "But that, as it appeared to the Government that the expedition to Perak would be of brief duration, and would not involve the employment of troops from India for such a length of time as to give rise to any general inconvenience or danger, and in view of the interests which India might be said to have in a speedy termination of the war, it was right to agree to an arrangement similiar to that adopted in the case of the expedition to Abyssinia." But Lord Salisbury added:—"That this was not to be regarded as a precedent for any future case in which troops might be required from the Indian Establishment for Imperial purposes." But that is one of the very precedents which have been quoted to-night as precedents which we ought to follow, although Lord Salisbury distinctly stated that it should not form a precedent for future application. (Hear, hear). A great deal has been said to-night about Mombasa, and I should like to call attention to that case and the arguments which the Treasury employed respecting it, because there can be no doubt that the Policy now submitted to Parliament is the policy of the Treasury. I think the case of Mombasa is a very good illustration of the manner in which the Treasury has approached the whole question, and I would draw attention to the reason which I am bound to assume the right hon. gentleman himself gave or sanctioned for maintaining that India should bear the entire cost of sending Indian troops to Mombasa. "My Lords" gave as their first and principal reason that the trade with Zanzibar and Mombasa amounted to £335,000 of exports and £146,000 of imports, and they thought that India had such an interest in Mombasa and Zanzibar that she was justified in sending her troops, and paying for them, to put down the rebellion that had arisen there. The right hon. gentleman is generally very accurate in his quotations, and I have no doubt he verified those quotations about the trade with Zanzibar before he gave it the Treasury stamp of being a good reason for importing troops from India. But we cannot compare these figures in pounds, shillings, and pence. We must put them into tens of rupees. I put the trade with Zanzibar higher than the right hon. gentleman has put it, but I cannot make it amount to a million tens of rupees. But is the right hon. gentleman aware of the proportion that that bears to the whole trade of India? The imports and exports of India for the year with which the right hon. gentleman was dealing, and in regard to which he thinks a million tens of rupees is to justify this interference, is to form the connecting link between the interests of India and the Indian military expenses, were 185 millions of tens of rupees. I put it to the House whether it would matter one brass farthing to India if the trade of Zanzibar were to be swept out of

existence? (Cheers.) The Treasury says that the trumpery interest of the 189th part of the whole trade in India is the justification of that interference. (Cheers.) I say that simply in passing, and I wish to come at once to the main principles involved in this question, and which are set forth with great clearness in the Despatch of the noble Lord. I I entirely agree with him as to his three principles. I think they are wise and statesmanlike, and I think they would be sound as future regulations in these Indian disputes. But I cannot assent to his application of the three principles that are to regulate the interference with the Indian troops to the reason which he gives with reference to free communication with Egypt by the shortest route. The object of the expedition has been fully dealt with to-night, and I will simply say, in one sentence, that this expedition is far more to serve Italian interests and Egyptian interests than Indian interests, and I would ask, is it just that the Indian taxpayer should be forced to find the money for the payment of the troops employed on the service of an ally of Great Britain? (Hear, hear.) The right hon. gentleman who has just sat down seemed to be very much surprised that we should demur to the interests of India being involved in this operation. I have no recollection of what I said in 1883, but I have no doubt the right hon. gentleman quoted me accurately, and I only corrected him to say that at that time I was in a position of greater freedom and less responsibility. (Ministerial laughter.) But I then held—and I hold now—that the justification of the whole military operations of 1882 was the Suez Canal; but if we follow Lord Salisbury's advice and look at a large map I do not think we shall find the interest of the Canal is in any way affected by the Sudan or the conquest of Khartum. Khartum has not been in the hands of Egypt for the last dozen years, and our communication with India has never been, I will not say imperilled, but has never been even in dispute. (Cheers.) I admit and I think that if a question arose with reference to the Suez Canal, India has a large, preponderating influence in it. So has Australia, so has New Zealand, so has Hong Kong, so has Ceylon, and so have all our settlements in the East. (Cheers.) But that question has not arisen in this case, though if it did I should be the last man to deny that India had an interest in it. But who is to be the judge as to whether India has this interest or not? I think Lord Cross gives the right answer when he says the Government of India. The hon. and learned gentleman opposite argued with great force in favour of that view. The right hon. gentleman denies that, and says it should be the Council at home. We say here to-night, whatever may be the view of the Government of India or the view of the Council at home, it must be Parliament, who must ultimately decide this question. (Cheers.) I will state as shortly as possible why I think Parliament should decide this question in favour of India. My first reason is that the revenues of India pay the whole cost of the Indian army. They pay the cost of recruiting and they pay the cost of training, and, when you say you are paying the cost of the troops, let me say that the daily pay of these troops is a very small part of what they cost. (Cheers.) No one knows better than the Chancellor of the Exchequer that that is not the rule which is applied with reference to the employment of British troops in India. India pays for every British soldier that is sent there—every shilling which that soldier has cost from the moment of his enlistment to the day of his death, including his pension. (Ministerial cries of "No.")

Sir James Fergusson: Embarkation.

Sir H. Fowler: Yes; embarkation. (Ministerial laughter and cheers.) But what I mean is that the capitation fee of £7 10s., which is additional to pay, covers the whole of those extra charges—the capitation fee, which is now the subject of investigation by a Royal Commission, and which is alleged by the Treasury not fully to cover, and by the Indian Government to more than cover, the entire cost.

Sir J. Fergusson: As the right hon. gentleman has been good enough to notice my interruption, perhaps he will allow me to ask him—Does he mean to say that the Indian Government pays for the cost of the soldiers in a link battalion serving at home?

Sir H. Fowler: I mean to say that what India pays as a capitation fee, in addition to other charges, is £7 10s. or £8 a head for every British soldier that is employed in the Indian service—£7 10s. or £8 per head per annum, and that that sum includes the cost to which I refer. Another reason is this. You have intrusted the administration of India to a Viceroy and Council practically chosen by ourselves. They are the Constitutional Guardians of the revenue of India, and except in some supreme necessity involving the very existence of the Empire, we have no right to apply these revenues for any other than Indian purposes. (Cheers.) The right hon. gentleman says this is a loan. But there is a lender as well as a borrower. We are the borrowers, and we dictate the terms of the loan, and India has no voice in saying whether she is willing to lend on these terms. (Hear, hear.) Again, I say there is no reciprocity. The charges upon India in respect of English soldiers going to India are not put upon the same basis as the cost to India of troops coming out of India. "England" (said Lord Lawrence) "paid no portion of the heavy expenditure of the mutiny. All the troops and the materials which were sent from England to aid in putting down the mutiny were paid for out of the revenue of India. It was never urged because this measure afforded temporary relief to the British exchequer that a portion of the ordinary cost of these troops should be paid by England." Lord Northbrook, a great Viceroy, said in the House of Lords speaking of the Abyssinian expedition: "The whole of the ordinary expenses were paid by India, the argument used being that India would have to pay her troops in the ordinary way, and she ought not to seek to make a profit. How did the Home Government treat the Indian Government when troops were sent out to the Mutiny? Did they say, 'We do not want to make a profit?' Not a bit. Every single man sent out was paid by India during the whole time—though only a temporary use was made of them—including the cost of drilling and and training as recruits until they were sent out." If this principle was to be applied in sending out troops to India, surely it ought also to be applied when Indian troops were sent on Imperial expeditions. (Cheers.) I will quote a still higher authority—Lord Salisbury:—"The special injustice of the course now about to be pursued consists in this, that when we employ English troops on Indian duty they are paid for out of the Indian revenues from the moment that they land in the country, but when we employ Indian troops on Imperial duty we say that India must pay for them." (Hear, hear.) Is the army of India to be regarded as a reserve? Some gentlemen hold the view that, as we have great Asiatic and Eastern interests, the Indian army is to be regarded as a reserve from which both the Imperial and the Indian Government can draw. If that is so, the Imperial funds should pay some proportion of forming it. If it is to be an army of reserve, and we are to draw upon it in aid of any of our requirements, we ought to pay our share of forming it, recruiting, training, and all the other ordinary expenditure of the Indian Army. (Hear, hear.) The right hon. gentleman was rather impatient of the allegation as to the army of India being too large or too small, as the argument is put. If it is too large we ought to reduce it; if it is too small it cannot be depleted. All I can say is this—I think the noble lord knows better than I do that successive viceroys, commanders-in-chief, and India councils have maintained during a long succession of years that the army was only sufficiently large for Indian purposes, and that it would not be safe to make any reductions. When the right hon. gentleman spoke just now of the readiness with which the Indian Government lent these troops, the eagerness with which they afforded evidence that the troops could be spared, I think he had forgotten one paragraph of the despatch which I will read—"We would point out that her Majesty's Government add to our responsibilities by calling upon us to furnish Indian troops for service at an unhealthy station like Suakin, in the worst season of the year in order to avoid the risk involved in sending troops for the purpose from England; during the absence of those troops we have to govern India with an army smaller than our needs impose upon us, and we cannot too strongly urge, therefore, that, whilst our responsibilities are thus increased, India should not at the same time be called upon to pay for troops not available for Indian needs." (Hear, hear.) That difficulty, therefore, Sir, was clearly present to the mind of the Indian Government. Another point I would make is this. In the arrangement of ordinary and extraordinary charges, the Imperial Government lays down the principle and the Imperial Government is the sole judge of its application. (Hear, hear.) In finance we must remember another point—namely, that the Exchequer which make this demand is the rich Exchequer, and the Exchequer from whom the demand is made is the poor Exchequer. (Hear, hear.) Look at the con-

trast. And I think the Indian people will look at the contrast. (Hear, hear.) Not very many members of this House heard the singularly able and lucid speech of the only hon. member of the House who is emphatically a native and resident in India, and who contended with great force against the injustice of imposing any charge whatever of this description upon the poverty of India. When the Indian people read the speech which the Chancellor of the Exchequer delivered in this House three or four months ago they will see that he announced that the realised surplus of the last year upwards of £4,250,000; that he was able to state that the taxation of 100 millions which he was proposing would involve no pressure upon the people of this country; that he declared that, with our Sinking Fund we had a reserve fund equivalent to something like £200,000,000 sterling—and this is the rich Exchequer which is putting the pressure upon a poor Exchequer which has developed its own country entirely at its own cost, where the sources of taxation are limited, and the tax which every man, woman, and child pays—the tax on salt—is already at a war limit, has been recently raised, and ought to be reduced! This is a question which the House of Commons, in dealing with the matter as it must do, not on narrow, but broad Imperial grounds, cannot ignore. And for what a paltry sum! I do not believe in the £35,000. I believe it will be more. I know that Estimates always increase in Government Departments. It would suit my argument better if it were £35,000. I believe £60,000 or £70,000 will be nearer. But even if it should be £35,000 is it wise or statesmanlike to defy the public opinion of the people of India, to commit the Imperial Government to a course which, as has been stated by high authority, "the whole Native and European Press condemn as impolitic, as dangerous and unjust?" Is it wise or statesmanlike to overrule the unanimous opinion of the Government of India on a question on which they say "public opinion in India is practically unanimous?" That Government—of which I am sorry the right hon. gentleman spoke as he did to-night—is our creation. We have decreed its constitution and composition. We have confided to it the government of the millions of India; and remember they regard it as the embodiment of the Imperial rule under which they live. It represents to them the Sovereign and the Parliament and that Government, in no hesitating or doubtful language, approves of their protest against the course now pursued. We are told that the proposal before the House is in accordance with precedent. The noble lord in his last despatch says it is impossible to controvert the logical conclusion at which he has arrived from the premisses he has laid down. Although I believe the precedents do not justify his action, although I believe that his premisses are unsound, and his conclusion is fallacious, I am quite willing to waive that belief, to admit his premisses and accept his logic, and in doing so I think I shall put my case on a different and a higher plane. The precedents of 1882 and 1885 have been quoted. A bad precedent does not demand, much less justify, its repetition. The Government which was responsible for the decisions of 1882 and 1885 was not infallible. (Hear, hear). The Parliament of 1895 is quite as competent—and I think on many grounds much more—as the Parliament of 1880 to create a precedent. We are not bound as a House of Commons—I say it openly, frankly, and fairly—in dealing with a question of this sort, where there has been no distinct, uniform precedent laid down, where the precedents have differed as widely as the cases have differed—we are not bound to follow an isolated precedent. I believe the decision of the House in 1882 aroused the strongest feeling of disapproval in India. And if for the moment I admit that the precedents and premisses of the noble lord logically lead to the conclusion at which he has arrived, my answer is the reply which his greatest leader once gave in this House when taunted with logical inconsistency on some political question. Mr. Disraeli, in one of those epigrammatical sentences in which he was wont to crystallise his experience of our Constitutional system, said "England is not governed by logic; England is governed by Parliament." (Hear, hear, and cheers). And it is the essence of Government by Parliament that Parliament can, does, and must recognise that national sentiment which we call public opinion, even if that national sentiment seems to conflict with something which may have been done in similar circumstances. No student of history can ignore the great part which national sentiment has played in human affairs, and every English Government, whether the strongest English Government or the weakest, not only carefully watches the growth and spread of public opinion at home, but eagerly scans the growth and tendency of public opinion in our colonies, whether self-governing or under the control of the Crown. Our colonial blunders in former days were the results of high-handed action in Downing Street, disregarding the views, the opinions, and, if you like, the prejudices of our fellow colonial subjects. Why, if you watch colonial sentiment, if you regard colonial public opinion, are you not to regard the sentiment of India? (Cheers.) Are we to listen eagerly to every expression of popular opinion in Canada on Canadian affairs, in Australia on Australian affairs, in South Africa on South African affairs—(cheers)—and shut our ears to the public opinion of India? (Cheers.) It may be said that this is a question of money. No, it is not a question of money. We cannot conduct and adjust our varied, our delicate relationships with our greatest dependency on the huckstering principle of buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest market. The first Secretary of State for India summed up in a sentence the spirit which should guide the attitude of the British Government to India in all the circumstances which that union would necessarily involve. "India," said Lord Derby, "is a great glory, a great responsibility, a great danger; a great glory if we studiously do our duty, a great responsibility"—I would ask the House to mark these words—"and, therefore, every member of Parliament should be as anxious to protect the interests of India as to protect the interests of his own constituents"—(cheers)—"a great danger, and, therefore, any injustice done to India may return to us with fearful retribution." I think that wise, that statesmanlike sentence should not only be emblazoned in the Council Chamber of Calcutta and Whitehall, but should regulate every vote which this House gives on a question affecting India. The issue of this Division is no party squabble; it involves no election pledges—(cheers)—it recalls no political programmes. Parliament in its Imperial capacity is called upon to discharge an Imperial duty, as my right hon. friend said, to perform a judicial act. Let us discharge that Imperial duty and give that decision in an Imperial spirit worthy of the great people in whose name and by whose authority we act. (Cheers.) We are not asked to-night to adjust some trumpery balance of account between the Exchequer of Great Britain and the Exchequer of India. We are asked to reverse, to override in our own interest the opinion of the people of India constitutionally embodied in the unanimous decision of the Viceroy and his Council, to whom we have confided the Government of India. At whose instance are we asked to take this step? I venture to say, not at the instance of the constituences that sent us here. (Cheers.) I honestly believe that the overwhelming preponderence of public opinion in this country is at this moment on the side of India. (Cheers.) In this House only one solitary member has spoken on the other side in favour of the course which the Government are taking; but men who have spent their lives in India—the one Conservative member who is himself an Indian has spoken—men of all parties, men inside politics and men outside, men who know India, men who are jealous of the honour of Great Britain, the organs in the press of Conservative, Liberal Unionist, and Radical, are at one in their utterance on this question. The people of England know that we have the power to do what is wrong? I cling to the belief, the well founded belief, that their desire is that we should have the courage to do what is right. (Cheers.) This House has a rare—I might say almost a priceless—opportunity of frankly recognising and ungrudgingly accepting the decision of the Indian Government on an Indian question, in which the Government and the people of India feel that the interests of India are in danger. Such a frank recognition, such a self-denying acceptance will quicken the growth of those feelings of mutual confidence, of mutual sympathy, of mutual good will, which will rivet India to Great Britain by ties stronger than the power of our Army, and more enduring than the splendour of our administration. (Loud cheers.)

Mr. A. J. Balfour.

The First Lord of the Treasury (Mr. A. J. Balfour): In the short time that remains to us before the House comes to a decision upon this question I shall not attempt to survey the whole field of debate which has taken place to-night. Much has been said upon legal and constitutional issues. Much also

has been said upon the course taken by the Government in regard to the troops sent to Mombasa. But I am sure that I shall be consulting the wishes of the House if I brush aside both those topics, interesting and important though they doubtless are, and if I come at once to what I believe to be the kernal and the central proposition of the opposition to the proposal which the Government has laid before the House. One other topic there is, indeed, upon which I would gladly have said a word if the opportunity had suited. I should have asked the House to consider whether the time has not arrived when we might, with advantage both to India and to England, constitute some kind of tribunal of arbitration—if I may use the phrase—for the determining of questions of this sort—(Hear, hear)—some tribunal in which the interests of India and Great Britain should be alike and equally represented; which might have authority in India and might have authority in this country—an authority which, perhaps, neither the expressions of the Indian Government, speaking for India, nor the expressions of the British Government, speaking, as they endeavour to do, not for Great Britain alone, but for the whole Empire—(Hear, hear)—do not always carry with them. (Cheers.) But those are subjects too long for treatment to-night, and I shall go at once to the dominant consideration, which will, I believe, much influence the voting in the Lobby, and shall give upon that central principle the views of her Majesty's Government, so far as I am confident to express them. What is the real argument which, adorned and expanded and decked out as it may be by other arguments and by historical illustrations, lies really at the root of the opposition to the Resolution moved by my noble friend? In one word, it is believed—erroneously, I think—by those who oppose this Motion that the action of the British Government is a mean action. (Opposition cheers). Those who oppose the Motion think we are using our power as a dominant partner in this association with India to squeeze out of India money which India does not owe us. (Opposition cheers). But if I shared those views, and if my colleagues shared those views, I need not tell the House we should be the last people in the world to bring forward a Resolution of this kind. (Cheers). I may perhaps be assisted in my argument if I remind the House of a topic used against us in the Debate, but which really ought to appeal to impartial minds in our favour. We have been told that the sum at stake is a trifling sum. So it is. It is not even certain, or even probable, that that sum, trifling as it is, will be paid by the British Exchequer. But that has been used by hon. gentlemen opposite as proof of the extraordinary pettifogging and huckstering meanness of this Government. Surely it shows that in the course we have been pursuing we have not been animated by those natural motives which have influenced British Governments of relieving the British taxpayer of some burden and of relieving the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the necessity of finding new resources, but that we have been animated, and animated alone, by a sincere belief that the principle which is embodied in this Resolution is not only wholesome for England but wholesome for India also, and wholesome, above all, for the Empire of which India and Great Britain are the largest constituencies. (Cheers.) It is admitted, as I am glad to see, by hon. gentlemen who have spoken against this Resolution, that her Majesty's present advisers have made great changes, and beneficial changes, in the financial relations between this country and India. (Hear, hear.) It is admitted by speakers on both sides of the House, who view with suspicion and even with resolute opposition the policy we are pursuing, that at all events that policy is not the policy, in all its details, which has been pursued up to this time; but that we have made great and beneficial changes in the interests of India in the policy which we have now adopted. (Hear, hear). Everybody has accepted the three principles laid down by my noble friend. But my noble friend has done more than laid down principles acceptable to all classes of opinion in this House. He and the Government of which he is a member have for the first time taken care that the views of the Government of India shall be laid before this House and be considered by this House before the House comes to a decision. (Cheers). That is the first change. The second is that he has laid it down that when either India is called upon by Great Britain or Great Britain is called upon by India to lend troops for any particular service, if the time for which those troops are lent shall exceed the very brief period of six or seven months, the whole cost, and not merely the extraordinary cost, shall be borne by the part of the Empire which is making the claim on the other part of the Empire. (Cheers.) And he has laid it down in the third place that there shall in the future be reciprocity in this matter between Great Britain and India; and if, in addition to the ordinary British army in India, there should, for any Indian purpose, be a temporary loan required from Great Britain, that loan shall be dealt with in precisely the same way and on the same principles as a loan which Great Britain may ask from the Empire of India. These are great changes. (Cheers.) They are changes entirely in the interests of India. They are changes entirely in the interests of absolute justice as between the two countries. And when I look back to the long series of precedents on this subject; and when I remember that in 1867 Mr. Gladstone said that the arrangements made by the then Conservative Government were too favourable to India—(hear, hear)—when I remember that in 1882, not only the whole of the ordinary cost, but the whole of the extraordinary cost, was thrown upon India, and that by a tardy and imperfect act of justice some small fraction of the extraordinary cost was afterwards paid back; when I remember that in 1885 Mr. Gladstone for the third time gave emphatic recognition to this rule without any of the limitations which we imposed upon it; and when I remember that almost every hon. gentleman opposite who then had a seat in the House, either by speech or vote, or by speech and vote, endorsed these principles—(cheers)—when I remember all that—I confess I am astounded at the air of disinterested virtue—(loud cheers)—with which they now come forward and, not content with all that we have done to put these financial relations upon a sound and equitable basis, accuse us of sacrificing, forsooth, the interests of India to those of England? (Cheers.) We have not gone half the length that they went. (Cheers.) We are all agreed that the policy of my noble friend is an enormous improvement on the policy of any of his predecessors, from whichever side they have been drawn. There is another principle quite removed, I am glad to think, from party politics, and the discussions as to who said what, when and how, and whether his vote and speech now was consistent with his vote and speech ten years ago. (Hear, hear, and laughter.) There is another principle of far deeper application on which every man in this House will be glad to agree. We are all of opinion that whatever justice dictates in this matter should be done. (Hear, hear.) We are all agreed that for us, the stronger Power, to put upon the shoulders of the weaker Power any portion of the burdens of the Empire which it is our business to bear, would be an act of public wickedness and infamy—(cheers)—and the question, therefore, only remains to determine whether or not the Resolution of my noble friend and the policy which that Resolution embodies does or does not violate the rules and principles on which every man in this House, to whatever party he belongs, is glad cordially to subscribe his assent. But let me remind the House that the particular proposition which, amid general assent, my noble friend has laid down for the practical division of the burden in this case as between England and India is merely a practical rule, and must rest upon deeper principles—principles perhaps not capable of mathematical or logical expression, but the general scope and bearing of which every man can understand. I assume that England and India are parts of one Empire having common interests, common objects, and therefore animated by common motives and a common policy. (Hear, hear.) I assent, of course, at once to the proposition that there are matters in which the direct interest of India is so remote that it almost vanishes, as there are Indian questions in which the direct interest of England is so remote that it likewise almost vanishes, and becomes what mathematicians call a negligible quantity. But consider those great Imperial questions on which no man can say that the interest of India is a vanishing quantity. Let me remind the House in this connection that the foreign and military policy of Great Britain has for many generations been largely influenced by Indian considerations. (Cheers.) And yet I am not aware that India has ever contributed, or has ever been asked to contribute, to that diplomatic machinery which has been largely used on her behalf. (Cheers.) I apprehend that the Crimean War—whether you think it good or bad, just or unjust, and I am not going to pay a compliment to that war, or rather to the authors of it—(laughter)—was largely an Indian war, was largely dictated by considerations of Indian policy. (Hear, hear.) Towards that war India never contributed a sixpence. The right hon. gentleman first told us that, so far as the Army is concerned, India pays every penny which is required for the

soldiers which India uses. But India, so far as I am aware, contributes not one sixpence to that great Reserve which we have accumulated, not for the needs of this country alone, but for the needs of any part of the British Empire, and notably for the needs of India. (Cheers.) That line of argument, important as regards the Army, gains double strength when we refer to the Navy. (Hear, hear.) The cost of the British Navy is 20 millions a year, and the contribution of India to that Imperial Navy is £100,000 annually. (Hear, hear.) It has been said that India would have to keep up a navy if she was not already protected by the Navy of England. (Hear, hear.) Is there any man who can suppose that, if England and India were divorced one from another, India could maintain a navy adequate to protect her shores from invasion for £100,000, or for ten times or 20 times £100,000 a year? (Cheers.) Let the House remember what is the position of India, and what it is acknowledged to be by right hon. gentlemen opposite. India depends upon England as its base, and the communications between England and India are absolutely vital to the existence of the Indian Empire. A defeat of the Indian Army on the Indus would be a trifling disaster for India compared with a defeat of the British fleet in the Channel, and the day which sees our military communication with India through the fleet severed, will be the last day of the Indo-British Empire. (Hear, hear.) Who pays the cost of this communication? What would you say of a general who said the whole cost of his Army was to be limited, or qualified or determined by the amount paid for the soldiers engaged in active operations in the front, ignoring the incomparably more important course of keeping open communications with his base? That general would be regarded as either a very poor arithmetician or a very bad strategist. (Hear, hear.) The truth is that, if you sum up all that is now done, and done without complaint, by this country for the common Empire, in the way of diplomacy, in the way of military reserve, and in the way of our fleet, I think you will find that, if a strict account was drawn between the Indian Empire and the British Government, a large amount of arrears was due from India to the British Exchequer. But, Sir, though this consideration ought not to be lost sight of, we are the last people to suggest that in this partnership the heaviest burden should be thrown upon India. All we say is that in establishing a rule of this kind it must in fairness be remembered that the rule is one most favourable to India, and that Great Britain is the partner which suffers most pecuniary loss. The right hon. gentleman laid down the methods by which my noble friend's principle rule is to be applied. My noble friend laid it down as a practical rule governing the relations of the Exchequer that, where Indian interests are not concerned in an obvious and direct manner, India should not be asked to pay. "Who is to be the judge of that?" asks the right hon. gentleman. He then says, quoting from a Despatch of Lord Cross, that the Indian Government are to be the judges in the matter. (Sir H. Fowler: It should at least be with their assent.) When did the right hon. gentleman invent this principle? He borrowed it from Lord Cross, but what a pity it is that he did not read Lord Cross's Despatch when in office. (Cheers.) I distinctly remember that one of the first things the present Government had to do when they came into office was to review a decision of the right hon. gentleman opposite with regard to Chitral. (Cheers.) And what was that decision? It was a decision overruling the unanimous opinion of the whole Indian Government without exception. (Cheers.) I am bound to say I think the Indian Government are much better judges of the policy to be pursued in Chitral than they are of the larger and more Imperial question which we are discussing now; and if they are to be overruled by the sole authority of the Secretary of State for India with regard to a purely Indian matter like Chitral, surely they must not be regarded as having the verdict without appeal upon a question in which England and the Empire at large are at least as much interested or more interested than they are themselves. (Cheers.) The time is growing short, and I must compress my arguments into the closest compass of which they are susceptible. I will only therefore say, as regards the contention that India is not interested in the operations now going on in Egypt, that at all events the Unionist Party and the House have committed themselves by immense majorities to the proposition that the present expedition is in the interest of Egypt, and will have excellent effects upon the interests of Egypt; and all we ask is that the natural conclusion shall be drawn from that—namely, that what is obviously for the benefit and the security of Egypt should not be regarded now as it had never been regarded in the past, as outside the purview of Indian statesmen. The relations between England, Egypt and India have been matters of consideration to the statesmen of both England and India for more than a century—(cheers)—and never yet has it been suggested that the good order and good government in Egypt, and the international relations which depend upon good order and good government in Egypt, are not matters partly of Indian concern. Therefore we are brought directly to the question of what is the sacrifice which India is asked to make on behalf of this Indian interest. I do not mean to discuss the pecuniary interest at great length, but one word I must say. Thought it is impertinent of me to attack eminent men and high authorities on this subject, I am bound to say that greater nonsense appears to me to have been talked both in and out of this House, both in and out of some public despatches upon the subject of the drain on Indian military resources than on almost any subject which I can recall to mind. One of my hon. friends who spoke on this point is intimately acquainted with City affairs, and I am quite sure he spoke excellent sense from a City point of view—(laughter)—but let it be remembered that you cannot draw a parallel of this kind between an army reserve and a banker's reserve. About 1 per cent. of the Indian army is being taken for six months. Any Indian necessity within that time would of course require the transport of the army back to India, and the transport of the army back to India is quite as rapid an operation as the transport of the army within India from one end to the other. This army is still available for Indian purposes if India requires it, and there is no suggestion either that England should borrow from India or that India should borrow from England under any circumstances whatsoever troops which in any human probability will be required for the internal necessities of one part of the Empire or of the other. Everybody knows that the strength of the army, be it the Indian, or the English, or the French, or the German army, is absolutely unnecessary year after year—decade after decade I had almost said—in time of peace. What it has to be kept for are those happily rare cataclysms to which every national nerve is strained to the utmost and all national resources drawn upon to the full. This is not such a period in India any more than it is such a period in this country, and one part of the Empire surely has a right, if it can do so without injury to the other part, to ask it to lend for a few brief months at most, without loss to itself, for which by hypothesis it can have no possible use. (Cheers.) The right hon. gentleman has told us that the effect of this resolution if carried, as I earnestly hope it will be—(cheers)—will be disastrous to our position and to our prestige in India. I cannot agree with that. I hold precisely the opposite opinion. If India was an estate which this country was going to exploit for its own advantage, if we regarded India merely from the point of view of national vanity or national profit, it might be said:—"You get your profit, your vanity is satisfied; it is not for you to ask even the imaginary sacrifice —for imaginary it is—which this Resolution imposes upon the the Indian people." But I should be sorry to think that such a view of the relations of these two integral parts of the Empire should become fashionable either in Britain or in India. I regard them as two elements in one great whole whose interests cannot be divorced, each of which must suffer with the sufferings of the other each of which must gain in the gain of the other, and which cannot look on with indifference on any of the needs or any of the policy which either one party or the other is obliged to pursue. (Cheers.) To tell the Indian Government that while we preserve in part for them—I do not put it higher than that—diplomatic, military, and naval establishments, while we keep open lines of communication, whether they be by the Suez Canal, Aden, or the Cape of Good Hope, and pay the cost thereof—to tell them that when some question arises in which they and we are interested, it may be in different degrees, but still alike interested, they are not to make a sacrifice, not even to make the imaginary sacrifice which they are called upon to make by this Resolution, is to breed ideas as to the true relations of this country which must ultimately end in their separation. (Cheers.) This sum of £35,000, whosoever pays it—whether it be England, Egypt, or India—is an absolutely insignificant item in the national account; but, Sir, if this House decides

that India is so little a part of, has so slight a connection with, this Empire, is drawn to us by bonds so slender and so insignificant, that even under the terms proposed by my noble friend, they cannot send 2,000 men to Suakin, then, Sir, I say you are educating, not merely the British public, but the Indian public in absolutely false notions—(cheers)—of what we all owe to a common Empire, and it is in the name, not merely of England, not merely of India, but in the name of that common Empire itself, that I ask the House to assent to this Resolution. (Loud cheers.)

The House then divided on Morley's amendment, when the voting was:—

For the Amendment	190
Against	275
Majority against	85

The announcement of the figures was received with loud Opposition cheers.

A divisi n being challenged on the main question, the House again divided, when the voting was:—

For Lord G. Hamilton's motion	252
Against	106
Majority for the motion	146

The announcement of the figures was received with Ministerial cheers.

July 8th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

INDIAN TROOPS IN AFRICA.

Expenses of Indian troops in Africa.—Petition from London, against imposition on the revenues of India; to lie upon the Table.

July 9th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

KYTHAL STATE.—PETITION.

State of Kythal.—Petition from Cis Sutlej, for inquiry; to lie upon the Table.

WAZIRI AND CHITRAL MEDALS.

Colonel Wyndham Murray asked the Under Secretary of State for War, when the medal for the relief of Chitral would be issued to the troops engaged.

Dr. Farquharson asked the Under Secretary of State for War, when the medals for the Waziri and Chitral campaigns would be issued.

Mr. Brodrick: It has been decided to strike a new medal for frontier services, the first clasp of which will be given for the Chitral campaign. The design is now awaiting final approval, and the dies will shortly be sent out to India, where the medals will be struck. The medals for the Waziri campaign have been issued.

July 10th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

THE NURSING STAFF AT ADEN.

Mr. Moon asked the Secretary of State for India whether the Government of India was prepared to provide or contribute to the providing of a trained nursing staff in the hospitals at Aden, or in anyone of the hospitals there.

Lord George Hamilton: A reference was made to the Government of India on the 9th April last, relative to the nursing staff at Aden, but I have not yet received a reply. The Government of India will be asked to expedite their report.

July 14th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

A MEDAL REFUSED.

Captain Grice-Hutchinson asked the Secretary of State for India, whether, in view of the fact that a decoration was to be issued to the troops employed in the late Ashanti expedition, he would reconsider the decision arrived at to withhold a medal from the British and Indian troops who served in the operations in Burma and the Chin Hills in 1892-93.

Lord George Hamilton: After fully considering the question I can see no reason for modifying the decision arrived at in 1894 not to grant the India medal to the troops who served in the operations in Burma and the Chin Hills in 1892-93 and to that decision I must adhere.

July 16th.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

INDIAN TROOPS AT SUAKIN.

A "MASTERPIECE OF MELANCHOLY MEANNESS."

THE PEERS AS "LITTLE ENGLANDERS."

THE RESOLUTION APPROVED.

The Under Secretary of State for India (The Earl of Onslow) rose to move—"That her Majesty having directed a military expedition of her Native forces charged upon the revenues of India to be despatched to Africa in aid of the Egyptian troops, this House consents that the ordinary pay of any troops so despatched, as well as the ordinary charges of any vessels belonging to the Government of India that may be employed in this expedition, which would have been charged upon the resources of India if such troops or vessels had remained in that country or seas adjacent, shall continue to be so chargeable; provided that if it shall become necessary to replace the troops or vessels so withdrawn by other vessels or native forces, then the expense of raising, maintaining, and providing such vessels and forces shall, in so far as may not be otherwise provided, be repaid out of any moneys which may be provided by Parliament for the purpose of the said expedition." His lordship said that the terms of the motion to which he asked their lordships' assent informed them that her Majesty had directed a military expedition of her Native forces charged on the revenues of India to be despatched to Africa. That expedition consisted of the 1st Bombay Lancers, the 26th Regiment of Infantry from the Punjab, the 35th Bombay Infantry, the 5th Bombay Mountain Battery, and a company of Madras Sappers and Miners. The troops, therefore, had been taken from all parts of India, and had been selected from among the most efficient portion of the Indian Army. They had done good service either in Abys inia or in Afghanistan, and were commanded by General Egerton, an officer of great experience. He had to ask their lordships' assent to the Resolution, because an Act was passed in 1858 for the better government of India, in which there was a clause to the effect that except for preventing or repelling actual invasion in India, or under circumstances of urgent necessity, the revenues of India should not, without the consent of Parliament, be applied to defray the expenses of any military expedition beyond the frontiers of India. The history of that clause was that when the Bill was passed through the other House of Parliament a clause was proposed by Mr. Gladstone to the effect that, unless the consent of Parliament was given, for the purposes of war the Indian forces of her Majesty charged on the Indian revenues should not be employed in any operation beyond the external frontier, and when that Bill came up to their lordships' House an Amendment was moved by the late Lord Derby, who was Prime Minister at the time, and who thought it necessary to apply a financial check to such an exercise of power. The effect of the clause, therefore, as it stood, was that the consent of Parliament was required, not before the Indian Army could be employed beyond the frontier, but before the revenues of India could be applied in the payment of such an expedition. A Resolution similar to the one he had placed before their lordships had been passed by the other House, and it was not by any means the first time that such a Resolution had been brought before Parliament. As a general rule, the circumstances under which those expeditions had been conducted were precisely the same as in the present case—that was to say, that the revenues of India bore the ordinary charges of the

expedition and the revenues of Great Britain the extraordinary charges. The only exceptions to that were in two very important and unusual cases. One was at the time when India was prostrated after a great internal struggle, and the other was when the troops were required for purely European purposes, and upon those two occasions no part of the expenses was charged on the revenues of India. But, as he had already said, the usual practice had been to adopt the plan of the Resolution he had submitted. He would recount the several occasions upon which expeditions of Indian troops had been sent out of India. The first occasion was in 1839, when an expedition was sent to China. That was in the days of the East India Company, whose duty it was to be regardful of the pockets of their shareholders, and when India was under the control of that company. It was suggested at that time that the revenues of India should bear no part of the expense, but the East India Company recognised that it was unreasonable that they should be paid for hiring out troops, and, in consequence, it was ultimately decided that the cost should be shared in the same proportion as was now proposed. In the case of the expedition to Persia the expenses were shared in the same proportion as was now proposed. At the time of the expeditions to China, in 1858 and 1859, the resources of India had just been tried to the utmost by the mutiny, and it was not thought possible or desirable or right to impose any part of the charges of those expeditions upon the revenues of India. In the case of the Abyssinian War, India bore the ordinary charges and England the extraordinary charges of the Indian troops; in the case of the expedition to Perak, the charges were divided equally between the two countries. The expedition to Malta in 1878 was another of the exceptional cases to which he had referred. Nobody at that time contended that the bringing of troops from India to Malta was very considerably in the interests of India, and, therefore, no burden was placed on the finances of India in respect to the bringing of the troops to Malta. Then came the two cases of expeditions to Egypt. The first was in the year 1882, when Arabi Pasha was threatening our communications with the East. It was proposed at the time that, inasmuch as the interests of India were manifestly affected by what was going on, the whole of the charges should be placed on her resources; but it was subsequently decided by Parliament that India should bear 60 per cent. and England 40 per cent. of the expenses. The second expedition was in 1885, when there were, as now, troubles in the Sudan. There was one satisfactory feature about the present controversy, and it was that it had never been suggested that it was not right or proper India should be called upon to furnish some part of her troops. The Government and people of India recognised that the Indian Army was a part of her Majesty's Army—(Hear, hear)—and they responded with alacrity to the call for troops. While he rejoiced that this was so, he could not but regret that trouble should have arisen as to whether India should share with England the duty of safeguarding the great highway which lay between the two countries. India had been asked to send 1 per cent. of an Army, the whole cost of which was 242,000,000 rupees. The pay of the troops sent out would be but 63,000 rupees for the six or seven months during which they would be employed. Suppose the 63,000 rupees were to be repaid into the Indian Exchequer during the last six months of the year, there would be, on March 31st, 1897, 63,000 rupees more in the balance available in the reduction of the amount to be borrowed for public works. Supposing that so small a sum as that could affect the loan, the annual saving to the Indian taxpayers would be 1,900 rupees, or about £110. Was it possible for any person to conceive that such a sum as that, distributed amongst the many million people in India, could enable the Indian peasant to increase his comforts by so much as a single pinch of salt? It had been said that this was not a question of amount but one of principle. (Cheers and counter cheers.) The real and only question which divided us was whether India had or had not any interest in the stability of the Government in Egypt. The Government of India had always denied that they had any interest in Egypt, but they had admitted that India was more interested in the safety of the Suez Canal and in the Government of Egypt than all her Majesty's possessions on the eastern side of that continent put together; they complained that, while they were called upon to make some contribution, great colonies such as Australia had not been called upon to make a similar contribution. The Government of India must have forgotten that in 1885 Australia sent a contingent to help us in Sudan, and annually contributed large sums for the purpose of maintaining in Australian waters a considerable squadron to defend, not only the commerce of Australia but also that of Europe and India. What was the position of India in this matter? The great self-governing colonies had their agents-general here, men who were well able to make a good bargain for their employers. The Foreign Powers had their ambassadors and their ministers, all of whom had the duty put upon them of making fair and equitable bargains with the English Exchequer. The Government of India had no such agent in this country outside the Government, and therefore it was the bounden duty of the Government of India to endeavour upon every occasion to obtain from the Imperial Exchequer the best terms they possibly could, and he did not think they could be looked upon as anything but advocates. The late Secretary of State for India advised the Government to accept the view of the Indian Government. He was rather surprised that such advice should come from that quarter when he remembered that the Government of which Sir Henry Fowler was a member insisted upon the passing of the Cantonments Acts in opposition to the wishes of the Government of India, and that they acted in opposition to the Government of India in respect to the occupation of Chitral. If that doctrine was to hold good, and the Government of India was to be the only arbiter, he could only say that he had always thought that Parliament expressly reserved to itself the power of acting as arbitrator between the Government of this country and the Government of India. Nor did Parliament act without being adequately advised. The Secretary of State for India was placed in the Cabinet, and defended the views of India in the great council of the nation. The Secretary of State was advised by men of no less experience than those who advised the Viceroy. What had been the case in the present instance? By a large majority the Council of the Secretary of State had advised him to act in the way in which the Government had acted. Sir Alexander Arbuthnot had declared that the supremacy of Egypt in the Sudan was a direct and substantial concern for India. The Government recognised that, and certainly the stable and orderly Government of the Sudan by Egypt could not be established so long as a cruel barbarian had at his mercy the upper waters of the Nile. (Hear, hear.) Mr. Childers who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer, said in 1882 that India might bear part of the cost then incurred, and Lord Kimberley, when he introduced a similar Motion in 1885, said there was no question that Egypt was a country in which India had a special interest. He wished next to direct attention to the consistent policy of this country with regard to the maintaining of communications with India by way of Egypt. Before this century dawned, when the East India Company was in power, when the trade between England and India was trifling in comparison with what it was now, it was thought necessary to despatch an expedition to Egypt to co-[illegible]rate with the English forces there. It was laid down that [illegible]ast India Company had material interests in the Gover[illegible] of Egypt; and when Nelson had defeated the Frenc[illegible] sent a special message to Bombay announcing the [illegible] the Company immediately sent him a present of [illegible] That was always the policy of the East India Com[illegible] regard to these matters in the East, it was diffic[illegible] where the interests of India ceased, and where tho[illegible]-land began. It might be said that the Canal was [illegible]w threatened, and that danger from the Dervishes was im[illegible]ry. He did not propose to give any opinion of his own as [illegible] the extent of that danger; he only referred their lordships to the book of Sir Alfred Milner, a distinguished public servant, who was the close and confidential adviser of the Government when the noble lord opposite was in power. In that book it was declared that there could be no permanent rest for Egypt so long as barbarism reigned and until order was re-established along the Nile for at least a considerable distance beyond Khartum. They used to hear a good deal from the opposite side about the evacuation of Egypt, but he was happy to think that they did not hear so much said on that point since noble lords opposite had been in office. No one would dream of leaving Egypt so long as there was an explosive barbarism along the banks of the Nile. He thought he had said enough as to the interests of India in Egypt, and he should only say a few words on the policy on the present occasion as compared with former expeditions sent to Egypt. The noble lord then read several extracts from official records to show that on

previous occasions decisions were arrived at by Parliament before the views of the Government of India were received. When they were received they were carefully considered and and precisely the same decision was arrived at. The loan of troops by India to England or by England to India had hitherto been fixed on no definite principles, but henceforth those principles would be clear and incontrovertible. There had been up to the present time no reciprocity between England and India in the matter, but henceforth the principle would be definitely settled. The despatch of the Secretary of State, dated June 30th last, said: "It may be laid down that on all occasions when the temporary loan of a military force is urgently required, either by Great Britain or by India, such assistance will be promptly given so far as the ability, resources, and situation of either country at the time may permit. In the next place, it would seem to be established that, if the object for which such assistance is required is one in which the Government supplying the troops has no special interest beyond that which must be common to all members of the Empire, the whole cost of the force, so long as it is required, including both ordinary and extraordinary charges, must be borne by the Government that needs its assistance. In the third place if the circumstances are such that the Government supplying the troops has a distinct and special interest in the matter at stake, then, although that interest may be less strong than that of the Government requiring assistance, the Government supplying the troops should be content to bear, in one form or another, a portion of the burden which the operations involve." Those were the principles which her Majesty's Government had laid down. When troops were sent to Mombasa the then Government determined that although the Government of India had undoubtedly commercial interests in the country, yet those interests were not sufficient to justify them in throwing upon Indian revenues any portion of the burden. We had never governed India under what was known as the old Colonial system—the system which Spain pursued in respect to her plantations, and we had never drawn steady revenues from our great dependency. All the advantage we had derived from her had been in the expansion of our trade and the development of our commerce. India, before our rule, had always fallen a prey to the rapacious, and it was the duty of her Majesty's Government to protect the people of India, but to do so they had a very heavy cost to bear. Was it too much to expect that some portion of the force which India maintained should be lent when occasion needed for the maintenance of her communication with her powerful protector? Her Majesty's Government were satisfied that in this case they were strictly acting on principles of equity and justice, and, although it would have been easy enough to have yielded to the demands of the Government of India, such a course would not have been in consonance with the duty they owe[illegible] not only to the Indian rayat, but also to the British tax[illegible]. He begged to move the Motion standing in his na[illegible]

LORD REAY.

[illegible]EAY said that in rising to oppose the Motion which [illegible] Earl had so eloquently proposed he would at once [illegible]he question as to whether India had a distinct and [illegible]erest beyond that which must be common to all [illegible] of the Empire. A distinct and special interest in [illegible]dian operations was proved by a chain of reasoning of [illegible]n the accuracy struck him as very doubtful. India was interested in the free transit through the Suez Canal, but had the Khalifa any intention of threatening the Canal? In their letter of March 15th the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury said that a stronger claim could be made out for the payment of the ordinary expenses of the regiment sent to Mombasa than for the retention of that charge upon Indian funds for the troops sent to Suakin. It followed that if the expenditure for the Mombasa regiment was wholly paid by this country, according to the Treasury, it should also be fully paid in this case. In referring to the Abyssinian expedition, Lord Lawrence was of opinion that—"This was neither a feature of hiring or lending, but simply one of payment by the country which employs the troops." He wrote:—"I cannot admit that India has the slightest interest in the question at issue between England and Theodore. We shall be neither stronger nor weaker out here, if he is duly punished for his misdeeds." What Lord Lawrence said of King Theodore applied to Khalifa. When the troops were sent to Malta the whole cost was paid by the Imperial Government, and the costs of the Perak expedition was, "not to be regarded as a precedent for any future case in which troops might be urgently required from the Indian establishments for Imperial purposes." In 1882 the Government of India objected to pay the whole cost, but they were prepared to pay the ordinary expenses chiefly on the ground that India had a "national interest" in the canal. Finally, India received £509,000 to meet an extraordinary expenditure of £1,058,852. Turning to the apportionment of the expenditure when Indian troops were despatched in 1885 to Suakin, on January 17th, 1885, Lord Dufferin's Government used these words: "The operations taking place in the Sudan have no connexion with any Indian interests, and lie altogether outside the sphere of our responsibilities. We can look for neither advantage nor loss from them. The pretensions and the aims of the leaders of the rising in Africa are a matter of indifference to the Government, which is in no way interested in disputing or putting down by force the claims of political or religious pretenders in regions of the world remote from its own limits and from those of its neighbours." And further: "The disposal of Indian revenues for other purposes than those which are strictly connected with the legitimate needs of Indian expenditure is a matter which is watched with increasing concern by all sections of the community in this country. We cannot conceive a case in which the claims of the Indian taxpayer to entire exemption from all share in the cost are more overwhelmingly strong." That despatch was issued by Lord Dufferin, a recognised authority on the Egyptian question, who would certainly not have expressed that opinion if he had considered that India had a substantial interest in the Suakin operations. In 1885 when the Government of the day decided to charge India they had not before them this despatch, whereas the present Government were aware of the opinion of both Lord Dufferin's and Lord Elgin's Governments. The Secretary of State, Lord Cross, informed the Government of India on February 3rd, 1887: "That, in the event of any occasion hereafter arising for the employment of Indian troops on duties not directly attributable to the requirements of your Government or at a distance from India, no portion of the expense should be charged against India without your Excellency's concurrence." The Treasury had been informed on December 21st, 1886, and on January 19th replied that they "make no doubt that, should the occasion again arise for employing Indian troops outside India, the views of the present Government of India and of the present Secretary of State for India in Council on the question of the expense of such employment will be respectfully weighed by the Imperial Government of the day." He should not claim that "the full assent and concurrence of the Government of India" were necessary. In this connexion he wished to remind the House the principle laid down by the Duke of Argyll was to be found in a despatch of November 24th, 1870, in which the noble duke said: "The Government established in India is (from the nature of the case) subordinate to the Imperial Government at home. And no government can be subordinate unless it is within the power of the superior government to order what is to be done or left undone, and to enforce on its officers, through the ordinary and constitutional means, obedience to its directions as to the use which they are to make of official position and power in furtherance of the policy which has been finally decided upon by the advisers of the Crown." This principle was further laid down in a despatch of the noble Marquess the Prime Minister of the 30th May, 1876. But, on the other hand, if the Government of India were consulted too, and expressed a deliberate opinion, the responsibility of overruling them was very great. (Hear, hear.) The difficulties inherent to the Government of India were enormous. When they were placed in a position to act against their convictions these difficulties were increased. This matter would be discussed in the Governor-General's Council. The members of Government would be called upon to justify the decision which had been arrived at here. But how could they "defend in debate what they do not approve"! Circumstances might arise in which such a dilemma was inevitable; but were those circumstances present in this case? It might be argued that the principle was not very important in this case: but it might involve a large amount in another instance. But that argument could not be used, because the Government of India, in paragraph 13 of this despatch of June 30th, said: "The precedent now created can only apply to loans of small bodies of troops, for

short periods, and for purposes in which India has a substantial interest." In other words, the amount would always be comparatively a trifling one. The limitation points to the fact that some misgiving was felt about the principle. He thought that it would have been infinitely more politic to not make the charge on this occasion, and to leave the matter open until Lord Welby's Commission had issued its Report, and their financial relations could be placed on a simpler footing, which would give less scope for raising diverging issues, or until that Court of Arbitration had been constituted which the First Lord of the Treasury suggested in another place. They were promised reciprocity, which hitherto had not existed. India had invariably paid for British troops, and even if reciprocity were guaranteed it was likely that India would have to pay more frequently for troops out of India than England for troops sent to India. Lord Lawrence stated in his Minutes of January 20th, 1868, that: "India pays all her own expenses. India does not cost England a shilling." He believed that the public conscience had awakened in this country. The time had come not to drive hard bargains with India. Recently an excise duty had been imposed on the lower counts of cotton manufactures, the product of Indian mills. In India they thought, rightly or wrongly, that the same object might have been attained by freeing from import duty all lower counts. In removing the duty from imported yarns, the handloom industry was absolutely exempt even for the higher class of goods. The salt duty was 2 Rs. per maund in 1882; and the Government of India of that day said that "the tax was still very high in relation to the cost of production of salt." It was now 2½ Rs. per maund. The Army expenditure had increased from 1875-6 to 1892-3 by 77 lakhs. Neither could they forget that the native States had voluntarily placed at our disposal Imperial Service Corps of a total strength of 17,684 men, and Gwalior and Jaipur Transport Corps 942 men and 1,473 animals. That represented an expenditure of 55 lakhs, of which Kashmir paid over 10 lakhs. For this object the Indian Government only spent 2 lakhs; and they had not forgotten how the Kashmir troops distinguished themselves under Colonel Kelly at Chitral, and of what use the Gwalior and Jaipur Transport was to General Low. The Transport was ready to march within 30 hours of the receipt of orders. The native troops sent to Suakin were proud of being selected; and he had no doubt that the Bombay troops would, should the occasion arise, distinguish themselves as the 28th Regiment of N.I. distinguished itself on the last occasion at Suakin. (Hear, hear). There was no unwillingness in India to share in the fortunes of this great Empire. Was it worth while, for the sake of a principle—even if it were admitted to have any application in this instance—to infringe a much more important principle, viz., that we should not create, needlessly, discontent in India? And remember that, on this occasion, the Government represented every section of the community in India and large numbers of our own countrymen. They had been told on a recent occasion that a vote in that House did not affect the fate of the Government of the day, and he hoped that their Lordships would remember that fact when they came to vote on this question. He had no doubt that, if their Lordships acted in regard to this matter with the same generous instinct which they followed in their private affairs, they would vote against this proposal of the Government and would thereby follow the noblest traditions of that House. (Hear, hear).

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE.

The MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE said that he did not think that their lordships would be surprised that he should desire to say a few words in justification of the vote which he intended to give if their lordships proceeded to a division on this question. His connection with India was so recent, his sympathy with the people of India was so deep, and his knowledge of the difficulties which the Government of India had to encounter was so intimate, and that it would be intolerable for him to vote for the Resolution if he believed it would occasion half the injustice which had been attributed to it by the critics of the Government. He believed that the apportionment of the expense which her Majesty's Government proposed was in itself fair and just, and he believed that Lord Elgin's Government, although they had been unsuccessful in obtaining all they wanted, had succeeded in obtaining at the hands of her Majesty's Government the admission of certain principles which, after they had been discussed and considered by the two Governments, and if necessary, supplemented by any machinery which might be found desirable, would place India for the future in an infinitely sounder position with regard to these controversies, than she had ever before occupied. (Hear, hear.) Those principles had received the adhesion not only of the India Office, but of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Leader of the House of Commons, and he felt no doubt that they were quite capable of becoming the basis of a thoroughly satisfactory and business-like arrangement between the two Governments. What, stripped of all adventitious matter, was the question before the House? India had an army of 215,000 soldiers, which she maintained not only for the purpose of internal police but also to defend her vast land frontier of some 5,000 miles. Of that army she was asked to lend for use outside the confines of India a small force, about 1 per cent. of the whole, upon terms which would relieve her entirely of all expense except the ordinary cost of the troops, which she would in any case have to bear. Was that on the face of it a flagrantly unjust arrangement? (Hear, hear.) These troops when at Suakin were less remote from their headquarters in India than they would be if employed in the remoter parts of the Indian Empire itself. Within a space of a month, he believed, it would be possible to send them back to India and replace them by troops from this country. Then there was the question of time. If at the end of the year the Indian troops were still required at Suakin, the whole arrangement would be open to revision. How different was the case from the case of 1885, when the Indian troops were detained at Suakin from March, 1885, to May, 1886, —15 months in all, and for 12 months after hostilities had ended they were engaged on garrison duty in that fortress. India had lent these troops with alacrity. The words were not his. They were those of the dissentient members of the Secretary of State's Council. There was no question of risk. It was a question of rupees. If he believed that there was any real risk to India, he for one would have been no party to putting pressure upon her. The question of risk and the question of money must not be mixed up. If the thing was wrong payment would not make it right, and he submitted that there was no doctrine more offensive to India than that which went to show that the scruples of the Power which lent the troops in a case of this kind ought to be overcome by the assumption on the part of the borrowing Power of the whole liability for the cost. If that argument were advanced, he should certainly meet it by saying that it was the duty of the Government to remove the temptation from the leading Power by deciding that in no circumstances should the Power which lent the troops be placed in the position of making a profit by the transaction. (Hear, hear.) As to the plea of the poverty of India, the Government were not asking India to put her hand in her pocket for a single rupee; and he felt sure the Government of India would desire that this matter should be decided not upon prinsiples of generosity or charity, but on principles of the strictest equity and justice. (Hear, hear.) Coming to the question of precedents, he did not suggest that too much importance should be attached to them. They might be bad, and in certain cases it might be that they should be set aside; but, so far as they were applicable to the present case, the precedents seemed to him to make entirely in favour of the Government. In cases of this kind there had always been a division of the expense between India and England, not by any means always on terms so favourable to India as the present. The noble lord opposite suggested that as a Royal Commission was investigating the financial relations of the two countries, England might be liberal and pay their bill without fuss. He should have thought that the reasonable thing to do was not to change the practice *pendente lite*, but to abide by the precedents. If he did not attach much importance to precedents, neither did he desire to attach too much importance to the *obiter dicta* which had been delivered on the one side or the other in Parliament. The actors in these controversies changed, but the parts they played are always the same. The Treasury was always the Treasury. (Hear, hear.) The Chancellor of the Exchequer was only the vigilant guardian of the public purse, as the Government of India was the guardian of the interests of the Indian taxpayer. Therefore these utterances must be interpreted with very careful regard to the circumstances in which they were delivered. Without going to the remoter precedents, he would like to notice what had been said with regard to those of 1882 and 1885. What the Government of India protested against in

1882 was the payment of the whole expense of the Egyptian expedition, and they eventually gained their point; but he did not think India was very magnificently treated, for she had to be grateful for the payment of half a million of money which left her liable for the whole of the ordinary expenses of the troops and 60 per cent. of the extraordinary expenses. (Hear, hear.) Then there was the Suakin expedition of 1885. The Government of India at that time were undoubtedly very sore indeed. They had a three-fold grievance. In the first place they complained of the absence of reciprocity as between the Indian and British Governments. In the next place they complained of being called upon to pay for military operations outside the limits of Egypt proper. In the third place they were indignant, and not entirely without reason, because the Resolution was carried in both Houses of Parliament before their protest had been laid upon the Table of the House. That indignity, at all events, the Government of India had been spared on the present occasion, nor was there any intention of requiring them to pay the whole expense of the expedition. The arguments which were advanced in 1882 and 1885 were directed, they would find, entirely to these three points; the first two points had been disposed of—they admitted fully that there should henceforth be absolute and complete reciprocity between England and India in these matters. The question, then, that remained was that of the interest of India in the Sudan. It had been conceded, and he did not think it would be disputed, that India had a very distinct interest in Egypt proper, in the maintenance of the authority of the Khedive, and in the security of the Canal. But it was contended that the interest of India was strictly limited to the immediate vicinity of the Canal? It could not be seriously contended that India could regard an outbreak of fanaticism in the Sudan with the same indifference as that with which she would regard an outbreak of fanaticism in China. Would anyone be found to pretend that a serious reverse to the Khedive's army would not shake the authority of the Khedive in Egypt proper? There could be no doubt about it. Then they were sometimes told that in this case we interfered, not forsooth because India was interested, but because we wished to do what was agreeable to our ally the Government of Italy. They had been perfectly candid in their expressions in regard to this part of the case; they had never disguised from the public the fact that the moment of our intervention was determined by the necessities of the Government of Italy, and surely it required no proof to show that it was for the interest of Egypt, and therefore of India, that they should extricate, as they had successfully extricated, our Italian allies from the imminent peril of a great catastrophe the effect of which might have been felt far beyond the limits of Egypt itself. With reference to our interest in the Sudan, he would like to read to the House the words of an authority whose weight would, he thought, be recognised by many of their lordships: "The Eastern Sudan is indispensable to Egypt. It will cost you far more to retain your hold upon Egypt proper if you abandon your hold of the Eastern Sudan to the Mahdi than what it would to retain your hold upon the Eastern Sudan by the aid of such material as exists in the provinces. . . . . The danger to be feared is not that the Mahdi will march northward through Wady Halfa; on the contrary, it is very improbable that he will ever go so far north. The danger is altogether of a different nature. It arises from the influence which the spectacle of a Muhammadan power, established close to your frontiers, will exercise upon the population which you govern. In all the cities in Egypt it will be felt that what the Mahdi has done they may do; and, as he has driven out the intruder and the infidel, they may do the same. . . . . If the whole of the Eastern Sudan is surrendered to the Mahdi the Arab tribes on both sides of the Red Sea will take fire. . . . . I see it is proposed to fortify Wady Halfa and prepare there to resist the Mahdi's attacks. You might as well fortify against a fever. Contagion of that kind cannot be kept out by fortifications and garrisons. But that it is real and that it does exist will be denied by no one cognisant with Egypt and the East." Those were the words of General Gordon immediately before his last departure from this country. Our policy was that of recognising the interest of India in Egypt and in all that concerned the stability of the Egyptian Government. Was it the case that in giving effect to that policy we had dealt illiberally with India? He should like to remind the House of a fact which might not be generally known. For the last twelve years we had maintained in Egypt a British force varying between 3,000 and 8,000 men; we had borne the whole of the ordinary cost of that force, and, although Egypt had undertaken to bear the extraordinary expense belonging to it, her contribution had not, he was able to say, been equivalent to the actual outlay. He would say nothing of the disorganisation of our military system at home which had arisen from the detention of these troops in Egypt. For all this we had not charged anything at all to India on account of the Egyptian garrison, and he would take upon himself to say that if a strict profit and loss account were opened as between this country and India on account of the occupation of Egypt it would be found that the Government of India had been by no means hardly or illiberally dealt with. (Hear, hear.) It was not infrequently urged that they were treating India in this matter much more hardly than they would venture to treat any of our own colonies. He knew that the colonial analogy was a somewhat doubtful one, because ever since 1870 our policy had been to concentrate our troops in this country and to leave in the colonies only such forces as were requisite for the defence of our coaling stations and naval bases. On the other hand, in the case of India it was no exaggeration to say that our whole military system was based upon the requirements of India. They had altered, in 1881 he believed, the distribution of the soldiers' service, as between service with the Colours and service in the Reserve, for the express purpose of suiting the convenience of India. The result was that the men serving in this country were younger, and that the number of men entering the Reserve had been smaller than they otherwise would have been. The colonial analogy was, therefore, not entirely on all fours with the case of India. If Imperial troops were lent to a colony the War Office invariably claimed the extra cost, the whole or part of it, but they made no claim for the ordinary pay and allowances of the force. The Ashanti expedition was a case in point—the Gold Coast bore the cost, but not the ordinary cost of the troops employed. Where one colony lent troops to another the lending colony always bore the ordinary cost of the troops which were lent. Then there was the case which had been referred to of New South Wales, which lent a contingent for service in the Suakin operations of 1885, and cheerfully and readily bore the whole cost of that contingent. (Cheers.) It seemed to him that these facts went to show that they were requiring India to do what the mother country did if she was lending troops to a colony, what the colonies did if they were lending troops to the mother country, and what one colony did if it lent troops to another colony. He had a very strong hope that when the despatch of the Secretary of State for India had been considered in that country it would be found that the Secretary of State had placed the position of India upon a very much sounder basis than it had ever occupied before. India had had some hard bargains, and she had not entirely forgotten them. He had a very sincere hope that we should frequently see native troops taking the field by the side of our own soldiers: he believed that this would be good for the troops of India and for our own troops; and when those occasions arose he was honestly convinced that it would be found that the Indian Government had been successful in securing terms which, possibly amplified and developed, would form the basis of an arrangement between the two Governments, founded upon common sense and equity, and one which could be adopted by both Governments without the slightest discredit or loss of dignity. (Cheers.)

Lord Kimberley.

The Earl of Kimberley said he had very naturally been referred to in the course of the debate, because, as Secretary of State for India in 1885, he undoubtedly supplied one precedent which had an important bearing on the question before the House. And, before he made any general remarks on the matter, he should like to say a word or two as to what really happened in 1885, because the noble marquess a little misunderstood it. The noble marquess seemed to think that the Government of India at that time suffered a certain amount of indignity by not being consulted. But the fact was that when it was decided that troops should go to Suakin he telegraphed the intention of her Majesty's Government to the Government of India. It seemed to him now, as then, that there was no ambiguity in the statement he telegraphed to the Government of India as to the ordinary expenses being borne by the revenues of India. If the Government of India had a doubt in the matter, why did they not telegraph to him to enquire

what was the precise meaning of his telegram, and also to inform him, when they had learnt that precise meaning, that they desired to lay a protest before him? If the Government of India had taken that course there was not the slightest doubt that he should have waited until that protest had been laid before him; but it was clear that, having received no remonstrance from them after they had been told what was about to be done, he thought he was quite justified in going to Parliament and saying that he had received no opposition from that Government. He regretted that things took place as they did, because it would have been very much better that he should have had the opinion of the Government of India before him, especially as he gave them by his telegram every opportunity of laying their case, if they so desired, before the Government of the day. His personal position might be said to be somewhat difficult after that precedent, but he freely admitted that on that occasion the Government took the course which had been taken by the present Government; and he also admitted that he used at that time the expression which had been quoted, that he considered the war in the Sudan had arisen out of our occupation of Egypt. One noble lord who had spoken had said that it was not always very wise to be governed by precedents, because there might be bad precedents, and he was inclined to confess that the precedent he had set up was not a good precedent. (Hear, hear, and laughter.) He was free to admit that a good deal had happened since then, and that his views at present were certainly not precisely those held by the Government of which he was a member and by himself in those days. He was now very decidedly of opinion, after an experience of ten years, during which the safety of Egypt had never been in danger, that the expedition in the Sudan on which the Government had embarked was unnecessary, dangerous, and likely to lead to very unfortunate results. Far from believing that it was likely to be beneficial to Egypt, his opinion was that it was likely to be extremely injurious, and on that ground he thought it extremely natural that anyone connected with the Government of India should demur to spending Indian money on the enterprise. He noted that the Prime Minister made a remark the other day which seemed to place the present enterprise upon rather a different ground than that of the safety of Egypt, for he said that we were morally bound, as far as possible, to see that Egypt was not in a worse position, as regarded her possession of territory, than she was when we intervened in 1885, and when the Government of Egypt was advised to withdraw from the Sudan. Now that was not precisely the same consideration as the safety of Egypt, and when he heard Sir Alfred Milner quoted as an authority he could not help wishing that they could have the opinion of a far higher authority. (Hear, hear.) Their adviser in 1885 was not Sir Alfred Milner, but Lord Cromer, whose views he had had an opportunity of ascertaining from frequent discussion of the subject. No man had studied the subject deeper, or was more capable than Lord Cromer of taking a fair, an unprejudiced, and calm view of the matter, and he was very curious to know what advice Lord Cromer gave to the Government in regard to the present expedition. (Hear, hear). But there was a far more important point for consideration than the opinions of any former Secretary of State in this delicate matter between the Imperial Government and the Government of India. The Under Secretary for India seemed to think that the matter would be solved by the principles laid down by the present Secretary of State in the Despatch published in the Papers before the House. He was glad to admit that he thought both the tone in which that Despatch was couched and the nature of the proposals submitted, would tend to advance the solution of the matter. But he doubted whether, after all, the really practical difficulty would be thus met, for the Secretary of State used the words on which everything depended :—"If the circumstances are such that the Government of India supplying the troops has a distinct and special interest in the matter at stake." The whole difficulty was how they were going to decide that point. On what principles were they to decide that India had a distinct and special interest? Who was to decide? (Hear, hear). The Government of India not unnaturally winced under the decisions of the Government at home. They had strong opinions and they naturally formed those opinions with reference to Indian opinion, and he did not in the least complain that they sought to place their views before the Home Government strongly in the interests of the Indian taxpayer. But he agreed with the declaration that the ultimate decision, in this as in other matters, could not be removed from the Government and the Parliament of this country. It was a question of discretion in the application of a principle from which we could not swerve. The Imperial power was here, and it must remain here. But it was a power that must be used with the utmost circumspection and the greatest tenderness towards the opinion of the Government of India, because it was a power which was naturally somewhat invidious though necessary. India was not in the position of a colony with what was called a responsible Government; it was essentially a dependency, though one so great and with interests so important that the utmost care should be taken never to press the exercise of our supremacy, except in cases where it was really necessary, and where we were convinced that we were not raising in India a feeling altogether disproportionate to the advantage we might gain by insisting on our position. (Hear, hear). That was really the gist of the matter, and what he complained of was that in the present case the Government, for the sake of a principle, with which he agreed, had pressed very far a small matter in regard to which Indian opinion was very strong. He thought that in this case it was much to be lamented that her Majesty's Government, after receiving the protest they did from the Government of India, did not, while maintaining generally the principle involved, make some concession to them. In all these matters they wanted a hearty concurrence, so that no controversy might be raised in these matters between England and India. He agreed with the famous saying of the noble Marquess that India was not to be regarded as a barrack from which we might continually draw troops. We had a right to look to the Government of India for assistance in a time of great difficulty, but he thought it would be very unwise if we got too much into the habit of looking upon the Indian Army as a source of strength upon which we could lightly draw. The reasons were obvious. The army was not beyond the requirements of India, for, though happily there was great tranquility in India, and great loyalty among her native Princes, yet it was always possible that some sudden storm might arise, and it had been a maxim, therefore, that the Indian army should always be in a condition to take the field at a moment's notice. For that reason we ought only in case of great necessity to draw troops from India. (Hear, hear). He held that if there was any place in the world in which India had an interest it was Egypt. (Hear, hear.) It was not necessary to make a careful creditor and debtor calculation and thus try to lay down the precise fraction of interest in Egypt which should belong to India and which should belong to the home country. It was sufficient, he thought, to lay down the general proposition that the way to India lay through the Mediterranean and Egypt, always, of course, assuming that it was to the interest of India that the connection with this country should be maintained. Assuming that he did not see how it was possible not to admit that, as regarded Egypt proper, India had such an interest in Egypt that it was reasonable she should pay something. But he had always thought that in these matters they should, if possible, avoid controversies which had to be carried on in public. There was nothing more likely to injure the connection between the Government of India and the home Government than controversies, sometimes partaking almost of an angry character. The very business of the Viceroy and of the Secretary of State was as far as possible to so arrange matters that they should never come to a point where there was to be a point of difference which was to be displayed at all. That was the secret of the just and wise government of India. Quite apart from any political or Party feeling, he regretted that a matter of this kind should come before Parliament. Looking at the matter all round, considering the smallness of the amount in dispute, considering the fact that there were divergent opinions as to the proprietary of the expedition to the Sudan, considering the strong opinion of the Government of India, and, lastly, considering that Lord Cross had wisely given an extension of a sort of *quasi*-representative institutions to the Councils in India which increased the necessity for greater caution in this matter, he regretted that this controversy should have arisen.

Lord Northbrook.

The Earl of Northbrook said he had heard his noble friend make many speeches in this House, but he had never heard a

speech of his in which his power of debate and his adroitness in dealing with questions had been more conspicuously shown than in the speech just delivered. The point his noble friend had to explain was how it came to pass that, while he as Secretary of State for India had in circumstances almost precisely similar taken exactly the same course which her Majesty's Government had now taken, he was a party to the opposition to the vote which their lordships were now asked to pass; but hardly any words of his speech were devoted to answering that question. The noble earl talked about looking at the matter all round, but it seemed to him his noble friend's views depended upon the side of the House on which he sat. He did not think the House fully appreciated the position of his noble friend. Near his noble friend sat Lord Rosebery and the Marquess of Ripon. He presumed they were all going to vote against the resolution. (The Earl of Rosebery: "Hear, hear.") After the melancholy death of General Gordon, and when the Government had decided to advance to Khartum, Indian troops were, in pursuance of a resolution passed by both Houses, sent to Suakin. But on May 15, in consequence of disturbances on the frontier of India, the Government gave up altogether the expedition to the Sudan, but they continued for a year to keep the Indian troops at Suakin. He maintained that when the expedition was given up the necessity for the Indian troops ceased to exist. The Government of India took that view, and at the beginning of 1886 they wrote to Mr. Gladstone's Government, of which his noble friend was a member——

The Earl of Kimberley said the Government of India addressed their letter to Lord Randolph Churchill, who was then Secretary of State.

The Earl of Northbrook said the letter was addressed to Lord Randolph Churchill, but it was answered by the noble earl. (The Earl of Kimberley: "Yes.") The Government of India contended that, as the original intention of the expedition was given up, it was only fair that the whole of the expenses of the troops, who merely formed the garrison at Suakin, should fall on the British Government. His noble friend did not attempt to answer that argument; he only said he did not think it was a good thing to make application to the Treasury. Where was the consistency of his noble friend in going into the lobby against this resolution? (Hear, hear.) He personally did not think the Government had acted wisely in putting this small charge upon the Government of India—(Opposition cheers)—but having been a party to a similar course in the past, he could not go into the lobby against the Government. He welcomed the proposals made by the Secretary of State in his last despatch respecting the principles upon which the future military charges should be arranged. The principle of reciprocity had been laid down in the despatch, it had been accepted by the Government. It was a principle for which the Indian Government had always contended, and he thought the concession of the principle would give great satisfaction to the Indian Government and in India generally. It was, however, still left in doubt who was to settle whether there were or were not special interests on one side or the other. If that was left open they would have precisely the same controversies in the future that they now had, and no good would be done by the proposal of the Secretary of State. (Hear, hear.) He had gathered that the Government intended to take precautions that the "proposals should not remain a dead letter." The proposal of Lord Cross with regard to the employment of Indian troops was that the expenses should not be charged upon India without the consent of the Government of India. He presumed if that proposal was attached to the proposal of the Secretary of State for India there would be some arrangement that the Government of Great Britain should say what were British interests and that the Government of India should say what were Indian interests. That would be fair to both parties, and he did not see that there would be any danger in it. He regretted that Lord Kimberley had expressed dissent from the liberal view of Lord Cross; and he still more regretted it as Sir Henry Fowler, in the other House, had expressed entire concurrence in the opinion of Lord Cross. Mr. Balfour made another suggestion which was well worthy of consideration; he suggested whether the time had not arrived when they might with advantage to India and to England constitute some kind of tribunal of arbitration for the determination of this class of question—some tribunal in which the interests of Great Britain and India alike would be equally represented. If the Government were to make a declaration that it was their intention in connection with the Government of India to make some arrangement of that kind it would go, he ventured to say, a great way to counteract—he believed entirely counteract—any ill-feeling which had been raised in India about the miserable contention as to £30,000 for the troops at Suakin. He ventured to submit that for the consideration of her Majesty's Government. (Hear, hear.)

The Duke of Argyll.

The Duke of Argyll said no member of the House had had a harder and stiffer battle to fight on behalf of the Indian Treasury than himself, for it so happened that his tenure of the office coincided with the great organisation of the English Army effected by Mr. Cardwell and Mr. Lowe. At that time the principle was taken up that, as at least one-third of the Army was kept up for the sake of India, India ought to bear one-third of the whole charges, home charges included. He had a fierce battle to defend the Indian Government from that new doctrine which was pressed with great plausibility. He resisted it to the death, and with the assistance of Mr. Gladstone and other members of the Government, that erroneous and dangerous principle was negatived, and it had been negatived ever since. He believed that the principles distinctly expressed in the Despatch would place the Government of India in a better position than it ever before occupied. The charge was a just and a fair charge, and he could not help saying that he viewed with great satisfaction the change in the public mind on the whole of this question. It was not merely that the opinion of the Government had changed; the sentiments of the public had changed. At one time to which he referred there was no Party in the House of Commons to defend the Government of India from the attacks made on it. It was evident that the real objections raised on the other side of the House were to the operations on the Nile. (Hear, hear.) They denied that the Sudan advance could be brought within the category of measures for the defence of the Indian Empire. He must frankly confess that he looked upon the expedition with immense satisfaction. (Cheers.) Egypt would not be Egypt until the valley of the Nile was cleared of savages and her commerce thrown open to Europe. (Hear, hear.) So far therefore from feeling that Indian interests were specially injured in this case, he held, on the contrary, that India was honoured in having a part of those great operations which he trusted would bring within the boundary of civilisation those vast territories which were now desolated by the Mahdi. (Cheers.)

Lord Stanley of Alderley.

Lord Stanley of Alderley called the attention of the House to a speech delivered on February 13th, 1893, by the Marquess of Salisbury, in which he said—"All these are ways of saving the English Estimates, which no doubt might seem very smart and very ingenious to those persons who arrange the figures at the English Treasury, but would not be so satisfactory on the other side of the water. You must not measure a financial injury by the number of thousand pounds involved. If people feel that their money is being taken from them, it matters very little whether it figures as thousands or tens of thousands. I regret the arrangement very much; I cannot see any reason for it."

Lord Welby.

Lord Welby said he was disappointed with the speech of the noble marquess, because he recollected a speech which had been delivered by him some two years ago, in which, referring to the extent of the Indian cotton duties, he spoke of the danger England incurred of losing the favour of India. The noble marquess then addressed a general warning to their lordships, and said that it was idle to conceal from themselves that many causes were at work which should make them pause before they did anything to shake the confidence of the people of India in the absolute disinterestedness of our rule. (Hear, hear.) That speech had converted him, in a measure, from those opinions in which he had been trained. He was trained from his youth in the strongest Treasury traditions; he was taught that their master was the British taxpayer, and that their first duty was to do everything to make his burden light. But was there not some reason for arguing that they might be buying gold too dear, even if the Government established the soundness of the principles for which it contended. One

partner sent troops in aid of the other partner, charging only those additional expenses which would not be incurred if the troops remained at home—he believed that was the condition which had been generally observed. But he was aware that the Indian Government maintained that on certain occasions it had not been observed, one great occasion being that of the Indian Mutiny, when the whole cost of the English troops which India borrowed was thrown on the Indian Exchequer. He thought they must admit that high authority both in India and England had pronounced against there being such an interest as had been suggested, and it was very seldom that there had been such a general agreement, not only among experts, but in the press, and even in the press which supported the Government.

Lord ROSEBERY: Hear, hear.

Lord WELBY: The Government were not carrying out those wise maxims which the noble marquess used in the speech which he had referred to.

The Marquess of LANSDOWNE said that speech was delivered against a proposal to deprive the Government of India of a part of its revenues and force it to resort to taxation. The present proposal did not touch the revenues and would not require the Government of India to resort to one farthing of taxation. (Cheers.)

Lord WELBY said he quite agreed that that was so, but he thought the remarks of the noble marquess were applicable in view of the stress he laid on the necessity of showing to the people of India that the Government at home acted in all respects where India was concerned with the utmost disinterestedness. He was the last person in the world to regard this sum as a light one. It was true that the Chancellor of the Exchequer only reserved for himself a modest surplus, but that was very considerably in advance of the sum about which they were now speaking.

LORD SALISBURY.

The MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I have been much struck with the fate which has pursued noble lords opposite. In two instances of late they have been compelled to repeat the part of Balaam—they had been brought here to curse but they have remained to bless. (Hear, hear, and laughter). The matter before the House appears to me to be one to be determined, not according to sentiment or to feeling, but according to strict justice. I join most heartily in everything that has been said by noble lords opposite as to the necessity of convincing the multitudes of India of our sense of justice, and of our desire to do them justice and to respect their interests and their rights. But I have an equal feeling of respect for the interests and the rights of British taxpayers, and I do not think that the danger of neglecting the interests and the rights of the latter, and compelling them to pay that which in justice they are not bound to pay, is altogether inferior to the danger which the noble lord opposite has dwelt upon so earnestly as likely to arise from neglecting the interests and rights of the taxpayers of India. We admit that the sum involved in this question is a small one, which of itself would be of but small importance, but the payment of that sum involves a principle of great interest to the British taxpayer, and our experience of what occurred in Lancashire last year has shown us that, where there is a sense of injustice entertained by the British constituencies, questions of policy will not prevent them from striking a blow in favour of their own view of what is just. Our duty in this matter, therefore, is to observe the most careful and complete justice. The noble lord who has just sat down has dwelt upon the importance of not keeping to a principle if the sum involved by it is a small one. If the noble lord had acted upon that principle when he was at the Treasury I can scarcely say how much of his well-known activity in that department would have survived. (Hear, hear, and laughter). However, I do not believe that the finance of a great Empire, or even of a small concern, can be conducted on the principle that where the sum involved is but small every claim against it must be admitted. (Hear, hear). This question has been so thoroughly discussed, and the present is such an inconvenient time for discussing it, that I shall not enter very far into the matter, but I wish to ask your Lordships to consider what the real point at issue is. I have heard a great deal about the Sudan expedition, and I am quite prepared to defend the action of the Government in respect to it, because I believe that it will be of great benefit to Egypt and to India. But in moving the Indian troops we were not actuated by a desire to send them there for the purpose of their taking part in that expedition—in fact, not a single Indian solder has been sent to the valley of the Nile. The object which we had in view in moving the Indian troops was the defence of Suakin, and if that place had not been defended at the expense of the Indian taxpayer it must have been defended at the expense of the British taxpayer. It is true that at the time of the Sudan expedition was first contemplated I received a communication from his Imperial Majesty the Sultan of Turkey to defend Suakin if we found it necessary to leave that place during the continuance of the expedition; but that offer I then declined. I am almost now inclined to regret that we did not accept the offer, because had we done so the arguments we should have had to make use of in defending our position might have been of a less difficult character. (Hear, hear, and laughter.) The question, however, before us is this—Is the Indian or the British taxpayer to defend Suakin and to prevent it from being taken possession of by some other Power? In our opinion, the whole of the southern littoral of the Red Sea is of interest to India. It is true that a portion of that littoral is at present held by Italy; but, speaking of that territory as matters stood a few years ago, the whole of the southern littoral of the Red Sea depended upon Egypt for its defence. Can it be said in such circumstances that India has no interest in the southern shores of the Red Sea or of the Gulf of Aden, which, in a political sense, are merely continuations of the Suez Canal. If the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, or the Gulf of Aden fell into the hands of another Power it would be India, and not England, that would suffer the most, because the former would be deprived of her military supplies. Even the present arrangements with regard to the shore of the Red Sea shows clearly which part of the Empire has the greatest interest in that line of communication between this country and India. Aden is situated at the very mouth of the Red Sea, and the defence of Aden is paid for, not by the taxpayers of this country—it is entirely in the hands of India. This shows what an interest India has in the southern littoral of the Red Sea. I need scarcely refer to the precedents of 1801, 1876, 1882, or 1885, when expeditions were sent to the shores of the Red Sea, and when the ordinary expenses of the Indian troops employed in them, and generally something more, were charged to the Indian Treasury. Therefore, in the present circumstances, we might justly have called upon India to contribute something towards the preservation of her communications through the Red Sea. But we have called upon her for no contribution at all; all that we have done has been to ask her not to make money out of our request for the loan of a portion of her troops. If you refuse this vote the only result will be that the accounts of the revenue for India next year will show so much money gained by lending Indian troops to this country. (Hear, hear.) There is nothing that has occurred in the course of this Debate with which I more sympathise than the regret which has been expressed that this matter should have been made the subject of Parliamentary discussion and of party sophistry and ingenuity. It appears likely that such a discussion may do some little harm. It is not a very admirable thing—and, indeed, there is something rather squalid in the fact—that there should be a contest between the two parts of the Empire as to what share each should bear in the expenses of its defence. (Hear, hear.) Moreover, such a discussion must lead to the inevitable injury which, as the noble earl opposite has pointed out, must result from disclosing Departmental communications, which are not always couched in a judicial tone. I do not think that that injury will be avoided by flinging aside all questions of financial economy on the ground that the sum asked for is a small one, and, therefore, no matter what the principle involved may be, the claim ought to be acceded to. I do not think that that would be a wise way of avoiding the difficulty, or that in the long run it would even be for the benefit of India. (Hear, hear.) We must try to adopt some way by which these discussions may be avoided in the future. I have no doubt that Parliament will be able to fix upon some principle by which these contributions by the different parts of the Empire will be regulated. In this view the Government have adopted an absolutely stationary attitude with regard to this subject. We have had regard to precedent, and we have adhered entirely to the position which our predecessors occupied in connection with this question. The whole subject is under investigation by a Royal Commission, who, it may be hoped, will furnish

suggestions for regulations to which the Government of the day may be able to conform without any fear that the steps which they may think necessary for the defence of the Empire will be made the subject of discussions which may be injurious to the interests of that Empire. (Hear, hear.) I do not know whether I am out of order in referring to such matters on the present occasion, but I hope that I may be allowed to say that early in the present year I was so impressed in favour of such a course being adopted that I laid before my colleagues a proposal for the appointment of a tribunal which should be so impartially composed as to obtain the confidence of the taxpayers of both England and India, which should consider the relative interests and rights of the two portions of the Empire; but when we came to consider the details of the proposal we came to the conclusion that we could not carry such a scheme into effect until the Royal Commission had made their Report. I much regret that it was necessary to postpone the consideration of such a proposal, because I am satisfied that if it were carried into effect we should have reached a solution of the difficulty which would operate in a far better manner than the present system does, and would enable us in many ways to show our sympathy and generosity to our Indian fellow-subjects. (Cheers.) But, my Lords, the issue before you to-night is not even that. If you resolve that the money shall not be granted, after the House of Commons has come to an exactly opposite decision, obviously the first principles of the whole question will be in a state of the greatest confusion. It will add enormously to the difficulty of arriving at maxims and rules in which we may all agree, and make it far more difficult to prevent in the future the occurrence of these unpleasant discussions. I earnestly hope that your Lordships will follow the precedents uniformly set and vote for this Resolution, and so enable us with as little loss of time as possible to place the matter upon a footing which shall avoid the chances of any difference or any distrust, on a question which is comparatively small, arising between the peoples of these two great parts of the Empire.

Lord Rosebery.

The Earl of Rosebery: My Lords, I have been much too long a member of this House to engage your attention for more than a minute or two at the witching hour at which we have arrived; and certainly I have no wish to introduce any controversial matter more than is necessary into the debate which I think must have been singularly satisfactory to the members and supporters of this House. I do not recollect having ever heard a debate in which so statesmanlike a view had been taken of the responsibilities of public men in addressing themselves to a grave and delicate question than has been the case to-night. Personalities have been happily and conspicuously absent. I do not even deprecate the noble earl's allusion to the singular tenderness of his own conscience as compared with those of others. (Laughter.) We remember the old story of the Pharisee and the publican, and we are not particularly surprised to see that line of argument continued to the present day. (Laughter.) The noble marquess who has just sat down has, as is not unusual with him, supplied a totally new explanation of the policy which a united Government is pursuing. We have never heard before, in any speech or any public document, of the necessity of garrisoning Suakin. I look in vain in the despatch of the Secretary of State. I do not think I heard every word of the speech of the noble earl the Under Secretary this evening, but I do not recollect that that argument occurred in it, and I am quite sure it did not occur in the speech of the noble marquess the Secretary of State for War. The noble marquess has an agreeable way of springing these agreeable surprises on us, and I am one of the last to complain, because I think it adds largely to the interest and excitement of the debates in this House. (Laughter.) But when I am asked by the noble marquess as to who it is that should be responsible for the garrisoning of Suakin, and when I am told that this call for the Indian troops has really nothing to do with any attack on the Dervishes——

The Marquess of Salisbury; I did not say that. I said it had very little to do with it.

The Earl of Rosebery: Very well; very little to do with it. The primary object was the garrisoning of Suakin. I am quite willing to take that; but when I am told that, I have to ask myself how was it that the garrison had been depleted. What has occurred to empty the garrison of Suakin? And I am compelled to answer the question in this way—that the troops were required for a march against the Dervishes, and for that reason troops were summoned from India. Surely the noble Marquess does not greatly help his case by starting this new theory of the garrisoning of Suakin, which, after all, is exactly the same explanation in different words as we have had before. (Hear, hear). That, after all is the main gist of the matter. The noble lord who represents the Treasury, and in so agreeable and competent a way—(laughter)—told us with absolute truth that the gist of the matter lies in this—has the Indian Empire any interest in the expedition you are conducting in the Sudan? (Hear, hear). The noble Marquess says they must fill up the gap caused at Suakin. The two propositions come to exactly the same thing, and we who are interested in this matter, and who are anxious to deal justice to India in spite of the many precedents which have been quoted—and I think too much stress has been laid upon them—have to ask ourselves, what is the interest of India in the crushing of the Khalifa? We have heard a great deal about the security of the Suez Canal. We were told that the Suez Canal was the route to India, and that India had a direct interest in its preservation. But what we do not hear from any of the numerous speeches made on behalf of the Government is this—in what way the existence of the Khalifa or of the Dervishes menaces directly or indirectly, the security of the Suez Canal. (Hear, hear). I am quite ready to admit that India has a certain interest in Egypt. If you are going to press that argument it will take you a great deal too far. If you ask me in what foreign questions India has an interest and how far India represents our interest in a great many external questions, you will be led into a scale of contemplated expenditure on the part of India from which I think even the present Government would shrink. (Hear, hear). It would not be difficult to prove that all our Mediterranean interests are in the main connected with India. I cannot deny the direct force of the reasoning that would make it so, because if you had no Indian Empire you might get out of the Mediterranean altogether; but I should be astonished if the noble marquess, carrying out this principle to its logical conclusion, were to bring before Parliament a proposal for settling the expenses of the occupation of Gibraltar, and of Malta, and of the Mediterranean fleet on the revenues of India. Though they are vast, they are interests you can logically connect with India; but I defy anybody to connect this expedition against the Dervishes with the interests of India. (Cheers). If it were to crush a Muhammadan pretender on the frontier of Afghanistan, or in that region with which I am so painfully familiar, the Pamirs, I can imagine going to great risk and expense to put down a false prophet of that description. But the difficulty with this false prophet is to get at him—(laughter)—to find him, to penetrate the almost impenetrable deserts which surround him—deserts which have no connection, direct or indirect with India. (Hear, hear.) One speaker, I think it was the Under Secretary, quoted General Gordon as bearing on this point. I would advise him not to quote too much from General Gordon with regard to the Sudan. I have not all his works at my hand, but I remember a very powerful and vehement passage in which he speaks of the Sudan as the most absolutely valueless possession that any country could possess; that it was useless to any human being, and fatal to any Power that held it. I say, then, that I do not believe that you can prove by any process of logic, or by any process of sophistry, that India has the slightest interest in this expedition. (Hear, hear.) The noble marquess says we use strong language with regard to this proposition, and he warns us against disregarding the interests of the British taxpayer in this matter. Why, when you are flinging the money of the British taxpayer out of the window by handfuls—(hear, hear, and laughter)—do you suddenly discover reasons to justify the pilfering from India of this paltry £35,000? (Cheers.) It is not we who use strong language. It is your own papers who use strong language—(laughter)—The *Times*, the *Standard*, the whole of the provincial Conservative press; and I think, if I can rack my memory so far, it is only in the faithful *Daily Telegraph* that you can still find a supporter of your policy. (Hear, hear.) I do not know where you will find the interests of the taxpayer represented. If you go to Lancashire—I should not be particularly afraid to face the verdict of Lancashire. What I say is, you are speaking of a thing you cannot ascertain. You are pretending—for I am sorry to say it is a

pretence—to be consulting the interests of the British taxpayer in this operation, and in doing it you disregard the principles of Imperial policy, which the British taxpayer grasps because they are simple, and which he will not disregard or forget. (Hear, hear.) The British taxpayer knows, if you do not know, that in questions where the Government of India unanimously differ from us on a principle of liability, though we need not go the full length of the declaration of the noble viscount, which has made so great a difference in our relations with India, and to an enormous degree affects the value of the precedents which have been cited—though we need not go to the full length of that declaration, the British taxpayer knows, and we know, that in these questions of liability with India we owe it to our own honour and our own dignity to show a singular tenderness for the interests of India when we are judges, and judges in a case to which we are parties. (Cheers.) I shall not detain the House another moment. I will only say that I never with more satisfaction in my life gave a vote against a motion than I give a vote against the Resolution of the noble earl to-night. (Cheers.)

The House divided:—

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HOUSE OF COMMONS.

PETITION.

Anglo-Indian and Eurasian Regiments.—Petition of the Eurasian and Anglo-Indian Associations, for formation; to lie upon the Table.

COOPER'S HILL COLLEGE.

Mr. BHOWNAGGREE asked the Secretary of State for India, whether there was shortly to be a vacancy in the post of the President of the Royal Engineering College, Cooper's Hill; and, if so, whether, in appointing a successor, the claims of eminent civil engineers to fill the post would be favourably considered, as the college was an institution for the education of civil engineers.

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: There will be a vacancy next September in the post of President of Cooper's Hill College. The claims of all classes of officers, qualified to succeed to the vacancy have received full consideration and an appointment will, I hope, be shortly announced.

MEDAL FOR SERVICE IN CENTRAL AFRICA.

Captain BOWLES asked the Under Foreign Secretary what steps had been taken by her Majesty's Government for recognising and adequately rewarding the distinguished services of those officers and men recently employed under Sir H. H. Johnstone, K.C.B., in the successful expeditions against the slave dealers in the British protectorate in Central Africa.

Mr. CURZON replied that the issue of the Central African medal had been sanctioned to the officers and men engaged in the operations from 1891 to 1894 inclusive. The issue for the operations in 1895 was now under consideration. The services of the officers of Her Majesty's regular forces had been brought before the Secretaries for War and India with a view to their being recognised as entitling them, so far as the regulations admitted, to be considered as having been mentioned in the despatches. The question of any further recognition of services in consequence of this motion was being referred to the Secretary for War.

RAILWAY EXTENSION.

Mr. R. SOUTTAR asked the Secretary of State for India, whether the Government of India had at present before it any project for completing the earthworks for the extension of railway beyond New Chaman to Kandahar:

Whether any communication had been made to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan on the subject:

And, were any proposals being entertained by the Indian Government for construction of a railway from Gwadar, on the Mekran Coast, to Seistun, and to the latter place from Nushki and Chageh, on the recently demarcated Beluch-Afghan line of our extreme sphere of influence.

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: So far as I am aware, neither of the projects referred to by the hon. member is under the consideration of the Government of India, nor has any communication on the subject been made to the Amir.

THE INDIAN BUDGET.

Sir WILLIAM WEDDERBURN asked the First Lord of the Treasury, whether he would state what arrangements were being made to bring on the Indian Budget at a date when Indian matters could be properly discussed:

And, whether he would provide one day for general debate on Indian affairs on the Motion that the Speaker do leave the Chair, and one day for the discussion of the East India Accounts in Committee.

Mr. BALFOUR said he could not hold out any hope of being able to give more time than in previous years for the discussion of the Indian Budget. If the House would help the Government in their desire to facilitate business he hoped the discussion would not be thrown so late as had unfortunately been the case in some recent years.

Sir W. WEDDERBURN reminded the right hon. gentleman that the late Secretary of State (Sir H. Fowler) had intimated his intention of defending his action in regard to the cotton duties, and of criticising the action of the Government on the subject, and that this discussion would probably occupy the greater part of one night.

Mr. BALFOUR: I have not heard of that.

July 17*th*.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

COST OF THE SUDAN EXPEDITION.

Mr. J. H. ROBERTS asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether any information had been received from the Egyptian Government as to the expenditure already incurred in connection with the military operations in the Sudan; whether that expenditure was still being defrayed out of the ordinary revenue of Egypt; and whether it was anticipated that any proportion of the cost of the expedition, beyond the extraordinary expenses of the Indian garrison at Suakin, would have to be charged to the British Exchequer.

The CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER: No information has been received from the Egyptian Government with regard to the expenditure already incurred in connection with the military operations in the Valley of the Nile. It is presumed that this expenditure is being defrayed out of the various moneys at the disposal of the Egyptian Government, including the advance of £500,000 made by the Caisse de la Dette Publique. The question as to whether any proportion of the cost of the expedition beyond what I have already stated to the House will be borne by the British Exchequer is reserved for future consideration and adjustment between the British and Egyptian Governments.

July 20*th*.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

INDIAN RAILWAY EXTENSION.

Mr. ASCROFT asked the Secretary of State for India, if he was in a position to state what effect had been given to the promise made by him, that early attention should be given to the development of India by an extension of the railways.

Lord GEORGE HAMILTON: Since the date of the speech referred to by my hon. friend, considerable progress has been made in extending and accelerating schemes of railway construction in India, and amongst other measures, provision has been made for an expenditure during the three years ending March, 1899, of 27 crores of rupees on railway extension, a sum much in excess of the expenditure of the last three years.

In addition to this, favourable terms have been offered to the public for the further extension of Indian railways, by private agency, by the construction of branch lines forming feeders to the existing main systems. Any capital expenditure

in connection with such branch lines will be outside the limit of 27 crores before mentioned.

Under both these combined heads of expenditure works of construction are in progress, and a sum of about 12½ crores of rupees will have been expended on the extension of the existing Indian railway system during the present financial year.

July 21st.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

SIMULTANEOUS EXAMINATIONS.—PETITION.

Civil Service of India.—Petition from Benares, for open competitive examinations simultaneously in England and India, presented by Sir W. Wedderburn; to lie upon the Table.

THE PROVINCIAL SERVICES.

East India (offices of Presidency Magistrate, and Judge of the Presidency Court of Small Causes).—On the motion of Sir W. Wedderburn, a Return was granted for correspondence between the Government of India and Bombay and the Secretary o State for India on the subject o the exemption of the offices of Presidency Magistrate and Judge of the Presidency Court of Small Causes from the operation of the rules relating to the provincial services.

TRANS-FRONTIER RAILWAYS.

Mr. Maclean asked the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether, as the distance intervening between the present terminus of the Indian railway system on the south of Afghanistan and that of the Russian railway system on the north was only about 700 miles, and Russia was now making a further extension of the Transcaspian line in the direction of Herat, her Majesty's Government would consider the expediency of opening negotiations with the Afghan and Russian Governments for the construction of a line through Kandahar and Herat connecting the two systems, with a view to the completion of an overland railway to Calcutta.

Mr. Curzon: It would be quite premature at this moment to consider the expediency of entering into negotiations for the the construction of a line of railway beyond the frontiers of India to join a line that is either not yet commenced or only in the earliest stages of progress.

THE JHALAWAR CASE.

Mr. Herbert Roberts asked the Secretary of State for India, whether he would grant a public enquiry into the case of Mahárájá of Jhalawar, in such a form that the Mahárájá might have a full opportunity of making his defence:

And, whether this enquiry would include an examination of the charges made by him against the political resident.

Lord George Hamilton: The decision of the Indian Government which I confirmed in a despatch of the 1st of May is final, and I have no intention of reopening this case.

THE MAHARAJA OF JHALAWAR.

MOTION FOR ADJOURNMENT.

Mr. Herbert Roberts: I beg to ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House—(oh, oh)—for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance—namely, "The treatment by the Indian Government of the Mahárájá of Jhalawar and the unsatisfactory character of the enquiry into his case."

Mr. Clancy: I rise to ask a question on a point of order. The question to which the hon. member wishes to call the attention of the House is a year old, and the decision of the Government is three months old. Can this be called a definite matter of urgent public importance—(cheers)—and can any Motion be based on it?

The Speaker: I have enquired into the facts, and I do not think that the hon. member has quite accurately stated the dates; I think I cannot take upon myself the responsibility of saying that this is not a matter of urgent public importance.

The pleasure of the House not having been signified, the Speaker called on those members who supported the Motion to rise in their places. There being some doubt as to whether not fewer than 40 members supported the Motion.

The Speaker said: I must ask hon. members to stand while being counted.

In the process of counting Mr. W. Redmond called out "Obstructing the Land Bill," followed by cries of "Order."

The Speaker: The hon. member is supported by more than 40 members. (Opposition cheers).

Mr. Herbert Roberts, who spoke amid Nationalist cries of "Divide!" and "Order!" moved "That this House do now adjourn." He said that the case was an important one, because the issue involved the principle upon which the whole constitutional question of the position of the Indian native Princes rested. He contended that when such a dispute as this occurred a native Prince ought to have some opportunity of stating his case and making a defence before an impartial tribunal. The case divided itself into four periods. The first period began in 1884 and ended in 1887. The native Prince attained his majority in 1884, and was instituted as ruler in that year. A condition affecting the Mahárájá's rule was that until he gained more experience he was to consult the Political Agent on all important matters; and the second condition was that he was not to alter or reverse any measures that passed during his minority without the concurrence of the Political Agent. The whole point therefore was whether the Mahárájá had knowingly violated any of the conditions of his rule. Some friction arose during this period, and the then Political Agent brought two or three charges against him in 1887. One was that the Prince had put the Political Agent at his left hand instead of at his right hand at the durbar. The Prince replied that he had followed well-established precedent. In September, 1887, he was deprived of his ruling powers. The next period began in 1887 and ended in 1892. In 1890 the Mahárájá wrote to the Viceroy of India that he had not knowingly broken any of the conditions, and stated that the whole matter turned on the meaning to be attached to the phrase "important matters." In 1892 Colonel Trevor recommended that the Prince be reinstated subject to three conditions—(1) control of the revenue in Agent's hands; (2) consultation on important matters with the Political Agent; (3) that measures authorised by previous Councils under Agent's administration be not altered. In 1892 the Mahárájá was reinstated, and all went well for two years. In 1894 the Prince was reinstated with full powers, and there was no condition whatever——

Lord George Hamilton: Yes there was.

Mr. Herbert Roberts: With one exception—as I was going to say, if the noble lord will allow me. In September, 1894, Colonel Trevor wrote to Calcutta, recommending that the Prince should have full powers, subject to one condition: "that he will not nominate any new members of his Council without assent of the Agent to the Governor-General of Rajputana." Major Irwin, then Political Agent at Jhalawar, pointed out that this was a condition which it would be impossible for the Prince to accept. His letter contained the phrase: "I don't suppose he will govern his State any worse than some chiefs with full powers." A letter from the Government of India to Secretary of State, dated Simla, the 11th September, 1894, stated: "With reference to Lord Kimberley's despatch, dated the 2nd March, 1893, we have the honour to report, for the information of her Majesty's Government, that, acting on the recommendation of the Governor-General's Agent in Rajputana, we have ordered the restoration of full administrative powers to His Highness Mahárájá Rana Zalim Singh of Jhalawar." The Prince was restored to full powers, subject "to keeping the Political Agent freely and fully informed as to all matters with which he ought to be acquainted." Lord Elgin wrote: "I rely upon your Highness to keep the Political Agent freely and fully informed of all the matters with which he ought to be acquainted, and it is necessary that I should add a caution that, if, unhappily, the Government of India should hereafter be unable to approve of your Highness's conduct of the administration, the present decision will be liable to reconsideration." The hon. member contended that careful perusal of Blue-book forces him to the conclusion that, as the presence and conduct of Major Wylie, as Political Agent, had led to the deprivation of the Prince's powers in 1887, so the arrival of Captain Evans Gordon led to his deposition in February, 1896. The whole point which he desired to raise

was that the House of Commons should see that, when charges of this kind were raised against a native prince, he ought to have the right, like other mortals, to be heard before an impartial tribunal. (Cheers.) Anyone acquainted with Oriental ideas or with India, must know how important this consideration was. The Prince, like many other princes, had the misfortune of being surrounded by unscrupulous advisers who made him their tool. In dealing with the last stage—namely, the period from 1894 to 1896—he should put the matter briefly. Captain Evans Gordon arrived as Political Agent in 1895. The correspondence between him and the Prince divided itself, naturally, into what was trifling and what was important. As to the former, he might quote a few sentences. Captain Gordon writes: "It has been reported to me that Bhawani Lal has been appointed munsarim of the stables in place of Khwajukhan. I must remind your Highness that this man was turned out of the State in 1891 by the Political Agent and Council, with the approval of the Agent to the Governor-General, and that Colonel Trevor only allowed him to return temporarily to Jhalawar in 1892. Under these circumstances, to give Bhawani Lal an appointment without consulting me constitutes a breach of the conditions laid down in His Excellency the Viceroy's kharita, under which full powers were restored to your Highness." The Prince replied: "With reference to your letter of the 26th ultimo about Bhawani Lal's appointment, I have the pleasure to say that, when I had engaged him as kamdar to Moharaniji Rathorje, I believe I verbally mentioned the fact to Mr. Irwin, and as no objection was raised against the appointment I thought in giving Bhawani Lal the stables post (in addition to his own) there would be no objection. Had I known that there existed anything against his present appointment I would not have appointed him on the stables without your consultation. But, since the man has already been dismissed from his posts and the State, I hope you will kindly think the matter fit to be dropped now." Then they read: Captain Evans Gordon wrote to me yesterday and asked me to write to you about sweetmeats that have been collected at the palace. These sweatmeats should be used as soon as possible, as they won't keep, and will very likely give rise to bowel complaints. If you have no objection I will go and see them if you appoint some one to show them to me, and advise as to their disposal." The Prince replied: "Your letter of the 12th, No. 321, about sweetmeats that are said to have been collected at the palace. In reply, I have the pleasure to say that no sweetmeats are allowed to go on accumulating. What are prepared within the two previous days are consumed on the third day, as a rule. I may say that no sweetmeats are remaining now, all having been used up already in the above-mentioned order." He would come next to the more serious charges, and one of these was the charge of the withdrawal of four and a-half lakhs from the Treasury. By the arrangement of 1894 the Prince retained full control of the revenue. In December, 1895, the Indian Government sent a very reliable official to investigate and report. This was Colonel Crosthwaite, who was met by Captain Gordon outside the camp, and there obtained a report as to the Prince's conduct. The Prince complained of this to Calcutta, that he had been subjected to insult and high-handed treatment by Captain Gordon. These were the main charges Captain Gordon wrote: "Enclosed statements were voluntarily made to me. Three of the men gave me the information on 4th January. The evidence proves that orders were issued to the troops to assemble, that ball ammunition was distributed, and that the rifles were loaded. The place of assembly was the Fateh Pultan lines, near the grass stacks and close to the agency and agent to the Governor General's camp. The movement of the troops and preparations were well-known in the town, and the matter was at once reported to me from half-a-dozen different quarters. We know that his Highness feared arrest, and it is my opinion that any supposed attempt upon him would have been resisted. It was merely a chance that some violence did not take place, for had we, who were in the tent, unwittingly done anything to harm him, his Highness would have given the signal and trouble would most likely have ensued. The Chief came to the interview with a revolver, and he was constantly looking out through the chikhs to see whether his men were there. Ahmed Shah Khan, Akram Khan's son, was seen behind the agent to the Governor General's camp, with some Vilayatis while the interview was going on, by my own office people. If it is thought necessary more evidence can be obtained, but the officers and men are very much afraid of being left to the mercy of the Chief, and it is remarkable that any of them should dare to come forward. It is believed that all their names are in the possession of his Highness, and that he intends taking some measures to make them deny what they have said." Then Colonel Crosthwaite wrote: "On the 31st I had a letter sent to his Highness asking him to come and see me. He at first declined to see me unless I paid him a ceremonial visit. He then said he would come if I assured him that at the interview he would not be arrested and deported to Benares. I replied that he would at the conclusion of the visit be allowed to leave in the usual manner, and that, if his Excellency the Viceroy were to order his arrest, the arrest would be made publicly and not by inviting him to visit me in my tent. I also told him that I had been directed to warn him of the serious nature of the case against him, and to invite from him an expression of what he had to say in explanation or extenuation. After receiving this letter his Highness came and saw me. He had a revolver in his belt. The Political Agent and Captain Impey, the First Assistant, were present at the interview. His Highness's attitude was unfriendly and uncompromising, and he appeared to be very angry. He refused to shake hands with Captain Evans-Gordon. He steadily maintained that he was right in what he had done. The Viceroy had given him full powers and he had a full right to exercise those powers without interference. He had not, in his opinion, done anything contrary to the injunctions contained in his Excellency's kharita. With regard to his dealings with the Political Agent, he said that he was not to blame, he had been very good friends until Captain Gordon had shaken his fist in his (his Highness's) face, and told him to accept a certain official's resignation. I told his Highness that I considered his action in sending away his Dewan and some other officials just before my visit was wrong; that his Highness was bound, in accordance with the Viceroy's instructions, to furnish all material information, and that sending away the Dewan so that he should not speak to me was a violation of those instructions. His Highness said that he had sent the Dewan off on State business, and had done nothing unusual or contrary to the Viceroy's orders. I must mention that on the 30th December I wrote to the Maharaj Rana, objecting to his sending away the Dewan, to whom I wished to speak on State matters, and requesting his Highness to recall that officer to Patan. To that he replied, 'I do not think I ought knowingly to allow him (the Dewan) to speak against me behind my back with the object of promoting his desires and to increase the present difficulties.' He concluded by requesting me to put in writing any questions I wanted to put to the Dewan, and he (his Highness) would get his written reply. No attention was paid to my request for the recall of the Dewan, and on the 31st of December I wrote to his Highness and told him that I should like to see the Dewan on the 1st of January. His Highness replied that he had sent the Dewan off to a place 60 miles away, and he could not return within the time required." The Mahárájá's reply to the charges was: "In regard to the insults, hardships and high handed treatment to which I have been and am still subjected, although I wanted to send full particulars in a separate kharita, giving full and proper proofs, but I was ill, and while not yet fully restored to health, preparations were made to send troops against me, under the orders of the Political Agent and the Agent to the Governor General without any cause. Cavalry from Agar and troops and sowers from Deoli were sent for without any cause, and I have further heard that more troops have been ordered from Deoli. In accordance with the desire of the Political Agent of Bakhshi—namely, Paymaster and Commander-in-Chief of the troops, who was an old servant of the State, had been ordered to be dismissed without cause, and Bhawani Singhji, who is the son of a Jagirdar, and my mortal enemy, who declares falsely that he is the heir of the 'Gadi,' but in reality he is not the heir, because if he or his family had been the heir, why should the late Mahárájá Prithi Rajji have called me from Kathiawar and made me his heir, has been appointed 'Bakhshi' of the army. From the date of his appointment, at the suggestion of the Political Agent, he has been fabricating false evidence about the distribution of cartridges, by tempting some of the men in the army, by holding out hopes to them of promotion of rank and increase of salary, and by threatening others with bad treatment and harm. He has got together about 10 to 11 men, who by his inducement, having sold their faith merely

for the sake of their own welfare, or from fear of ill-treatment and harm are giving such false account of distribution of cartridges as cannot be even reasonably entertained or imagined. He causes it to be written down and then attested at the Agency. Daily men, most of whom have been punished, are called to the Agency, and their statements are written down. No attention is paid to the statements of those men who, fearing God and having regard to their conscience, decline to make false statements about the distribution of cartridges, and object that this had no foundation at all; nor is their statement taken down. I beg to bring to your Excellency's notice the fraudulent and deceitful proceedings of this man, and request that your Excellency out of kindness and a sense of justice will not take into your consideration their fabricated evidence and artful proceedings. I hope that no attention will be paid to their *ex parte* and false proceedings, otherwise I shall be unjustly subjected to great oppression, and Government after becoming aware of the true circumstances, which I am ready to prove, will have cause for regret. As for myself, I beg to state that I have neither done anything wrong nor intend to do so, and that I have done nothing but remain silent and carry out orders. The relatives of the Agency establishments have spread a report that the Dewan has been promised by the Political Agent that if he can get a Superintendency established, he (Political Agent) will become Agent there, and will make him Vice-President of the Council. On this account the Dewan of the State, the Political Agent and Kunwar Bhawani Singh have induced most of the army and other officials of the State to bring about mismanagement of the affairs of the State. In short they have induced them to act in opposition me, to and have thus subjected me to severe oppression. They have given such exaggerated accounts of my proceedings, that I am in fear of my life. They have so disappointed those men, who do not wish to act against me, that they are ready to leave service and go away. Even the English-knowing head clerk, who was in my service, was so much threatened that he resigned his appointment. Now I have nobody who knows English. I have therefore had to write this kharita in Urdu. As, in consideration of my good-will, I consider myself to be under the care and protection of Government, I have therefore given this brief account of my circumstances in the hope of obtaining justice. I trust that mercy will be speedily shown to me, so that my life may be saved, and all the high-handed treatment to which I have been subjected at the instance of the Political Agent under the advice of the Agent to the Governor General, and to which I may be subjected in future, may be put a stop to with the utmost promptitude." There was another important point he had to make, and that was that the Prince had expressed a strong desire to have a Commission of Inquiry into his case. On February 12, 1896, he wrote to the Viceroy: "I request that a commission may be appointed to make enquiries, and the members should be such as have no connection with the Rajputana Presidency." Was not that a reasonable request to make? In reply to that request the Government of India wrote: "The demand for a commission made by the Maharaj Rana overlooks the true issue. The Government of India, as the paramount power, are bound in their dealings with native States to hold the scales equal, and, while they secure the Chief in the exercise of the powers that belong to him, to protect his subjects from misgovernment by their misuse. Where it is necessary for the Government of India to interfere to secure good government, they must act on their responsibility and by the advice of their accredited agents, and can delegate their functions to no other authority or tribunal." He agreed with every word of that reply. The Government of India must "hold the scales equal" between the native rulers and the agents of Great Britain who reside with them.

Mr. Bhownaggree: That reply had reference to the relations between native chiefs and their subjects, and not to the relations between native chiefs and the officers of the Indian Government.

Mr. Herbert Roberts said he was dealing with the principle contained in the demand of the Mahárájá. He did not overlook the issue, because the scales could not be held equally between the parties to a dispute unless an opportunity of being heard was given to each party. "The Government of India must act on their own responsibility, and not delegate their functions to other tribunals." He quite agreed with that, but the Government were not asked to delegate their functions. They were only asked to hear both sides before coming to a decision. This principle was vital to the issue. Colonel Crosthwaite himself seemed to admit that, before the facts could be really understood and judged upon, a formal enquiry must be held. On this point he would direct the noble lord's attention to a paragraph in a letter of Colonel Crosthwaite in which the Prince was deposed, in which he said: "Without holding a formal enquiry it is impossible to say whether he speaks the truth."

Lord George Hamilton: What is Colonel Crosthwaite's own opinion?

Mr. Herbert Roberts: He said, "I do not believe it;" but that did not affect the point. The noble lord said that the decision arrived at in February last was final, and could not be reopened. He hoped, however, that the result of this discussion would be to cause the noble lord to reconsider the matter, and to give the Maháráj Rana some further and adequate opportunity of stating his case and defending his action. He did not desire to ask the House of Commons to pass judgment on either party. That was a matter for the Indian Government. But he did claim that the Imperial Parliament had a right to lay down the principle on which the Indian Government should act, and to say that, when such serious charges were made by a political agent against a native Prince, the latter should have an opportunity of defending himself before judgment was passed. Great interest was taken in this matter throughout India. The Indian press without exception was loud in protesting against what had occurred. The English press, without distinction of party, joined in demanding a fair hearing for the Rájá, and he believed that in pleading his cause he was but advocating a principle which was vital, in his opinion, to the continuance of those relations of goodwill and confidence between Great Britain and the Empire of India on which the welfare of the two countries depended.

Sir W. Wedderburn seconded the Motion. He said he wished to refer chiefly to two points, namely, the importance of this matter and the necessity of giving the Rájá an impartial trial. It had been said by the political officers that these proceedings were being very closely watched all over Rajputana. But he went further and said that the proceedings were being watched by every ruling Chief throughout India, not only with interest, but with anxiety and alarm. How could that fail to be the case when they saw one of their number deprived of his throne and exiled from his dominions, not for any maladministration proved in public enquiry, but upon the secret reports of the political agent who was on bad terms with the Prince himself. Our position in India depended very much on the goodwill of the native Chiefs. At the time of the Mutiny they were our sheet-anchor, and those who took an interest in our Imperial fortunes should be especially careful to remove all causes of unrest and alarm among the native Chiefs of India. He did not say there were not cases in which the Government of India ought to interfere—cases in which maladministration and tyranny were proved. In such cases it was not only the right but the duty of the Indian Government to interfere. He agreed entirely with the view that it was to the paramount Power alone that the inhabitants of native States should look for protection against misgovernment and tyranny; but what he contended for was that in this case no tyranny and no oppression had been proved against the Chief in question. He maintained that this was a personal quarrel, and that the charges of maladministration were somewhat of an afterthought. It was the misfortune of our political system in India that in every native State there were two kings, the Rájá on the one hand, who gathered around him the supporters of the "ins"; and the Political Agent, on the other hand, who gathered around him every faction who might be termed the "outs." The only story the Government of India heard was the story told by the Political Agent, whose only source of information was the faction whose very object it was to discredit the Rájá. His proposition was that this Prince had not had an impartial trial, because all the information on which the Government of India had acted was one-sided information, obtained from a tainted source. Such being the case, he was entitled to a fair and impartial hearing before the very serious step of deposing him was taken. The correspondence showed that there was

no real popular discontent. All the signs of popular discontent were wanting. What were the charges of misgovernment? The only thing he saw charged in the nature of maladministration had reference to the revenue settlement, and the remarkable part of that accusation was, not that the Rájá had taken too much from his subjects, but the statement of the agent absolutely was that he did not take enough. He only wished that the people of British India could make that charge against their Government. Another complaint was that the Rájá cut down expenses. Again, he could only wish that the Government of India would do the same thing, and so get rid of a great deal of objectionable taxation. The reports of the political officer did not lay any great stress on acts of maladministration. The Government of India practically gave away the whole case by saying that the question before them had been not so much specific acts of maladministration by the Rájá himself as his attitude towards the British Government. The whole case had arisen out of a quarrel between the political agency and the Rájá, and what was asked was that there should be an impartial enquiry. He had no special knowledge of this particular chief but it was in the interests of all the chiefs, and because he believed there was no more important thing for our rule in India than to cultivate and retain the goodwill and friendship of the native chiefs that he seconded this motion

Lord George Hamilton said that he could not question the right of the hon. gentleman to make exceptional use of the forms of the House to call attention to this question; but he thought everyone in the House would admit that he had chosen a singularly inopportune time. These papers had been in the hands of the House for some time past, and the matter might have been raised last week or the week before, next week or the week after, without in the least degree affecting the hon. member's case. (Hear, hear.) The hon. member had deliberately selected a day specially apportioned to the discussion of an important Bill in which many hon. gentlemen took a great interest. The question which the House wished to discuss was more or less limited by time, and if a motion of this kind was made in order to obtain a great slice of the time of the House for one day it was more or less an indirect attempt to kill that measure. (Hear, hear.) He thought he could demolish the whole of the hon. gentleman's case in half-a-dozen minutes. It was a matter of great surprise to him that two hon. gentlemen should read the Blue-book with such blind eyes. Every little detail in favour of the Mahárájá had been paraded before the House, but the main facts on which his deposition was based had altogether escaped their notice. He was the adopted son of the ruler of a small State created by the Indian Government, and on the death of his adopted father he was sent to a college at Rajputana. During the time he was a minor his State was governed by a native Council, under the superintendence of the Political Agent. The result of that was that the State greatly improved in prosperity, and the people became habituated to good government and administration. When he arrived at his majority the Indian Government only allowed him to undertake the functions of government on the condition that he did not attempt to upset the principles of government in force during his minority, and that in all cases of material importance he should consult the Political Agent. It was said that there was a personal quarrel between him and the Political Agent, but there had not been a single Government during the last fifteen years who had not come into collision with him, or a solitary Political Agent who had not had occasion to report him. The first Political Agent was Sir Edward Bradford, the present Chief Commissioner of Police, and all who knew him would say that he was a model Political Agent, combining firmness with a courtesy and charm of manner which was seldom to be found. The Mahárájá had not been two years discharging the functions of his State before Sir Edward Bradford had to report him as almost hopeless. He did all he could to keep him straight, but the young man disregarded his advice, and the only alternative seemed to be to depose him. The Indian Government declined to adopt that step, but considerably reduced his powers and addressed to him a very severe warning. That was under Lord Dufferin. The succeeding Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, had attention called to his conduct, and had to address to him a still stronger caution, pointing out that it might be necessary to remove him outside the State. This apparently had some effect upon him, and to a certain extent he became more amenable to advice, and shortly afterwards he was allowed to discharge some of the functions he had previously enjoyed. Later on, as he seemed more disposed to act on advice and to carry on his government on proper lines Colonel Irwin, the then Political Agent, recommended that he might be given the full powers he originally had. The one mistake was clearly the granting of those powers, because the moment he had them he lapsed back into his old habits. Captain Evans Gordon then appeared on the scene, and finding malpractices going on in every branch of the administration, protested against it. The Mahárájá then deliberately tried to bribe Captain Evans Gordon, and, the attempt being exposed, refrained from offering any apology to the Political Agent. The Prince took as his confidential adviser a native advocate who had been struck off the rolls, and the agent complained, the day after, that every form of maladministration was practised, he himself being boycotted, and people who had obtained access to him being dismissed. Altogether the Prince showed himself to be an impossible ruler, and in the end his deposition became absolutely necessary. He himself admitted that it was necessary most scrupulously to guard the rights and privileges of Indian princes. (Hear, hear.) At the present moment he was glad to say the relations between those princes and the Indian Government were most cordial. Through the assistance and advice of the political agents, we had to discharge a most difficulty duty. The administration of the native States was steadily improving, but, just as we had a duty towards the native princes, so had the Indian Government a duty towards the people who lived in the native States. We had taken from them the means of revolution, and we were, therefore, bound to prevent misgovernment. In the present instance, the Prince had refused to comply with the conditions on which alone we could accept his authority, and as he had set the Indian Government at defiance his deposition could not be avoided.

Mr. Clancy rose in his place, and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put."

The Speaker withheld his assent, and declined then to put that question.

Dr. Clark said the only charge of maladministration against this Prince was that he had attempted bribery, but it was clear from the Blue-book that the attempt had been made, not by the Mahárájá of Jhalawar, but by a Bengali Babu, who had been dismissed by the Resident and who had offered the new agent 15,000 rupees if he would refrain from further action against him. He protested against the Prince having been deposed without being heard in his own defence. Not a single fact showed, directly or indirectly, that the Mahárájá was a party to bribery. He thought there was plenty of territory already under the Crown, and that those native states should be kept for the development of native statesmanship.

Mr. H. J. Wilson said he was inclined to agree with the Secretary for India that this young man was a rather difficult person to deal with; and he thought it was hardly wise to invest a youth of 18, straight from college, with such powers. It seemed to him most important that the native princes should understand more clearly than they did the circumstances under which they were liable to be deposed. He had had the honour of being a member of the Royal Commission on Opium. A good deal of evidence was laid before it as to the rights the Government of India claimed to exercised over the native princes. He found——

The Speaker: Order, order! The hon. gentleman would not be in order in going into the general question of the relation between the Indian Government and the native princes. He must confine himself to the question of the deposition of the Mahárájá.

Mr. H. J. Wilson said he was merely going to point out that it was only on certain specified grounds of invalid administration that the native princes were interfered with. Neither in the papers presented to the House nor in the statement of the noble lord the Secretary for India was there any evidence of maladministration, cruelty, or injustice against the Mahárájá. It was to a large extent a question of jealousy, of good manners or bad manners, and of a personal quarrel between the Political Resident and this young man.

Captian Norton rose to continue the Debate.

The First Lord of the Admiralty rose in his place and claimed to move, "That the Question be now put."

The SPEAKER: Perhaps the hon. gentleman was about to withdraw his Motion?

Mr. HERBERT ROBERTS: Yes, sir; in the circumstances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

The Motion was, by leave, withdrawn.

July 24th.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

MADRAS PRESIDENCY EVICTIONS, ETC.

East India (Madras Presidency, Evictions),—Return (presented 11th June) to be printed. (No. 313.)